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Part I   Introduction 
  It would have been a saga of financial innovation and the coming of age of modern 
risk management. Within a few years’ time, private-label residential mortgage-backed 
securities, i.e. securities issued by private entities (hence “private label”) and backed by a 
pool of residential mortgages, rapidly grew from a niche segment to a multi-trillion-dollar 
business in a market jealously guarded by government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. The triumph over the “agencies” (i.e. GSEs) was once so close, until 
the entire private-label RMBS market (or “non-agency” market, as compared to the “agency” 
market) completely collapsed in the summer of 2007 (Figure 1). The credit market was 
rattled. The ripple effects of the credit crisis have surprisingly resulted in the collapse of the 
entire world economy.                 
Figure 1   Non-Agency RMBS Issuance in 2007
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 (Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, author’s own calculation) 
The spectacular failure of the non-agency market has quickly turned into a blame 
game. Investors who got burnt by the suddenly “toxic” assets claimed that the information 
disclosed to them was inaccurate and insufficient. They also blamed rating agencies for 
rubber-stamping the garbage securities with “AAA” ratings. Rating agencies pointed fingers 
at loan originators for originating bad loans and investment banks for providing inaccurate 
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information. Politicians and regulators were abhorred by trillions of dollars of CDO, CDO 
square and CDS that were so complex and opaque that pricing and unwinding them became 
an impossible mission. They were not immune to the blame game either. They turned a blind 
eye to the financial alchemy that led to the collective suicide of the entire financial industry.     
At the center of the blame game is securitization, which has been condemned as an 
evil invention that enables greedy investment bankers to sell toxic mortgages disguised as 
AAA-rated securities. Although there are a lot of talks about what has gone wrong with 
securitization, unfortunately it seems that most of the criticisms on securitization of mortgage 
loans so far have been based on a simplified theoretical securitization model that has failed to 
capture the real dynamics of the actual transactions in the market. This paper fills the gap and 
provides a transactional analysis on non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities issued 
before the credit crisis.    
Before diving into the details, it should first be made clear what has not gone wrong 
with the securitization process. The fundamental idea of securitization remains sound with 
respect to RMBS securities. Through “slicing and dicing” a future stream of cash flow into 
smaller streams of cash flow with different risk profiles, maturities and interest rates, the 
securitization process creates value by generating a higher demand for the total cash flow, in 
the same way that selling chicken pieces generates more profit than selling a whole chicken.
1 
The basic idea of risk-based pricing is valid, too. Even if subprime loans inevitably perform 
worse than prime loans, the additional risk could be mitigated through legitimate credit 
enhancement techniques such as overcollateralization, excess spread and the 
senior/subordinate structure.
2       
                                                 
1 Allan Sloan, House of Junk, Fortune, Oct. 29, 2007, at 117. 
2 For example, one credit enhancement technique is over-collateralization. An issuer may issue bonds with a 
total principal of $100 million backed by a mortgage pool of $104 million. In addition, as the interest rate 
charged on mortgage loans is much higher than the required rate of return on mortgage-backed securities, a 
certain discount is possible. For an introduction on credit enhancement techniques, see Chapter 6 of THE 
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But these are only true if you know what you are slicing and dicing.  The soundness 
of securitization hinges upon the question whether the future performance of the underlying 
cash flow could be predicted correctly so that the deal structurer could use various credit 
enhancement techniques in his arsenal to configure the profiles of the securities he creates 
accordingly and investors could also properly price the securities. During the credit crisis, it 
turned out that the predictions about the performance of the underlying mortgage pools of 
RMBS securities were deadly wrong. Investors lost confidence and the entire market 
collapsed within a matter of months. 
Two aspects of the pricing mechanism could have contributed to the massive 
mispricing in the credit crisis. First, the disclosed information on the mortgage-backed 
securities may be insufficient and/or inaccurate to make it impossible for investors (or rating 
agencies on their behalf) to correctly gauge the risks. Second, the pricing/prediction 
techniques used by investors (or rating agencies on their behalf) may be simply flawed. This 
paper touches upon both. It analyzes the structures of the RMBS transactions and the motives 
and liability exposures of key transaction parties in the securitization process. It also provides 
a description on what information has actually been disclosed during the securitization 
process, to what extent such information has been verified through due diligence, and how 
rating agencies, acting on behalf of investors, use such information.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part II provides an overview of 
the non-agency RMBS market and a closer look at how transactions are structured. Part III 
describes three different disclosure activities in relation to mortgage-backed securities, i.e. 
disclosure to rating agencies, mandatory disclosure to investors under federal securities laws 
and voluntary disclosures under investment contracts or to private data vendors. Based on the 
discussions in Part II and Part III, Part IV analyzes the role of key transaction parties in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Frank J. Fabozzi eds., McGraw-Hill, 2006) (hereinafter 
referred to as MBS Handbook).  
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securitization process including investors, loan originators, rating agencies and investment 
banks and examines the merits of various arguments regarding the cause of the credit crisis. 
Part V summarizes several recent proposals to enhance the securitization process, followed 
by the author’s comments. Part VI concludes the paper.  
Part II   Market Overview, Transaction Types and Deal Structures 
1.  Mortgage Market Overview  
A.  A Classic Mortgage Securitization Model 
  In a lot of economies, and which is still the case in the United States to a certain 
extent, banks originate mortgage loans and keep them on their balance sheets until maturity. 
There is no secondary market for mortgages. However, banks holding mortgages pose some 
problems. To start with, they need to have stable deposits to fund them. And there is a serious 
maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities. Banks also want to boost their 
profitability by doing new business instead of passively holding a pool of mortgages and 
collecting their monthly payments.  
The solution is to create a secondary market for residential mortgage loans. One may 
think that mortgage loans could be traded on a whole-loan basis, i.e. one bank would sell a 
portfolio of mortgage loans to another bank. This often happened between a small bank and a 
large bank. However, whole loan trading could not create an active secondary market because 
the demand for mortgage loans was confined to a small circle of banking institutions.  
  Here enters the brilliant idea of securitization. A textbook example of mortgage 
securitization almost always starts with a bank manager feeling tied up with a pool of 
mortgages producing stable but unimaginative monthly cash flows. The manager decides to 
sell off the mortgage pool through securitization. Depending on the types of assets involved, 
securitization may adopt different transaction forms. In the non-agency mortgage market, the 
trust structure described below is the most prevalent if not the exclusive structure. The bank 
sets up a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”),  i.e., a common law trust, and then sells the 
mortgage pool to the SPV on a non-recourse basis. The sale must achieve the status of a “true 
sale” so that the bankruptcy of the originator will not affect the already securitized mortgage 
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loans. The SPV issues a series of securities of different risk attributes backed by the mortgage 
portfolio. Rating agencies are brought in to judge the credit-worthiness of the securities. After 
securitization, the SPV is administered by an institutional trustee. The mortgage portfolio 
continues to be “serviced” by the originator or a third-party servicer, which collects monthly 
payments from the borrowers and handles defaults and foreclosures. The bank gets paid with 
the sales proceeds of the securities offering and can start new business with the money. 
Investors get a piece of security with the exact interest rate, credit profile and maturity they 
want. Everyone is happy.     
 
B. GSE-Sponsored  Securitizations 
Although the securitization of many other types of assets may still follow the classic 
originate-to-securitize model described above, this has not been the case for residential 
mortgages. Until very recently, the secondary mortgage market has been dominated by two 
mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
3 Both are privatized government sponsored 
agencies (“GSEs”) chartered by the U.S. Congress. The GSEs purchase mortgages 
                                                 
3 A third entity in the market is Ginnie Mae, which is directly owned by the U.S. government instead of being 
merely “sponsored” by the U.S. government. Ginnie Mae does not itself issue mortgage-backed securities. 
Instead it guarantees mortgage loans borrowed by qualified middle to low income families. These loans are then 
pooled and securitized by qualified Ginnie Mae issuers. The debt of Ginnie Mae is expressly guaranteed by the 
full faith and credit of the U.S. government. See information about Ginnie Mae on its website:  
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/about.asp?Section=About.  
Borrower 
Borrower 
Borrower 
Borrower 
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Figure 2 Classic Originate-to-Securitize 
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conforming to their standards from mortgage lenders and in return either pay the sellers in 
cash (“cash program”) or with GSE-issued securities backed by the same pool of mortgages 
sold by the sellers (“swap program”).
4 Under the swap program, the GSEs guarantee 
payments on the mortgage-backed securities. If the mortgage pool could not generate 
sufficient cash flow to support payments to securities holders, the GSEs will make up the 
difference. The GSEs will also periodically issue securities guaranteed by them and backed 
by mortgages purchased under the cash program.  
Although the GSEs “securitize” the mortgage pools, they do not need the blessings of 
credit rating agencies. The market has for a long time believed that the US government 
implicitly guarantees their debts.
5 Further, securities issued by the GSEs do not have the 
senior/subordinate structure. Each piece represents an undivided interest in the mortgage 
pool.
6 With the GSEs shouldering the credit risks, investors can focus on other risks, in 
particular, prepayment risks. When interest rate increases, borrowers hold on to their 
mortgages and the value of the mortgage-backed securities decline. When interest rate 
decreases, borrowers refinance their mortgages. Investors get paid before maturity and have 
to find other investment opportunities in a low-interest-rate environment.  
Here is how securitization helps again. By pooling many of these mortgage-backed 
securities issued by the GSEs into another SPV and slicing and dicing the combined cash 
flow, an issuer may use the SPV to issue new securities backed by these securities with 
different interest rates and maturities, which are called collateralized mortgage obligations 
(“CMOs”).
7 Under the new structure, some securities are paid off before others, although the 
                                                 
4 See Task Force on Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosure, Staff Report: Enhancing Disclosure in the 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets (2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/disclosure.pdf, 15.   
5 Id., 8.   
6 Id., 13.  
7 See Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth and Its Future Potential, in A 
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000), 36-37. For an introduction to 
CMO, see Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, Examining the Growth of the Collateralized Mortgage 
Obligation Market, http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/leadership/whitepapers/cmo.pdf.  
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purpose is not to shift credit risk, which is guaranteed by the GSEs, but to shift the 
prepayment risk. The structure is defined as a “real estate mortgage investment conduit” 
(“REMIC”) under the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984
8 and enjoys 
pass-through status instead of being taxed at multiple levels after the enactment of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.
9    
C.  Market Segmentation and the Room for Private Players 
Because the GSEs allegedly enjoy implicit guarantees from the US government, 
similar mortgage securities issued by private entities do not stand a chance in competing with 
GSE-sponsored securities. However, as the GSEs only purchase mortgages of a certain credit 
quality (often called “prime loans”) up to a certain principal amount (“conforming loan 
limit”)
10, their power could not reach two segments of the market. One is a market for loans 
exceeding GSEs’ conforming loan limits (“prime jumbo loans”), which are extended to 
borrowers with good credit to finance the purchase of bigger-than-usual houses. The other is 
a market for loans to borrowers who cannot get a prime loan. Subprime loans are offered to 
borrowers who have a blemished credit history (e.g. having a credit score of less than 620, 
which is usually the cut-off score for prime loans
11) but who are willing to pay a higher 
interest rate for the loan. As Figure 3 shows, a new type of mortgage in the below-prime 
market has grown into prominence since 2002 – “Alt A” loans are offered to borrowers who 
have relatively good credit history but could not satisfy all the GSE underwriting standards 
for reasons such as limited or low documentation of income, higher loan-to-value ratios, 
                                                 
8 Pub. L. 98–440.  
9 The enactments of both acts were the results of heavy lobbying efforts by several investment banks. See 
Ranieri, supra note 7, 37-38.  
10 See MBS Handbook, 7-8.  
11 See MBS Handbook, 99.  
- 8 -  
variable incomes, second house purchase, etc.
12 The line between an Alt A loan and a 
subprime loan is not always clearly drawn and originators often have more refined categories 
than the Alt A/subprime dichotomy in the below-prime world.
13  
 
Figure 3  Growth of Non-Agency RMBS Securities
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(Source: Inside Mortgage Finance)  
D.  The Boom and Bust in the Non-Agency Market 
 In the non-agency market, private issuers pool non-conforming mortgages (e.g. prime 
jumbo, Alt A or subprime loans) and issue mortgage-backed securities backed by the 
mortgage pool. These securities are issued as multi-class REMIC securities with a 
senior/subordinate structure. The subordinate tranches will serve as credit enhancement for 
the senior tranches. Because of the existence of credit risk, the securities are rated by rating 
agencies. This may still not be enough. In earlier times, external credit enhancement 
techniques such as bond insurance were often used.
14  
                                                 
12 See MBS Handbook, 9. Investment properties are fairly rare in agency and jumbo deals but very common in 
Alt-A deals, which may have as much as 50% of investment properties but the average percentage is 20%. See 
MBS Handbook, 99.  
13 For example, one product area consists of loans to borrowers with both impaired credit and les rigorous 
documentation under the general umbrella of Alt-B. See MBS Handbook, 9.  
14 See Standard & Poor’s, U.S. Residential Subprime Mortgage Criteria, 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/RMBSSubprime_092004.pdf, 65 (analyzing the 
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Until very recently, the non-agency market was quite small compared to the agency 
market. The GSEs have been vigilant in guarding their dominant status by lowering their 
underwriting standards and increasing their conforming limits.
15 After a few years of 
prosperity, the non-agency market almost collapsed in 2000 due to poor performance of the 
2000 vintage (i.e. loans originated in 2000) and the temporary liquidity crisis caused by the 
collapse of Long Term Capital Management.
16 The interest rate cuts in early 2000s saved the 
industry. The low-interest environment led to massive refinancing of mortgage loans by 
borrowers and the non-agency RMBS market quickly revived. However, as Figure 4 shows, 
the agency issuance volume also picked up in 2000 and 2003 at the same pace and the market 
share of the non-agency issuance remained almost unchanged.  
 (Source: Inside Mortgage Finance) 
  Figure 4 Comparison with Agency Issuance 
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structure of a transaction with bond insurance). See also Adelson & Jacob Consulting, LLC, The Sub-prime 
Problem: Causes and Lessons, http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Sub-prime_Problem-
Causes_&_Lessons.pdf, 3 (Claiming that until 1997, the vast majority of home equity MBS had used bond 
insurances). 
   
15 See MBS Handbook, 111.  
16 See MBS Handbook, 366. See also, Standard & Poor’s, Subprime Mortgage Lenders Transition In A Stressed 
Mortgage Cycle, May 8, 2007.   
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The real breakthrough came in 2004
17, when the accounting scandals of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac broke out and they were financially constrained in buying more 
mortgages.
18 Equipped with excessive liquidity but facing a troubled buyer of their prime 
mortgages, many traditional prime loan originators significantly expanded their non-
conforming loan programs.
 19  New players also entered the market. In the ensuing two years, 
non-agency issuance represented almost 50% of the total RMBS issuance until it was 
discovered in early 2007 that many subprime mortgages originated in 2006 would quickly 
default almost immediately after origination.
20 The early payment default shock caused a 
tightening of loan underwriting standards, which forced many borrowers of adjustable rate 
mortgages to default once their monthly payments spiked because they could not refinance 
their mortgages anymore. More defaults caused a decline in housing prices and even more 
mortgage defaults. Eventually the poor performance of the non-agency RMBS securities 
caused a total shutdown of the market in the second half of 2007. The market remained 
effectively closed in 2008 with almost no new securitization activity in the entire year.
21        
                                                 
17 The expansion began in the later half of 2003 as there would usually be a few months’ gap between a loan’s 
origination and securitization.  
18 See Paul Muolo and Mathew Padilla, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND 
CREDIT CRISIS (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 185. 
19 For example, Countrywide, once the nation’s largest independent mortgage lender, primarily made traditional 
first-lien home loans to individuals with strong credit until 2003. According to Countrywide staff, there was a 
significant “culture change” in or about May 2003. The company expanded aggressively into making non-
conforming loans ever since. See In re Countrywide Financial Corporation Securities Litigation (filed 
complaint), 2009 WL 222002 (C.D.Cal.), 25.    
20 See Yuliya Demyanyk and Van Hemert, Otto, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (August 19, 
2008), 1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396. (showing the actual delinquency rates for 2001-
2007 vintgages) See also, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 16 (Reporting that many originators did not have 
sufficient liquidity to fulfill their repurchase obligations).  
21 According to a search in the SEC’s EDGAR filing system, only a few prime jumbo loan deals were able to 
come through in 2008 as the prime jumbo sector was largely insulated from the below-prime sector. Most of the 
issuances in 2008 were re-securitization transactions under which pieces of existing RMBS securities were 
pooled and re-securitized.  
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2.  Primary Market: Non-Agency Loan Origination 
A. Originate-to-Sell  Model 
At the inception of the secondary mortgage market, the purpose of securitization was 
arguably to assist banks to release capital from their vast mortgage holdings. Consequently, 
the secondary market was supposed to be complementary to the banking system.
22 Over the 
years, the success of mortgage securitization, especially with the blessings of the GSEs, has 
transformed the supply and demand relationship between the primary market and the 
secondary market. It is no longer the case that the secondary market absorbs any surplus that 
banks are not able to hold with their own balance sheets. Neither is the case that the 
secondary market buys whatever banks originate. The whole relationship has been reversed. 
Banks originate mortgage loans because they want to sell them to the secondary market. As 
marketability of the loans is their primary concern, their origination activities will follow the 
demand for particular types of loans in the secondary market.  
The creation of this originate-to-sell (or more popularly known, originate-to-
distribute
23) model has fundamentally transformed the mortgage business. Perhaps the most 
important change is that banks are no longer needed to originate the loans. If an originator 
can quickly sell off the mortgage loans it originates, it does not need deposits to fund its 
operation. An originator no longer profits from the difference between the interest rate it 
charges on its loan portfolios and the interest rate it pays on the deposits. Instead, the profit 
comes from the difference between the proceeds from selling the mortgage loans and the 
costs for making these loans. Mortgage business becomes not that different from any 
manufacturing business.       
                                                 
22 See Ranieri, supra note 7, 32.  
23 This paper prefers using “originate-to-sell” because “originate-to-distribute” seems to suggest that the 
originator securitizes the loans and “distributes” the securities. As shown in this paper, more often than not, 
originators sell their loans to other bigger originators or sponsors as whole loans rather than securitizing them. 
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Appendix 1 lists the top 20 originators in each major category of the non-agency 
market for the year 2007. Although most of the companies on the lists have been on the top 
list for the past few years, their relative ranking in 2007 may not be representative of the past 
years because all loan originators have significantly reduced their origination volume since 
the second half of 2007. Many companies on the list have already been bankrupt or closed 
and those left have either virtually shut down their operations or have switched to originating 
prime mortgage loans or FHA/VA mortgage loans. FHA/VA mortgage loans are loans 
extended to qualified low and medium-income families. These loans will be guaranteed and 
securitized by Ginnie Mae, which is an entity explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of 
the US government.
24 
Many originators on the top list are not banks. In particular, most of the originators of 
subprime loans are not traditional bank lenders while there are a higher percentage of 
commercial banks on the prime jumbo originator list. Large bank originators may choose to 
retain some loan portfolios and securitize the rest while non-bank lenders virtually sell all 
their loan portfolios because they do not have a depository base to carry them.
25 Some 
originators are owned by investment banks as a result of acquisition during the boom years. 
Although some are savings banks or affiliates of banks, their operations are not primarily 
funded by deposits. For example, HSBC Finance is a consumer finance company acquired by 
HSBC years ago and is financed through debt offering and borrowing.
26 Countrywide, once 
the largest independent mortgage lender in the United States before it was acquired by Bank 
of America, used to be largely funded by borrowings, too.
27  
                                                 
24 See supra note 3.      
25 See MBS Handbook, 16.  
26 See annual reports of HSBC Finance.  
27 See, for example, 2006 annual report of Countrywide.  
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B.  Financing for Non-Bank Originators  
  The financing of a non-bank mortgage business is not different from the financing of 
a manufacturing business. The primary financing need is short-term in nature: an originator 
needs to fund the mortgage loans during the period between origination and sale. Large 
sophisticated originators have access to the capital market for such financing needs. They 
may issue short-term notes or enter into securities repurchase arrangements. One important 
source of funding in the capital market is the issuance of asset-backed commercial papers. An 
issuer will set up an SPV and inject mortgages into the SPV. Backed by the mortgages, the 
SPV will issue asset backed commercial papers (“ABCPs”). The mortgages are sold off 
periodically and the commercial papers are either repaid or extended for another term.
28 
  For originators that do not have ready access to the capital market, borrowings from 
warehouse lenders satisfy their short-term financing needs. An originator may set up several 
revolving facilities with warehouse lenders. A popular approach is to enter into a repurchase 
arrangement with the lender under which the originator sells the mortgage loans it originates 
to the lender according to a pre-determined pricing mechanism. The originator at the same 
time promises to repurchase the mortgage loans back from the lender after a certain period of 
time (e.g. 90 days). The lender acts as a “warehouse” for the loans before they are sold or 
securitized. The primary purpose of entering into a repurchase arrangement instead of a 
secured lending arrangement is to avoid bankruptcy risk. Although the Uniform Commercial 
Code will typically re-characterize a repurchase arrangement as a secured lending 
arrangement,
29 the industry believes that this particular type of arrangement is protected by a 
special treatment clause under federal bankruptcy laws.
30 
                                                 
28 See Moody’s, Moody’s Approach to Rating Single Seller Mortgage Warehouse Structures, January 5, 2005.   
29 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1).   
30 See Brief of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, In re American Home Mortgage 
Holdings, Inc., et. al., http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/briefs/2007/AmHomevCSFB.pdf.   
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  This type of warehouse lending is considered by many lenders to be a safe business 
because the collateral for the loan is highly marketable mortgages. Warehouse lenders also 
protect themselves through various contractual arrangements. If a mortgage loan is found to 
have documentation deficiencies, the lender may resell the loan back to the originator 
immediately. If a mortgage loan defaults, the lender is also entitled to dump the loan back to 
the originator.                 
  The failure by non-bank originators to sustain their short-term financing channels was 
the direct reason why many non-bank originators failed. During the credit crisis, the entire 
ABCP market was also shut down. As the default rate increased, warehouse lenders became 
concerned about their collateral and cancelled their warehouse facilities to originators. At the 
same time, they resold defaulted mortgages back to originators. Facing with mounting 
repurchase requests and little demand for their mortgage loans from the secondary market, 
originators have only one choice – bankruptcy.      
Figure 5 Failure of Mortgage-Related Companies 
Year  Failed  Acquired 
2009 51  11 
2008 120  37 
2007 160  43 
2006 27  20 
2005 9  7 
2004 9  8 
2003 11  5 
    (Source: www.mortgagegraveyard.com) 
C.  Mortgage Brokerage and Correspondent Lending  
  Large originators dominate all three sectors of the non-agency market. However, they 
are not “originators” in the usual sense. One survey of all mortgage loans originated in 2007 
(including both prime loans and non-prime loans) suggests that 28.2% of the loans were 
originated through mortgage brokers, 28.6% through correspondent lending relationships and 
only 43.1% through the originators’ own retail channels.
31 Another survey in 2007 claimed 
                                                 
31 See THE MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 2008 (Financial World Publications, 2008).  
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that 58% of US residential mortgage loans originated in 2006 were through mortgage 
brokers.
32 The percentage of brokered loans and correspondent loans in the non-agency 
market is not available but is believed to be much higher than those sold to the agency market. 
During the height of non-agency RMBS market, some subprime lenders even shut down their 
entire retail lending channels and operated exclusively on a wholesale basis.
33 
  Lightly regulated at the state level, mortgage brokers often claim that they enjoy the 
status of independent contractor and act as the information conduit between lenders and 
borrowers.
34 A mortgage originator maintains relationships with thousands of independent 
brokers across the country. Brokers solicit borrowers and collect the information required for 
loan approval such as borrowers’ FICO scores, income information and property appraisal 
reports. They then submit the loan application package (often over the internet) to one of the 
mortgage originators they conduct business with for approval. Funding will be provided once 
the loan is approved. 
  Correspondent lending is for small lenders to participate in the mortgage origination 
business. A small lender establishes a correspondent lending relationship with a large lender 
and from time to time sells its loan portfolios to the latter. The small lender will utilize the 
same underwriting standards of the buyer. The buyer will implement various quality control 
measures such as periodical review of lending process of the seller and complete re-
underwriting of a portion of the purchased loans. 
  The engagement of mortgage brokers and correspondent lenders provides obvious 
benefits for the originators. The mortgage pool backing an RMBS issuance always consists of 
                                                 
32 See Wholesale Access, Handout from the 2007 MBA Convention, http://66.225.31.160/wp-
content/uploads/file/wac_final.pdf. 
33 See 2006 annual report of New Century Financial Corporation, available through the SEC EDGAR filing 
system. 
34 For example, Massachusetts’ mortgage broker licensing law clearly provides that mortgage brokers are 
independent contractors but not agents of either the borrower or the lender. 209 CMR 42.16. See also Harry 
Dinham, Prepared Testimony on “Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home 
Foreclosures” Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 
http://www.fambpalmbeach.com/GovAffairs/dinham%20testimony.pdf, appendix 1.  
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mortgages from different regions of the country due to requirement for geographic 
diversification. Without mortgage brokers and correspondent lenders, mortgage originators 
will have to maintain a national operation, which is only feasible for a few national players. 
Second, mortgage brokers are like employees of the originator paid on a commission basis. 
The originator could keep their overhead cost at a low level since there is no cost if a broker 
does not generate loan deals.
35 Third, an originator could easily expand its business and 
increase its production volume by signing up with more brokers and correspondent lenders, 
who are always willing to do business with anyone that wants to buy their mortgage loans.  
3.   Secondary Market: Non-Agency Mortgage Securitization  
  In the non-agency market, after a pool of mortgage loans are identified, they are 
converted into securities through securitization and sold to secondary market investors. 
Unlike the issuance of GSE-sponsored mortgage-backed securities, the issuance of non-
agency mortgage-backed securities is not exempted from the Securities Act of 1933.
36 
Because of securities law requirements and practical concerns, actual securitization in the 
non-agency market is more complicated than the simplified model presented at the beginning 
of this part. This section explains three fundamental aspects of the actual securitization 
process, including the use of a depositor arrangement to satisfy shelf registration 
requirements, separation of loan origination and securitization and the use of contractual 
representations and warranties by transaction parties.         
                                                 
35 See Muolo and Padilla, supra note 18, 183.  
36 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2). It should be noted that GSEs are no longer completely exempted from 
federal securities laws. For example, Section 1112 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (15 
U.S.C. 7800) amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to repeal the exemptions from certain provisions of 
the ’34 Act for GSEs. For an analysis of the securities status of asset-backed securities, see Tamar Frankel & 
Ann Taylor Schwing (editor), SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND 
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES, 2nd ed., (Fathom Publishing Company 2005), Vol. 2, 7-22. 
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A. Issuance  Types 
Appendix 2 sets out a breakdown of the transaction number, volume and percentage 
of each asset type in the non-agency RMBS market since 2001. Apart from prime jumbo, Alt 
A, and subprime loans, another two types of mortgages are routinely securitized in this 
market although their market shares are much smaller. “Scratch and dent” loans, as the name 
indicates, are loans that have certain deficiencies such as unusual loan terms, missing 
documentation and first payment defaults.
37 Their performance is usually more difficult to 
predict and require special pricing and servicing techniques. HELOC is short for “home 
equity line of credit”, which is typically an open-ended revolving facility extended to 
borrowers that want to tap into their home equities. A HELOC loan is secured by a second 
mortgage on the property. A HELOC loan is different from a HEL loan, which is short for 
“home equity loan”. The latter is actually a term often used to describe below-prime loans in 
general because historically most mortgages loans securitized in the non-agency market were 
home equity loans secured by a secondary mortgage. Although most mortgages in the non-
agency market now are first mortgages, the term nevertheless stays. 
38 
  With the exception of scratch and dent loans, most non-agency mortgage-backed 
securities have been issued in the public market by filing of a registration statement with the 
SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. Private issuance under Rule 144A has been of 
minimum amount for most of the time except for the year 2007, when issuers of subprime 
and HELOC RMBS securities seemed to turn to the private market for purchasers when the 
public market was dried up. With regard to scratch and dent loans, their various deficiencies 
often make it difficult to collect all the necessary information required to be disclosed for a 
public offering. In addition, the SEC has for a long time held the position that an “asset 
                                                 
37 See Scott Olson and Heather Moulder, Scratch and Dent Mortgage Loans: What an Investor Needs to Know, 
The Journal of Structured Finance, Winter 2005, 81-84, 81.  
38 See MBS Handbook, 365. 
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backed securities facility” should not be backed by a pool of assets with delinquencies of 
more than 20% at the proposed offering, nor should an ABS asset pool have any non-
performing assets at the proposed offering.
39 Such a view has been codified in the 
corresponding SEC regulations.
40 These restrictions further bar many scratch and dent loans 
from being securitized through the public offering channel. 
  Appendix 2 further categorizes private market transactions into NIM transactions and 
Non-NIM transactions. NIM stands for “net interest margin”, which is a term used by banks 
to describe the difference between their lending proceeds and borrowing costs. NIM 
securities are securities backed by the residual interests retained by RMBS issuers (usually 
the unrated residual part at the bottom) in their previous securitization deals. They are called 
NIM securities because the excess spread component of a MBS residual part is similar to the 
“net interest margin” reported by financial institutions. NIM securities are frequently insured 
by a mortgage insurer because their performance is particularly hard to calculate by ordinary 
investors. NIM transactions are particularly popular in subprime transactions and issuers 
routinely execute an NIM transaction alongside a regular RMBS issuance to sell off their 
retained residual interests. 
41 
B. Depositor 
  Figure 6 and Figure 7 below illustrate the two basic structures for mortgage-backed 
securities publicly issued in the non-agency market. The three basic players in a securitization 
transaction are originators, sponsors and underwriters. Originators originate mortgage loans. 
                                                 
39 See SEC, Asset-Backed Securities; Final Rule, Fed. Reg. Vol. 70, No. 5, 1506-1631, 1517. According to the 
SEC, the reason for the restriction is that in either case the assets are not performing in accordance with their 
terms and management or other action may be needed to convert them to cash. Therefore such assets may no 
longer be (and in the case of non-performing assets, are not) converting into cash within a finite time period, as 
required by the definition of asset-backed security. Non-performing assets are defined under Regulation AB as 
financial assets that should be charged off.  Delinquent assets are assets on which any portion of a contractually 
required payment is 30 days or more past due.      
40 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c)(2). 
41 See Adelson & Jacob Consulting, Home Equity ABS Basics, 
http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/Home_Equity_ABS_Basics.pdf, 12-13.   
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Sponsors put up a mortgage pool for securitization. Underwriters sell the mortgage-backed 
securities. Once a mortgage pool is identified and the securities backed by such pool are 
issued, the pool will be closed and no new mortgage loans will be added thereafter. The 
revolving trust structure, under which new assets are injected into the trust after old assets 
retire, is not used in the RMBS market.     
In an originator transaction (Figure 6), a loan originator assigns a pool of mortgages it 
originates to a depositor, which for most of the times, is an affiliate of the originator. Here the 
originator is also the sponsor of the transaction. After receiving the mortgage pool, the 
depositor immediately deposits the pool with a special purpose vehicle it sets up on a back-
to-back transaction. In the public issuance market, the special purpose vehicle is most likely 
to be a common law trust established in New York. The trust is governed by a pooling and 
servicing agreement (“PSA”) to which the trustee, the depositor, and the master servicer are 
all parties. Originator transactions are typically conducted by large players such as 
Countrywide, Indymac and Washington Mutual.  
Mortgage-backed securities will be issued pursuant to the provisions of the PSA. The 
PSA will also be the governing document for all post-securitization activities including 
servicing of the mortgage loans, monthly payments to certificate holders and trustees’ 
obligations. Depending on the transaction structure, the sponsor may make certain 
representations and warranties about the mortgage loan pool directly to the issuing trust under 
the PSA (if it is a party to the PSA), or the rights of the depositor under the sales and 
purchase contract between the sponsor and the depositor will be assigned to the issuing trust 
under the PSA (if the sponsor is not a party to the PSA). The securities issued by the trust will 
be distributed by underwriters, just like stocks and bonds.  
An aggregator transaction is different from an originator transaction in that originators 
do not securitize their own loans. Rather they sell their loans to a sponsor. The sponsor 
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aggregates the loans from multiple originators and assigns the combined mortgage pool to an 
affiliated depositor.
42 As the sponsor in an aggregator transaction is usually an affiliate of an 
investment bank, the specific transaction is almost certainly underwritten by the investment 
bank affiliate either exclusively or as a lead underwriter. The business of aggregating 
mortgage loans from multiple originators for securitization is referred to as “principal 
finance” (or “conduit business”).
43       
Figure 6 Originator Transactions 
   
AAA 
AA 
 
Neither the SEC nor any academic work on asset securitization has explained why an 
SPV-like depositor would be used in securitization transactions. It seems that the engagement 
                                                 
42 For a description of the making of one specific deal, see Allan Sloan, supra note 1. 
43 See JPMorganChase, Re: Asset-Backed Securities Release Nos 33-8419 and 34049644 File No. S7-21-04, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72104/russo071204.pdf, 5.  
Figure 7 Aggregator Transactions 
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of a depositor could not be explained from an economic/business perspective. The rationale 
the author could think of is largely a legal one. To publicly issue mortgage-backed securities, 
an issuer is required to file a registration statement in accordance with the Securities Act of 
1933. The default form is the S-1 form. However, the preparation of the S-1 form takes time 
and attracts scrutiny from the SEC. The issuer also faces various marketing constraints. 
Naturally the better solution is to be able to offer these securities on a continuous offering 
basis.  
In connection with the enactment of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act of 1984 (“SMMEA”), the SEC permitted SMMEA-eligible securities (including all 
RMBS securities) to be offered on a shelf registration basis.
44 The availability of the S-3 
form could significantly reduce the registration time needed for a securitization transaction 
but it creates a new problem. An operating company (e.g. an originator) registering a shelf 
would mean that the company must fulfill all the periodic disclosure requirements and
securities law obligations. The requirements in effect amount to an offering of debt/equity 
securities by the company itself.  
 other 
                                                
The solution is to use a depositor company as a buffer between the sponsor and the 
special purpose vehicle. A depositor company files a registration statement with the SEC for 
offering securities on a continuous basis and maintains the effectiveness of the registration by 
filing periodical updates. When a mortgage pool is identified for securitization, it could 
quickly issue RMBS securities backed by such mortgage pool through a shelf takedown 
offering with the filing of a prospectus supplement. The company derives its name from the 
Securities Act of 1933, under which the entity depositing the assets with the trust is called a 
“depositor” and is deemed to be the issuer of the securities, although technically it is the trust 
 
44 17 C.F.R. 230.415(a)(vii). For the SEC’s explanation on the permission, see SEC, Shelf Registration, 48 F.R. 
52889.  
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that issues the mortgage-backed securities.
45 Depositor companies only have minimum assets 
and their activities are usually limited to maintaining the effectiveness of the shelf 
registration. As a shelf takedown transaction can be done rather quickly, the investment bank 
could potentially price the mortgage pool and the mortgage-backed securities to be issued at 
the same time without having to pre-purchase the mortgage pool.
46 
Depositor companies are usually affiliates of sponsors. Based on the author’s own 
survey, all RMBS securities issued in 2006 and 2007 were on a shelf registration basis and all 
utilized a special purpose company as the depositor of the transaction. Transactions in which 
the sponsor is not an affiliate of the depositor are rare in the non-agency market, accounting 
for only 14 issuances in 2006 (out of 1202 transactions) and 21 issuances in 2007 (out of 772 
transactions) of all publicly issued RMBS securities based on the author’s own calculation. 
These transactions are called as “rent-a-shelf” transactions and are conducted by securitizers 
that do not maintain their own shelf registrations and “borrow” the shelves maintained by the 
securities underwriters.
47      
Many securitization sponsors have multiple depositors specializing in the 
securitization of certain asset types. For example, when Countrywide issues RMBS securities, 
Countrywide Home Loans Inc., acting as the sponsor of the deal, will transfer the mortgage 
pool to one of its wholly-owned depositors, CWMBS, Inc (in case of a prime jumbo 
issuance), CWALT, Inc.(Alt A issuance), CWABS, Inc. (subprime issuance) or CWHEQ, Inc. 
(HELOC issuance). In 2006, about seventy depositors were involved in the issuance of 
RMBS securities in the non-agency market. The top twenty “shelf owners” represent about 
90% of the issuance volume. 
  
Figure 8 2006 Non-Agency Public RMBS Issuance By Shelf  
Shelf Owner  Depositor  Deal No.  Volume  Percentage 
                                                 
45 Securities Act of 1993, 2(a)(4). 
46 See SEC, supra note 44, 52891.   
47 See SEC, supra note 39, 1534.   
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Number 
Countrywide   4  166  $143,070.18  13.77% 
Lehman   1  86  $89,797.78  8.64% 
Residential Funding Company  5  112  $71,949.93  6.92% 
Bear Stearns   2  80  $71,508.56  6.88% 
RBS   2  42  $53,300.38  5.13% 
Goldman Sachs   1  59  $53,106.52  5.11% 
Wells Fargo   1  41  $47,156.97  4.54% 
JP Morgan   2  47  $45,793.38  4.41% 
Washington Mutual   1  43  $40,088.15  3.86% 
Morgan Stanley   2  37  $39,797.41  3.83% 
Indymac   2  59  $38,280.52  3.68% 
Credit Suisse   3  41  $35,135.71  3.38% 
Merrill Lynch   1  49  $34,730.62  3.34% 
Deutsche Bank   2  39  $31,517.35  3.03% 
Citigroup   3  41  $31,408.38  3.02% 
Bank of America   3  38  $28,580.41  2.75% 
Long Beach   1  15  $25,687.96 2.47% 
HSBC   3  18  $20,168.11  1.94% 
UBS   1  29  $19,877.62  1.91% 
Ameriquest   2  10  $17,007.56  1.64% 
     (Source: SEC filings, author’s own calculation) 
C.  Analysis of Transaction Type Data 
  (1)  Classification of Transactions 
In the non-agency market, the relationships between parties conducting loan 
origination, transaction sponsoring and securities underwriting deserve a closer look. 
Appendix 3 divides non-agency transactions into eight categories based on such relationship 
differences. The fundamental difference between Type A transactions and Type B 
transactions is whether the lead underwriter of the securitization transaction is an affiliate of 
the sponsor. The definition of affiliation for this paper is more stringent that that under the 
accounting rules. Only subsidiaries within one financial group are considered to be affiliates. 
It should also be noted that RMBS issuances, especially when the sponsor is not the affiliate 
of the underwriter (i.e. Type B transactions), typically employ an underwriting syndicate 
within which one underwriter will lead the underwriting efforts. Only lead underwriter is 
considered here as it is primarily responsible for the preparation of issuance documents.  
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Each major type of transaction (i.e. A or B) is further divided into four sub-categories 
(A-1 to A-4, B-1 to B-4), depending on the relationship between the sponsor and the 
originator. As issuers of RMBS securities are only required to disclose the identities of 
originators contributing more than 10% of the mortgage loans in the mortgage pool, a 
transaction involving an affiliated originator of the sponsor will only be identified to the 
extent that it is so disclosed in the disclosing documents. At last, for each transaction type, 
Appendix 3 further splits the transaction volume in three ways depending on whether the 
sponsor of the transaction is a commercial bank, an investment bank or a non-bank lender. 
Top five transaction modes (out of twenty-four modes in total) for each asset category are 
highlighted.  
Figure 9  2006-2007 Public Non-Agency RMBS Issuance By Transaction Type  
2006  2007   
Prime  Alt A  Subprime  Prime  Alt A  Subprime 
A-1 17.84%  2.95%  14.70%  27.73%  5.02%  22.20% 
A-2 22.88%  22.73%  5.28%  22.20%  27.89%  14.26% 
A-3 2.59%  13.97%  34.38%  1.77%  6.29%  19.08% 
A-4 14.98%  25.15%  16.30%  8.57%  25.53%  19.90% 
B-1 12.47%  24.68%  18.70%  13.96%  22.98%  12.66% 
B-2 27.59%  9.00%  2.70%  23.58%  10.31%  3.01% 
B-3 0.47%  0.16%  4.29%  0.00%  0.00%  3.56% 
B-4 1.17%  1.36%  3.64%  2.19%  1.98%  5.32% 
Type A Transactions in Total  58.29%  64.80%  70.67%  60.27%  64.73%  75.44% 
Classic Model (A-1+B-1)  30.32%  27.64%  33.41%  41.69%  28.01%  34.86% 
Expanded Classic Model  80.79%  59.36%  41.38%  87.47%  66.20%  52.14% 
Single Originator Ratio  33.37%  41.77%  72.08%  43.46%  34.30%  57.51% 
(Source: SEC filings, author’s own calculation) 
 
(2) Uncontested  Issuances   
Figure 9 is a summary of Appendix 3 data. It can be seen that the combined volume of 
Type A transactions is unusually high across all asset categories. The highest ratio is in the 
subprime sector, in which more than 70% of the transactions in 2006 and 2007 are Type A 
transactions. A Type A transactions in this paper is defined as a transaction in which the 
sponsor is an affiliate of the lead underwriter. The loans to be securitized may come from 
sources ranging from the sponsor itself (Type A-1) to multiple unaffiliated sponsors (Type A-
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4). The significance of Type A transactions is that the issuer (technically the depositor, an 
affiliate of the sponsor) is on the same side with the underwriter. In a typical securities 
issuance, an underwriter has an obligation to diligently investigate into the accuracy and 
sufficiency of the information disclosed in the prospectus. It is supposed to guard the gate to 
the capital market and refuse to underwrite deals that do not pass their smell tests. The exact 
same obligation applies to underwriters in Type A transactions but the fundamental 
difference is that the issuer of the securities and the underwriter belong to the same financial 
conglomerate.    
(3)  Separation of Origination and Securitization  
The transaction type data shows that there is a clear separation between the 
origination function and the securitization function, which means that loan originators do not 
necessarily securitize their own loans. In terms of transaction volume, the classic originate-to-
securitize model under which one originator securitizes its self-originated mortgage loans (i.e. 
Type A-1 and Type B-1 transactions) accounts for roughly only one third of the transaction 
volume across all asset categories in 2006 and 2007. Indeed, the majority of the transactions 
involve the sponsor buying at least some mortgages from unaffiliated originators. Note that 
the fact that a mortgage pool is originated by one originator does not mean that the originator 
originates all loans through retail channels. Rather it should be expected that a large portion 
of the loans will be originated through mortgage brokers or purchased from correspondent 
lenders. However, if a mortgage pool is originated by one originator, it generally means that 
one set of underwriting standards is applied. If a mortgage pool is said to be originated by 
multiple originators, different underwriting standards are used. 
  Expanding the classic model to include A-2 and B-2 type transactions, i.e. 
transactions involving some self-originated loans and some loans purchased from unaffiliated 
originators, the ratios of transactions under the expanded model increase significantly for 
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prime jumbo transactions (81% in 2006 and 87% in 2007). The ratio for Alt A transactions 
increases to 59% and 66% in 2006 and 2007 respectively while the ratio for subprime 
transactions still remains relatively low – 41% in 2006 and 52% in 2007. This means that in 
about half of the subprime RMBS issuances in these two years, the sponsor of the securities 
issuance or its affiliates
48 do not originate any of the mortgage loans to be securitized.  
The breakdown in Appendix 3 clearly shows that investment banks play an important 
role in separating the origination function from the securitization function. Type A-3 and 
Type A-4 transactions conducted by investment banks, which are transactions in which 
investment banks buy a pool of mortgages from one (Type A-3) or multiple unaffiliated 
originators (Type A-4), account for about 39.5% of the total subprime issuance in 2006. The 
figure is 33.8% for Alt-A transactions and 11.4% for prime jumbo transactions. As a matter 
of fact, investment banks should account for an even higher ratio. Appendix 3 makes rather 
an arbitrary division between commercial banks and investment banks by deeming large 
players such as Citibank, Bank of America and JPMorgan as commercial banks. In effect 
when they conduct Type A-3 and Type A-4 transactions, the sponsors are likely to be their 
investment banking arms. 
(4)  Explanation for Separation – The Need for Aggregation  
  Why would an originator sell its loan portfolios to others instead of securitizing them 
itself? One factor at play seems to be the mortgage pool size required for a successful 
securitization.
49 When a pool grows larger, the law of large numbers is more likely to apply 
and the prediction on the performance of the mortgage pool can be more statistically accurate. 
Rating agencies have for a long time factored pool size into their rating considerations.
 50 
                                                 
48 Note that an issuer of RMBS securities by law is always the depositor of the transaction, which is a separate 
entity from the sponsor but is usually an affiliate of the sponsor.   
49 See Mark Korell, The Workings of Private Mortgage Bankers and Securitization Conduits in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000), 96-97. 
50 In its 2003 report, Moody’s states: “Pool size plays an important role in shaping the pool loss distribution. The 
smaller the pool, the less certain we can be that the outcome will fall within a tight band around our 
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From an issuer’s perspective, a bigger deal is more cost-effective because many transaction 
costs, e.g. legal and printing fees, are fixed. Structuring techniques also favor large mortgage 
pools. A common credit enhancement measure is cross-collateralization, which requires the 
mortgage pool to be divided into several sub-pools. Each sub-pool supports a certain amount 
of securities on its own while the excess cash flow of each sub-pool is then combined to 
support the issuance of a new class of securities. As Figure 10 shows, the average size of a 
public RMBS issuance has grown considerably over the past few years in all three asset 
categories. Subprime deals are general larger than prime jumbo deals and Alt-A deals and 
billion-dollar transactions were the norm in the boom years between 2004 and 2006. 
  One the other hand, mortgage loans cannot wait too long to be securitized. One 
concern of course is that originators must sell those stinky mortgage loans before the 
borrowers become default. However, there are other legitimate concerns. A few months after 
origination, situations may change and original information collected about the mortgage 
loans, such as the borrower’s FICO score, income level and the appraisal value of the 
property may no longer be meaningful. Once a loan is treated as a “seasoned loan”, an 
information update and a re-evaluation become necessary, which inevitably increase the 
origination costs.
51 Most non-bank originators also could not afford the carrying cost since 
they borrow heavily on a short-term basis. 
Eventually under the originate-to-sell model, it is critical for mortgage originators to 
quickly dispose of their mortgage loans so that they could re-use the money. According to the 
author’s own survey, it is common for an RMBS issuance backed by a mortgage pool with a 
weighted average seasoning of zero to three months only. Direct securitization is often not a 
practical option for none but only a handful of very large originators. As one manager puts it: 
                                                                                                                                                        
expectations.” Moody’s, Moody’s Mortgage Metrics: A Model Analysis of Residential Mortgage Pools, April 1, 
2003, 10.  
51 For example, S&P defines a seasoned loan as a loan that has been in a portfolio for more than nine months. 
See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 14, 14.   
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“…there is no place in the ABS market for small and medium-sized issuers. They should be 
more conservative than their larger competitors because they are less diversified.”
52          
Figure 10 Average Size of a Public RMBS Issuance
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(Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, author’s own calculations) 
  (5)  Explanation for Separation – Other Factors 
The practical need for very large financiers to step in and serve as a super aggregator 
is one reason for investment banks to set up the so-called “mortgage conduit programs”, or 
prime finance business, to collect small loan portfolios and aggregate them for securitization. 
However, this alone does not explain the transaction volume data. To start with, many large 
originators mix their own mortgage loans with loans from unaffiliated originators before they 
securitize (i.e. A-2 and B-2 transactions). As a matter of fact, one of the largest originators, 
Wells Fargo, routinely securitizes its prime jumbo loans together with loans from unaffiliated 
originators. One possible explanation might be that their business is geographically 
constrained but their loan pool needs to be well diversified geographically. Another 
explanation might be that these unaffiliated originators are really just large correspondent 
lenders that use their own standards to originate loans. 
                                                 
52 See Nomura, ABS Gold Coast Report: Coverage of Selected Sessions of ABS East 2003, 
http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/ABS_East_2003_Notes.pdf, 10. 
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Another phenomenon that cannot be explained is why there are a large number of 
Type A-3 transactions, especially in the subprime sector. In a Type A-3 transaction, an 
investment bank/commercial bank purchases a pool of mortgages from a single unaffiliated 
originator and then securitizes the mortgage pool in the secondary market. Figure 11 and 
Figure 12 list the top 10 originators for Type A-3 transactions in 2006 and 2007 respectively. 
Most of the originators on the list are large originators and do not have to sell their mortgage 
pools to aggregators. Some of these originators are also significant issuers of mortgage-
backed securities. Why would they choose to sell a pool of mortgages when the option to 
securitize is also available? Looking at the buy side of the whole loan trading market, the 
corresponding question is this: why do investment banks want to purchase mortgage pools, 
apart from servicing small originators, from large originators?  
 
53 
Figure 11 Top 10 Originators For Type A-3 Transactions In 2006 
Originator  Total Mortgage Pool Size  %  Deal No.
First Franklin  26.17 (billion)  13%  21 
New Century  24.92  12%  26 
Countrywide 21.87  11%  16 
WMC Corp.  20.90  10%  18 
Wells Fargo  19.92  10%  19 
GreenPoint 17.07  9%  15 
Fremont 16.16  8%  18 
Option One  14.31  7%  14 
Mortgage Lenders Network  6.62  3%  10 
ResMae 4.32  2%  6 
Top 10 Total  172.25  86%  163 
A-3 Transaction Total  200.77  100%  200 
(Source: SEC filings, author’s own calculations) 
 
Figure 12 Top 10 Originator For Type A-3 Transactions in 2007 
Originator  Total Mortgage Pool Size  %  Deal No. 
New Century  11.87 (billion)  22%  11 
Wells Fargo  7.32  14%  11 
Countrywide 6.04  11%  6 
WMC Corp.  5.38  10%  5 
Option One  4.97  9%  5 
GreenPoint 3.22  6%  4 
                                                 
53 First Franklin does not appear in the 2007 list because it was acquired by Merrill Lynch in early 2007 so all 
First Franklin deals have been counted as Type A-1 transactions, which partly explains why there is a seemingly 
drop in volume of Type A-3 transactions and an increase in volume of Type A-1 transactions. 
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Fremont 2.28  4%  3 
American Home Mortgage   2.24  4%  2 
Accredited Home Lenders  1.88  3%  2 
Suntrust 1.82  3%  3 
Top Ten Total  47.08  88%  52 
Grand Total  53.77  100%  65 
(Source: SEC filing, author’s own calculations) 
One explanation seems to be that competition for underwriting business has reduced 
the profits from traditional underwriting business. Most of the commercial bank originators in 
this market have investment banking affiliates that could underwrite RMBS deals in house. 
The only few large originators that still need assistance from investment banks, such as 
Countrywide, Indymac, GMAC-RFC and Wells Fargo, conduct business with many rather 
than only a few of the investment banks. For example, Countrywide used to utilize the 
services of every investment bank available in the market when issuing mortgage-backed 
securities. Investment banks had to compete with each other for underwriting business from a 
few clients and these clients were also building their own underwriting capacities.  
Another important reason might have to do with the nature of mortgage-backed 
securities, or structured finance products in general. Structurers do not structure a transaction 
randomly. Investors often tell structurers the attributes of the securities they want to buy, such 
as rating, maturity and coupon rate, and structurers in turn build these specific securities for 
them. Having control of a large pool of mortgages could give the structurers maximum 
freedom in meeting clients’ needs. Actually early pioneers Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers established their own mortgage origination business long time ago. Many others 
followed suit and acquired independent mortgage originators to boost their supply.   
Investment banks compete with each other for mortgage loans, in particular Alt A and 
subprime loans that produce higher yields, and as a result, it might be better for an originator 
to sell in the whole loan trading market rather than securitize in the secondary market.  
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One obvious benefit is that investment banks could lend their reputational capital to 
mortgage originators by purchasing mortgage pools and securitizing them instead of acting 
merely as underwriters. Investors may have more confidence in the securities if they know 
that an investment bank must have screened the mortgages before it purchases them with its 
own money before it is willing to make a long list of representations and warranties discussed 
below.. This might also explain why most of Type A-3 and Type A-4 transactions occur in 
the subprime and Alt A sector but rarely in the prime jumbo sector.  
A second benefit is that an originator does not have to retain any interest in the 
mortgage pool but if it securitizes the pool, it has to hold or find a way to dispose of the 
unrated tranche at the bottom. A third benefit is that an originator does not need to worry 
about securities litigation risks as it is not part of the issuance transaction.  
At last, an originator may have access to cheaper financing if it sells the mortgage 
loans. During the height of the market, it was reported that investment banks would lure 
mortgage originators to sell mortgage loans to them by extending warehouse credit lines at 
very low rates.
54 Investment banks would not make any money out of the warehouse lending 
business but their whole loan trading business would benefit from increased mortgage 
purchase volume from the borrowing originators.  
D.  The Role of Representations and Warranties in RMBS Transactions   
In an RMBS transaction, investors usually do not have direct access to the mortgage 
loan files, i.e. loan application forms, property appraisal forms, and credit reports relating to 
each mortgage loan, for reasons such as protection of privacy of mortgage borrowers. 
Information is disclosed to them through a prospectus, which contains representations from 
the issuer (and endorsed by others such as the underwriter) about certain aspects of the 
                                                 
54 See Muolo and Padilla, supra note 18, 190.   
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mortgage pool. If there is a material misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, 
investors can demand remedies under federal securities laws. 
However, not every piece of information is delivered in this way. For example, 
investors inevitably want to know that all the mortgage loans they are about to purchase are 
legally enforceable. One probably will never find any representation about the legality of the 
mortgage loan agreements in any RMBS prospectus. Rather, such representation is made by 
the sponsor in the sale and purchase agreement between the sponsor and the depositor. The 
prospectus will point out the fact that the sponsor makes a representation that all mortgage 
loans are legal, valid and enforceable in the sale and purchase agreement.  
The extent of these representations and warranties varies from transaction to 
transaction but the purpose of these representations and warranties is clear – essentially all 
non-credit related risks should be retained by sponsors. If a representation or warranty is 
breached, for example, if a mortgage loan is found to be a “high cost” loan under HOEPA, 
the PSA provides that the sponsor shall replace the affected loans with comparable substitutes. 
A standard clause in the PSA is that replacement is the sole remedy for investors. Investors 
will not be able to bring any securities litigation even if one such representation is materially 
breached, for example, 75% of the mortgage loans turn out to be unenforceable, because the 
RMBS issuer has never said anything about the enforceability of the mortgage loans in the 
prospectus. The representation is made by the mortgage loan seller in the PSA, the breach of 
which should only be remedied through the enforcement of the replacement obligation. 
Naturally such representations and warranties are only effective to the extent that the 
mortgage lenders and the sponsors could make good their promises. If they go bankrupt, 
these representations and warranties will become meaningless, which is what has happened in 
the non-agency market since the credit crisis. However, we should also appreciate the truly 
catastrophic nature of the crisis. For example, back in 2006, who would imagine that the 
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Lehman Brothers Holdings, the holding company of Lehman Brothers and the sponsor of all 
Lehman Brothers RMBS securities, would close its doors?     
Although the “true sale” requirement of securitization requires the seller not to retain 
any meaningful interest in the securitized assets, the seller does have a repurchase obligation 
if it breaches any of its representations or warranties under the sale and purchase agreement. 
Accounting rules still recognize a transaction with a repurchase obligation as a true sale, even 
though the seller may be requested to repurchase any number of loans at any time.  
Investors benefit from such an arrangement because they do not bear any non-credit 
related risks under the caveat that the mortgage seller will not default on its replacement 
obligation. Issuers should also be willing to make representations in contract rather than 
directly in a prospectus as misrepresentation in the latter will often have severe consequences. 
RMBS underwriters benefit, too. The existence of a representation clause in a contract is 
much easier to verify than a direct factual representation about certain aspects of the 
mortgage loans.  
An additional “benefit” of such an arrangement goes to the mortgage originator. If an 
originator securitizes its own loans, it will make the representations and warranties itself to 
the investors. If an originator sells its loans to a buyer who in turn securitizes the loans, the 
buyer will make the representations and warranties to the investors but it will inevitably seek 
the same from the originator, which means that the originator bears the ultimate replacement 
obligation unless it defaults. The replacement protection is meaningful to investors only when 
an actual breach can be found. Many, if not most of the mortgage foreclosures are not 
contested by mortgagors so even if mortgage originators breached certain regulations when 
originating the loans (e.g. the Truth in Lending Act) and as a result the loans should be 
repurchased by the mortgage sellers, the servicer will not find out the breach. Even if many 
mortgage originators were subject to investigations for predatory lending practices during the 
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credit crisis, their practices would not be found to be in violation of laws if they were willing 
to settle.
55 Mortgage originators would admit no wrong in a settlement and as a result, 
investors could not use the settlement result as prima facie evidence for a breach of law by 
mortgage originators.
56 In addition, many mortgage loans were sold or securitized on a 
servicing-retained basis rather than a servicing-released basis, which means that the 
originators would continue to service their self-originated loans after securitization. The 
originators therefore had the incentive as well as resources to cover up any loans that should 
have been repurchased and replaced by themselves. Even if the originator ceases to service 
the loans, the new servicer may be an affiliate of the sponsor or an unaffiliated third party that 
begs the sponsor for servicing business. It is unlikely that the servicer will be particularly 
active in reporting breaches to bring trouble to its affiliates or patrons. 
The trustee seems to be a natural choice for protecting investors’ interests but in 
reality it is not. First, the trustee does conduct a review of the mortgage loan files before it 
accepts the mortgage loans as trust property. However, such review is always limited to an 
examination of file completeness rather than a substantive “forensic review”. Once the trust 
has been established, the trustee does not have an active obligation to look for breach of 
representations or warranties but only a passive obligation to respond to findings from other 
parties. If it does conduct a review, it will have to be pay for it out of its own pocket. 
Investors generally do not have the right to inspect the mortgage files themselves and even if 
the trustee allows them to do so, investors will have to face a free riding problem from other 
investors.    
 
55 See Ruth Simon: Investors Hit BofA Loan Modifications, Wall St. J., November 18, 2008, At C1. (Reporting 
that Bank of America’s decision to embark on an $8.4 billion loan modification program to settle charges 
brought by state attorneys general against Countrywide was challenged by investors. Investors required Bank of 
America to repurchase the loans involved but Bank of America refused because no court has made findings that 
the Countrywide loans were “either predatory or unlawfully originated” so no breach of representation should be 
found.) See also Ruth Simon: Crisis on Wall Street: Mortgage-Bond Holders Get Voice – Greenwich 
Financial’s William Frey Challenges Loan Servicers Like BofA, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 2008, At C3. (Reporting 
details of the lawsuit)   
56 Id. Information Flow in the Non-Agency RMBS Market 
Part III  Information Flow in the Non-Agency RMBS Market 
1. Introduction 
Part II of the paper has described how different entities produce and accumulate 
mortgage loans and finally get them ready for securitization in the non-agency market. A 
handful of large financial institutions control the gateway to the secondary market and act as 
sponsors of RMBS issuances. They, together with their depositor affiliates and underwriters, 
control the disclosure of information about the mortgage loan pools to the investors of the 
secondary market.    
The uniqueness of such information flow is that federal securities laws only govern 
one aspect of the disclosure activities. Rating agencies require information for their rating and 
issuers practically need to follow the rules set by rating agencies and disclose to them 
whatever information they require for rating the securities. What is more, an RMBS issuance 
is a transaction governed by a trust document, under which the certificateholders (i.e. 
investors) usually have rights to receive certain periodic reports and other information from 
the trustee, although there is much overlap between the information disclosed in such reports 
and in the reports filed with the SEC. 
  These three types of disclose practices (i.e. disclosure under federal securities laws, 
disclosure to rating agencies and disclosure under trust documents) are deeply intertwined. 
Since a trust issuing securities technically fits into the definition of an investment company 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, RMBS issuers have been seeking exemptions 
from this act by relying on Rule 3a-7, which, amongst other things, requires the securities 
issued by the trust to be of investment grade as determined by rating agencies.
57 How rating 
agencies rate RMBS securities and what information they require for such ratings in turn has 
a profound impact on what information is disclosed to investors in prospectuses. Investors’ 
                                                 
57 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(a)(2). 
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informational needs have traditionally not been satisfied by the rigid disclosure requirements 
under securities laws and as discussed later in this section, the SEC has for a long time 
permitted issuers to disclose other types of information outside the prospectus either through 
the so-called informational and computational materials or through free writing prospectuses 
after the offering reform. Lastly, virtually all public RMBS issuances have less than three 
hundred record holders. Issuers have been relying on Section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to suspend their reporting obligations thereunder at the beginning of 
the next fiscal year after the securities are issued.
58 Once issuers cease to follow federal 
disclosure rules, investors will have to rely exclusively on contractually provided reports to 
certificate holders for updated information on the underlying mortgage pools. These reports 
also form the information base for rating agencies’ post-rating monitoring and surveillance 
activities.           
2.  Disclosure to Rating Agencies 
A.  The Rating Process 
One must know how rating agencies rate RMBS securities before she understands 
why rating agencies require certain information. RMBS securities are complicated. Multiple 
assignments are often necessary as loans are transferred from originators to the sponsor of the 
issuance, which then transfers them to the depositor that deposits the transferred loans with a 
trust governed by a trust agreement of hundreds of pages long. Multiple parties are involved: 
apart from originators, a sponsor, a depositor, a trustee and often multiple servicers (master 
servicers, primary servicers, special servicers) are involved. Many transactions also have a 
securities administrator and a risk manager. Weakness in one building block of the 
transaction will threaten the stability of the entire structure. 
59 
                                                 
58 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §15.  
59 See, for example, Moody’s, Moody’s Re-examines Trustee’ Role in ABS and RMBS, February 4, 2003.  
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Rating agencies are expected to analyze a wide variety of issues before they assign a 
rating. For example, Standard & Poor’s claims that it analyzes the following factors before it 
reaches a rating opinion:  
•  the credit quality of the pool of securitized assets;  
•  structural and legal risks of the transaction; 
•  the payment structure and the cash flow mechanics of the securities; 
•  relevant operational and administrative risks; and  
•  any other sources of payment for the securities, e.g., guarantees, swaps, or other 
forms of credit support for the transaction. 
60  
It looks like a full plate of issues but actually that does not necessarily translate into a 
huge amount of work to rating agencies each time a deal is structured. Transactions off the 
same “shelf” often adopt the same deal structure (but not the same tranche structure, which is 
understandably customized for each transaction) and involve the same group of players. A re-
evaluation is not necessary each time. The sponsors/depositors are most likely to be familiar 
faces in the market (see shelf activity data in Figure 8). Transactional services in the non-
agency market are also concentrated in the hands of a few institutions. Eight institutions 
provide trustee services for a total of 95% of all non-agency MBS issuances by volume. Even 
legal services for RMBS issuances are provided by only a few law firms, which know quite 
well what legal requirements rating agencies will impose on these transactions.       
Figure 13 Top 8 Non-Agency MBS Trustees In 2006 
Trustee  Deal Number  % of Total Volume 
U.S. Bank  353  26.6% 
Deutsche Bank  299  22.8% 
Bank of New York  201  13.1% 
HSBC 124  9.2% 
LaSalle 126  8.8% 
Wells Fargo  78  6.3% 
JPMorgan 72  5.3% 
                                                 
60 See Standard & Poor’s, S&P Testimony On the Role of Securitization in the Subprime Mortgage Market, 
April 17, 2007, 4.  
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Citibank 38  2.9% 
Total of Top 8  1291  95% 
Total Market  1786  100% 
(Source: Inside Mortgage Finance) 
 
 
Figure 14 Legal Advisors in the Asset Backed Securities Market (1/1/2006-9/1/2008)
61 
Issuer Advisor  %  Underwriter Advisor  % 
McKee Nelson  13% McKee Nelson  25.80%
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft  12.80% Thacher Proffitt & Wood  11.20%
Sidley Austin   11.90% Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft  10.10%
Thacher Proffitt & Wood  9.70% Sidley Austin  5.30%
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe  8.30% Stroock & Stroock & Lavan  5.20%
Dechert 4.50% Dechert 4.90%
Mayer Brown  3.20% Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe  4.30%
Hunton & Williams  1.80% Skadden, Arps  1.90%
Skadden, Arps  1.50% Latham & Watkins  1.60%
Dewey & LeBoeuf   1.40% Mayer Brown   1.40%
Top Ten Issuer Legal Advisor Total  68.10% Top Ten Total  71.70%
Transactions with Issuer Legal 
Advisors -Total  76.20%
Transactions with Underwriter Legal 
Advisors - Total  78.80%
(Source: Thomson SDI) 
As most of the RMBS issuances are repeated transactions, structural analysis is only 
peripheral to the entire rating process. The core part of rating process is the processing of a 
“loan tape” with rating agencies’ proprietary rating models. The loan tape contains detailed 
information about each loan (e.g. loan amount, borrower’s FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, 
etc.) presented in a format conforming to the requirements of the specific rating agency. After 
processing loan level information, the rating model returns an expected loss distribution of 
the mortgage pool. It will then check how a proposed tranche performs under different 
simulated stress scenarios. If that tranche could reach the expected loss requirement for a 
specific rating level, the tranche will be assigned that rating. 
62 
                                                 
61 Market share is calculated based on transaction volume. The SDI database covers all asset backed securities 
issued publicly, including non-agency RMBS securities, agency securities, commercial MBS securities and non-
mortgage securities. Agency securities may not involve outside counsels.    
62 Each of the three rating agencies has utilized essentially the same rating process. For descriptions of their 
rating methodologies, see Standard & Poor’s, supra note 14; Moody’s, Moody’s Mortgage Metrics: A Model 
Analysis of Residential Mortgage Pools, April 1, 2003; Moody’s, Moody’s Approach to Rating US Residential 
Mortage-Backed Securities, December 30, 2008; Fitch, ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model, 
August 14, 2007.       
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  In laymen’s eyes, the rating model is like a rating agency’s crystal ball through which 
the future performance of the mortgage pool can be seen. However, underlying the model is 
just an actuarial analysis every insurer, especially life insurer, conducts every day to assess 
how much it charges for its insurance policies. Rating agencies and RMBS bond insurers 
actually co-existed in the market for a long time, especially in the subprime sector, because 
investors preferred additional comfort from bond insurances.
63 The situation started to 
change in mid-1997 when investors felt that they were overexposed to a handful of mortgage 
insurers and the bond insurance fee seemed largely superfluous because rating agencies an
bond insurers conducted basically the same analysis and an insurer was almost never called to 
pay. Since early 2000 bond insurances have become extremely rare across all sectors of the 
RMBS market. Investors have since then relied exclusively on internal credit enhanc
techniques.
d 
ement 
                                                
64  
The prediction power of the rating model rests on the rating agency’s assessment of 
the historical performance of a large number of similar mortgage loans. For example, 
Moody’s claimed that the prime jumbo/Alt A module of its rating model, Moody’s Mortgage 
Metrics, was backed by its analysis of the performance of over 500,000 prime jumbo loans 
before introducing the module in 2003.
65 Its subprime module, which it has kept secret until 
very recently, derives its predictive power from a “large, high-quality data set of two million 
subprime mortgage loans” in its Moody’s Mortgage Credit Research Database.
66 Fitch’s 
model,  ResiLogic, is claimed to be based on the performance history of over 1.6 million 
mortgage loans originated between 1992 and 2000 and encompasses three major credit 
sectors, prime, Alt A and subprime.
67 Their loan performance data mainly comes from 
 
63 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 14, 65.   
64 Another reason that bond insurers are driven out of the market may be the increasing use of credit default 
swaps at the CDO level, which provides hedging on another level.  
65 See Moody’s, Moody’s Mortgage Metrics: A Model Analysis of Residential Mortgage Pools, April 1, 2003, 1.  
66 See Moody’s, Introducing Moody’s Mortgage Metrics, 52.   
67 See Fitch, ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model, August 14, 2007, 1.  
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LoanPerformance, a mortgage industry information provider but Moody’s has also contracted 
loan originators directly for information.
68  
Before the credit crisis broke out, only Standard and Poor’s fully licensed its rating 
model (“LEVELS”) to third parties.
69 Investors and deal structurers could run the loan tapes 
through the rating model themselves. Moody’s only licensed its prime/Alt A module. Fitch 
started to use its new rating model, ResiLogic, in late 2006 and for the first time also made its 
model available to third parties.  
B. Model  Input 
Appendix 4 sets out the detailed loan tape data fields for the three rating agencies at 
various times. Standard and Poor’s has constantly updated its loan tape inputs although the 
changes have not been significant over the time. Two most recent versions are presented in 
the table, one after its May 2004 revision and the other after the latest November 2008 
revision. Moody’s has not made public its detailed loan tape layout (under the title of 
“Moody’s Latest”) until 2007. However, a 2007 Moody’s report provided a list of its key data 
fields then used in its model.
70 Moody’s indicated that these key data fields had been 
established since 2002.
71 Fitch’s current model has only been in use since November 2006 
and information about inputs for its previous models is not publicly available on its website. 
The table in Appendix Two presents its most recent requirements for the loan tape layout.     
How do rating agencies determine what data fields they require? The purpose of 
analyzing historical performance data is to identify those factors that could distinguish 
mortgage loan performances in a meaningful way. For example, all three rating agencies have 
found out that a borrower’s FICO score is a strong indicator of loan default probabilities. The 
                                                 
68 See Moody’s, supra note 66, 52.   
69 As early as 1998, Standard & Poor’s marketed LEVELS as a risk-based pricing tool for originators. See 
Standard & Poor’s, Risk-based Pricing of Subprime Mortgage Using LEVELS, October 1998. 
70 See Moody’s, Moody’s Revised US Mortgage Loan-by-Loan Data Fields, April 3, 2007, 3.  
71 Id., 1.  
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higher a borrower’s FICO score, the less likely the loan will default in the future, although 
understandably the relationships between these factors and loan performances are non-
linear.
72  
Instinctively not every factor has the same weight in determining the outcome of the 
pool analysis. In Standard and Poor’s comprehensive 2000 report on its US residential 
subprime mortgage securitization criteria, which has not been updated ever since, it listed the 
following as factors that could affect foreclosure frequencies and loss severities
73:  
Figure 15 S&P Factors 
Foreclosure Frequency  Base Loss Severity 
Borrower credit quality (FICO) Loan to value ratios 
Loan to value ratio  Mortgage insurance 
Property type  Lien status 
Loan purpose  Loan balance 
Occupancy status  Loan maturity 
Mortgage seasoning  Loan type 
Pool size  Loan purpose  
Loan size  Property type 
Loan maturity  Occupancy status 
Loan documentation type  Geographic dispersion 
Adjustable-rate mortgages  S&P’s Economic Index 
Balloon mortgages  Mortgage seasoning 
Lien status   
    
Moody’s used to classify the data fields into three categories, primary, highly 
desirable and desirable.
74 Primary data fields are required to run its rating model, which 
include data such as the borrower’s FICO score, the loan-to-value ratio, the type of the 
mortgage, property type, Zip code, etc. Highly desirable and desirable data fields are not 
required to run the rating model but Moody’s would utilize conservative assumptions to size 
for the unknown risks.   
Although Fitch requests for a large amount of data for its RMBS ratings, its 
ResiLogic model identifies 13 factors “sufficiently significant to be incorporated in the 
                                                 
72 See, for example, Moody’s, Moody’s Approach to Rating US Residential Mortgae-Backed Securities, 
December 30, 2008, 12.  
73 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 14.  
74 See Moody’s, supra note 70, 3. 
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model’s FOF [frequency of foreclosure] calculation” and uses “a slightly different set of 12 
credit dimensions to compute a base LS [loss severity] expectation, similar to those used for 
the FOF calculation”.
75 The factors are listed in the order of influence below. 
Figure 16 Fitch’s Factors 
Order of 
Influence 
Frequency of Foreclosure  Base Loss Severity 
1 FICO  Closing  Balance 
2 Credit  Sector  CLTV 
3 CLTV  Loan  Coupon 
4  Property Type   Property Type 
5 Product  Type  Occupancy 
6  Documentation Type  Loan Purpose 
7  Loan Term  Credit Sector 
8  Prepayment Penalty  Product Type 
9 Occupancy  Seasoning 
10 Front-End  DTIs  FICO 
11  Loan Balance at Closing  Loan Term 
12  Loan Purpose  Servicer Rating 
13 Seasoning   
 
The selection of these factors has its practical limitations. For example, both Moody’s 
and Fitch have found that there is a weak correlation between the borrower’s debt-to-income 
(“DTI”) ratio and loan performance, although instinctively one may believe that DTI should 
be a key determinant of a borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage.
76 Moody’s attributed the 
weak correlation to the vastly different practices to calculate the DTI ratios. Consequently it 
has not built DTI into its quantitative model but still require them to be reported. It will make 
out-of-model adjustments to the loss distribution results.
77 Fitch has incorporated DTI into its 
model but has ranked it only the tenth of the thirteen factors it uses for predicting the 
frequency of foreclosure.
78 Its model originally used front-end DTIs but later switched to 
back-end DTIs because the former lacked predictive power.
79 It seems that the correlation 
between a certain factor and loan performance cannot always be explained perfectly. For 
                                                 
75 See Fitch, ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model, August 14, 2007, 2.  
76 Id., 9. See also Moody’s, supra note 72, 15.   
77 See Moody’s, Id. 
78 See Figure 16. 
79 See Fitch, U.S. RMBS: Updated Criteria to ResiLogic Model, August 14, 2007, 3.  
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example, although weak correlation between DTI and loan performance is found, rating 
agencies have nevertheless found that the level of details a mortgage borrower’s 
income/assets is documented (e.g. full documentation, limited documentation or no 
documentation) is a useful factor to predict the performance of mortgage loans.  
Another practical limitation is the lack of performance history of many new mortgage 
products and new origination practices. Many new mortgage products such as adjustable rate 
mortgages, interest only mortgages and net amortization mortgages simply do not have a 
performance history. Although subprime loans have existed for a long time, subprime loans 
originated before early 2000 were very different from those originated in the past few years. 
Early subprime loans were smaller in amount and extended to borrowers with much worse 
FICO scores (around 500s) than recent ones. A substantial down payment was usually 
required.
80 As Figure 3 shows, very few Alt A loans were originated before 2002, which 
might be the reason why Moody’s actually relied on the performance data of prime loans to 
rate Alt A loans when it introduced the new rating model in 2003. Although rating agencies 
have always been providing information on their rating methodologies to the public, until 
now it still remains a mystery as to how exactly they build their rating models and how 
confident they are about their models when they do not have sufficient historical data to back 
their analysis.    
3.  Mandatory Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws 
A. Base  Prospectus    
Most, if not all of the RMBS securities are issued on a shelf registration basis. In a 
typical RMBS issuance, the issuer (i.e. depositor) maintains an active shelf by filing a 
prospectus with the SEC (“base prospectus”). Once a mortgage pool has been identified and 
                                                 
80 See MBS Handbook, 366-369.  
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the tranche structure of the issuance has been determined, the issuer compiles a prospectus 
supplement with deal-specific information. The prospectus supplement is then delivered to 
investors accompanied by the base prospectus.  
Base prospectuses generally do not contain any specific information about the 
mortgage pool to be securitized. Rather, they are written in very broad languages about:  
•  the types of the securities that could be sold from the shelf; 
•  general descriptions of the kinds of information that may be disclosed in each 
section of the prospectus supplement; and 
•  information about various transactional mechanisms that almost never change 
from transaction to transaction, such as clearing procedures. 
If a shelf is dedicated mainly to securitize mortgage loans from one originator, for 
example, a major bank may set up a shelf to securitize its own loans, information about the 
originator’s loan programs and underwriting standards will be disclosed in the prospectus to 
avoid repetition. However, great latitude is often needed as most shelves may be used to 
securitize mortgage loans (or even mortgage-backed securities in case of a re-securitization) 
coming from all potential sources and of various qualities. Consequently, base prospectuses 
of different issuers often do not look that different from each other.  
B. Prospectus  Supplement  and Transaction Documents  
The prospectus supplement contains the deal-specific information. The SEC has for a 
long time recognized that the entire federal securities disclosure regime, designed for 
securities offerings by operating companies, simply does not work for asset-backed 
securitization deals. The depositor is a special purpose company so an audit of its financial 
books is largely unnecessary.
81 There is no business for the management to discuss about. 
Actually there is even no management – once the mortgage pool is assigned to the trust, the 
                                                 
81 See SEC, supra note 39, 1511.    
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trust is supposed to be “passively owning or holding the pool of assets”.
82 “Instead, 
information about the transaction structure and the characteristics and quality of the asset 
pool and servicing is often what is most important to investors.”
83  
Over the years, the SEC has worked with the securitization industry to develop a 
separate disclosure regime through a number of SEC no-action letters and the filing review 
process. The SEC started to consolidate and codify its positions in 2004 and in May that year 
issued its proposed Regulation AB for public comments, which consisted of a set of rules 
specifically governing disclosure matters relating to asset-backed securities.
84 The final rule 
was promulgated in early 2005 and compliance with Regulation AB was required for all 
asset-backed securities issued after December 31, 2005.
85 The SEC claimed that Regulation 
AB largely reflected existing staff positions at the time with a few exceptions although some 
commentators believed that quite a few significant changes had been made with the 
introduction of Regulation AB.
86 
Although the SEC proposed to set up a principles-based disclosure regime for asset 
backed securities and intended to let issuers decide on the materiality of specific 
information,
87 the bulk of Regulation AB are actually long lists of types of information that 
the SEC considers to be important enough to include in its own regulation. The SEC did 
resist industry recommendations to formulate asset-specific disclosure rules.
88 As a result, 
Regulation AB applies to all asset classes. Appendix 5 lists all the disclosure items to be 
included in a typical RMBS issuance. Based on the nature of the information, it classifies the 
disclosure items into seven categories. The key categories are: 
                                                 
82 17 CFR 229.1101(c)(2)(ii) 
83 See SEC, supra note 39, 1508.   
84 SEC, Asset-Backed Securities; Proposed Rule, Fed. Reg., Vol. 69, No.93, May 13, 2004.  
85 SEC, supra note 39. 
86 See SEC, supra note 39, 1508. With regard to the industry’s view, see John Arnholz & Edward E. Gainor, 
OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (Aspen Publishers 2006).  
87 See SEC, supra note 39, 1508.  
88 See SEC, supra note 39, 1509.   
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•  Transaction parties - information on transaction parties including sponsor, 
depositor, issuing entity (i.e. issuing trust), originator, trustee and servicer;     
•  Static pool information – information on performances of past pools securitized 
by the same sponsor; 
•  Current mortgage pool information – statistics on pool characteristics or to put it 
in another way, information on the assets side of the issuing trust’s balance sheet; 
and 
•  Tranche structure and credit enhancement – how the MBS issuance is to be 
structured/information on the liabilities side of the issuing trust’s balance sheet.    
Relevant transaction documents are filed separately on 8-K forms. The most 
important transaction document is the pooling and servicing agreement (“PSA”) pursuant to 
which the issuing trust is established. The PSA governs the assignment of the mortgage loans 
by the depositor to the issuing trust, the payment sequence of the cash flow generated by the 
mortgage pool, a wide variety of administrative matters after the securities are issued and the 
detailed servicing requirements to be followed by servicers. Key clauses of the PSA are 
required to be summarized in the prospectus supplement. One appendix to the PSA is the so-
called “mortgage loan schedule”, which lists, on a loan-by-loan basis, relevant information 
about the mortgage pool such as the loan amount, interest rate, loan-to-value ratio, loan 
purpose, and property type. However, the schedule is almost always omitted from the 
electronic Edgar filing, probably due to file size concerns, and can only be obtained by 
contacting the trustee or the legal counsel.      
Apart from the PSA, the mortgage pool sale and purchase agreement between the 
sponsor and the depositor, the separate servicing agreements between the master servicer and 
actual servicers are also disclosed either as appendices of the PSA or separately. If 
derivatives contracts are entered into on behalf of the trust, they are also disclosed. Disclosure 
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practices about two types of contracts are different from issuer to issuer. The first is 
underwriting agreement with underwriters. Second, if the mortgages are not originated by the 
sponsor but rather purchased from unaffiliated third parties, the relevant purchase agreement 
is not always disclosed as it is not considered to be part of the current securitization 
transaction.      
C.  Periodic Disclosures    
Before the promulgation of Regulation AB, asset-backed securities issuers, including 
RMBS issuers, were exempted by the SEC from filing quarterly reports. Instead, the SEC 
permitted issuers to file the monthly distribution reports required to be distributed to the 
certificateholders under the PSA under cover of Form 8-K.
 89 The SEC also modified Form 
10-K to allow issuers to follow special annual reporting rules.
90 Regulation AB created a new 
Form 10-D for monthly distribution reports and also codified the SEC’s positions on annual 
reports of asset-backed securities.
91 
  Disclosures on Form 10-D are required to include the following items: 
•  Distribution and pool performance information which includes:  
o  cash flows received and the sources thereof for distributions;  
o  fees and expenses;  
o  beginning and ending principal balances of the asset-backed securities; 
o  number and amount of pool assets at the beginning and ending of each 
period; 
o  updated pool composition information; 
o  delinquency and loss information; and 
                                                 
89 See SEC, supra note 39, 1509.  
90 Id. 
91 17 C.F.R. 229.1121.  
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o  material breaches of pool asset representations or warranties or transaction 
covenants. 
•  Legal proceedings; 
•  Sales of securities and use of proceeds; 
•  Defaults under senior securities; 
•  Submission of matters to a vote of securities holders; 
•  Significant obligors of pool assets (usually not applicable to RMBS securities); 
•  Significant enhancement provider information; and 
•  Other information. 
Annual reports for asset-backed securities are much shorter than those for operating 
companies. The two most important items are regarding servicers. The annual report must 
contain a servicer’s statement of compliance with its servicing obligations and a report by an 
independent public accountant regarding compliance with particular servicing criteria. In 
addition, the issuer is also required to file a Sarbanes-Oxley Act certification that is modified 
by the SEC for use by issuers of asset-backed securities.
92  
Whatever the specific continuing disclosure requirements are, RMBS issuers only 
need to comply with them for a short period of time. As RMBS securities are offered and sold 
under a registration statement filed with the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, 
issuers have periodic disclosure obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
However, under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, such periodic filing 
obligations “shall…be automatically suspended as to any fiscal year, other than the fiscal 
year within which such registration statement became effective, if, at the beginning of such 
fiscal year, the securities of each class to which the registration statement relates are held of 
                                                 
92 See SEC, supra note 39, 1510.  
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record by less than three hundred persons.”
93 Section 15(d) also authorizes the SEC to 
determine how to interpret the “held of record” requirement as it deems necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest.
94 
After each RMBS issuance, the trustee keeps a record of the certificateholders. In the 
mean time, the securities are registered with and cleared through the system of the Depository 
Trust Company (“DTC”). When determining the number of record holders, the SEC has 
required the list to be retrieved from the DTC system.
95 Even so, as is the case for many other 
types of securities, the RMBS securities are likely to be registered under brokers’ names. As 
there is no need to further determine the real beneficial owners of the RMBS securities, 
almost all publicly issued RMBS securities qualify for the suspension under Section 15(d). 
Through a search on SEC filings, the author finds out that, during the period of 2004-2007, 
for all but a few RMBS securities issued in one particular year, the issuers would file a 15-
15D termination report at the beginning of the next year and would provide Section 15(d) as 
their legal basis for terminating their reports. The number of record holders provided in the 
15-15D report ranges from two to more than seventies according to a survey of about 100 
randomly selected securities. Of course this number in no way reflects the number of ultimate 
beneficial owners of the securities.  
The SEC has been well aware of the situation and when proposing Regulation AB, 
solicited public comments on whether it should consider changing the practice but has 
eventually decided that they “are not at this time revisiting the statutory framework of Section 
15(d) regarding the suspension of reporting obligations” because that would raise “broad 
issues regarding the treatment of other non-ABS issuers that do not have public common 
equity”.
96                   
                                                 
93 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §15(d).  
94 Id.  
95 See Letter of American Bankers Association, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72104/aba071504.pdf, 12.  
96 See SEC, supra note 39, 1563.    
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4. Voluntary  Disclosures 
A. Disclosure  of  Loan-Level  Information Prior to Issuance 
As Appendix 5 shows, the SEC has not required RMBS issuers to disclose in statutory 
prospectuses loan-level data to investors similar to the loan tape data disclosed to the rating 
agencies. Instead, statistics and averages would suffice. Often an issuer presents pool-level 
information in a tabular format, in distributional groups and incremental ranges. Important 
averages, such as the weighted average coupon rate, weighted average FICO score and 
weighted average loan term are provided.  
The potential reasons for the SEC not to require disclosure of loan-level data will be 
explored in the next part. The decision seems strange, considering how rating agencies 
conduct their credit analysis on a loan-by-loan basis. As rating agencies indicate, the 
relationships between loan factors and loan performance are complicated and non-linear so 
there is no simple formula to determine how many loans will default in the pool based on a 
few average numbers. The lack of loan-level data disclosure has been considered by many as 
a main reason why investors have failed to correctly identify the risks. 
  The critics above have failed to recognize the “special deal” the securitization 
industry has made with the SEC. Through a series of landmark no-action letters, the SEC has 
since early 1990s permitted issuers of asset-backed securities to provide “informational and 
computational materials” to potential investors before a prospectus supplement has been filed 
with the SEC. Note that these no-action letters were issued before the sweeping offering 
reform in 2005, when written communications relating to the offering of other securities were 
still largely restricted to preliminary prospectuses before a final prospectus was filed. 
Informational and computational materials include information on the proposed transaction 
structure, asset pool information, various calculations performed by the underwriter about the 
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securities, etc.
97 The reason why the SEC has permitted such communication prior to filing is 
obvious. Unlike stock/bond issuances, asset-backed securities are often customized for 
specific investors, negotiations between investors and underwriters are commonplace and the 
transaction structure is constantly changed to reflect negotiation results. The existing offering 
regime, under which an issuer is supposed to keep silent before it gets the prospectus ready, 
does not work for the issuance of asset-backed securities.  
  Because investors have access to information about mortgage pool characteristics 
before a prospectus supplement is filed, the natural question is how much information is 
disclosed to them before issuance. Unfortunately the exact scope of information available to 
investors is hard to verify, as issuers had not been required to file these informational and 
computational materials electronically before Regulation AB became effective. The reason is 
a technical one. When the relevant no-action letter was issued by the SEC, the SEC’s Edgar 
system was just set up and issuers argued that it would be very hard for them to convert 
extensive data into the ASCII format used by the Edgar system at the time. As a result, the 
SEC permitted traditional paper filings.
98 The no-action letter had been relied upon by the 
securitization industry until the SEC officially abolished the old exemption under Regulation 
AB. 
  There is evidence that loan-level data may have not always been disclosed. There was 
once a view in the industry that the SEC prohibited the disclosure of loan-level data in 
informational and computational materials because such data was not listed in the original 
SEC no-action letters.
 99 The question was finally addressed by the SEC in its proposing 
release for Regulation AB, in which the SEC clarified that disclosure of “loan level” 
                                                 
97 17 C.F.R. 229.1101(a).  
98 See SEC, supra note 39, 1558-1559. 
99 Adelson & Jacob Consulting, LLC, Report from Orlando 2007: Coverage of Selected Sessions of ABS East 
2007, http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/ASF_2007_Notes.pdf, 24. 
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information was consistent with the no-action letters.
100 As a result, it has been clear since 
May 2004 that loan level information can be disclosed to investors as part of the 
informational and computational materials before the mortgage-backed securities are issued. 
  The SEC offering reform in 2005 liberalized securities offering practices for 
sophisticated issuers. Under the new rules, issuers of mortgage-backed securities may qualify 
as seasoned issuers (but not well-known seasoned issuers) and may always utilize free-
writing prospectuses after filing a base prospectus with the SEC.
101 Once the offering reform 
circular became effective at the end of 2005, issuers of mortgage-backed securities could 
utilize either informational and computational materials or free writing prospectuses to 
communicate information not included in the final prospectus to investors during the offering.  
Essentially all issuers started to use free writing prospectuses to communicate, as they offer 
more flexibility than the use of informational and computational materials.  
After the offering reform, the issuance of mortgage-backed securities usually starts 
from the identification of a mortgage pool and communications with potential investors, 
either orally or through free writing prospectuses. Issuers disclose a wide variety of 
preliminary information through free writing prospectuses such as proposed deal structures, 
presentations about the experience of the servicers, and draft prospectus supplements to 
targeted investors. Judging from the formats of some free writing prospectuses, apparently 
the issuers or underwriters are sometimes using free writing prospectuses to respond to 
specific written questionnaires prepared by potential investors.  Due to requirements under 
Regulation FD, these free writing prospectuses are often required to be filed with the SEC 
after use to avoid selective disclosure problems. During this marketing period, issuers and 
underwriters solicit orders from investors, negotiate with them and finalize the tranche 
structure based on investor needs. Usually, within a short period after the filing of the first 
                                                 
100 See SEC, supra note 84, 26683.     
101 See SEC, Securities Offering Reform. 
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free writing prospectus, the final prospectus supplement will be filed with the SEC, which, in 
combination with the base prospectus, will constitute the final 10(a) prospectus.     
The author has conducted a research on 2006 SEC filings for all publicly issued 
subprime mortgage-backed securities. The research indicates that issuers of most of these 
securities used free writing prospectuses to disclose loan-level data before filing the final 
prospectus supplement, although there was no uniform format for such disclosure. A few 
issuers did not disclose such information. However, it is not clear whether this is because the 
issuers refused to make such disclosure or the investors simply did not bother to ask for the 
loan-level data. It may quite be possible that the loan-level data provided through free writing 
prospectuses is not the same as that of the final mortgage pool as the issuer may decide to 
replace some or even the majority of the mortgage loans before the deal structure is finalized. 
However, there should be little difficulty for issuers to provide the final loan tape data if 
investors do make a request for it as they have disclosed at least the preliminary loan tape 
information to the investors. In the end, it may be fair to conclude that investors have had 
access to certain loan-level information at least since 2006. The collapse of the RMBS market 
was largely due to the poor performance of the 2006 vintage of mortgage-backed securities 
but access to loan-level information did not seem to have helped investors avoid bad 
decisions at all.    
B. Post-Securitization  Disclosure     
  Issuers of RMBS securities have always sought to suspend their periodic disclosure 
obligations by relying on the exemption under Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. As a matter of fact, PSAs often include a provision that the trustee has the obligation to 
ensure that the disclosure obligations are timely suspended. The suspension of disclosure 
obligations under federal securities laws does not mean investors will be kept in the dark 
though, as investors will continue receiving monthly reports similar to 10-D reports in 
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accordance with the reporting provisions under the PSAs. Such reports are delivered to 
investors through websites maintained by the trustees or the so-called “master servicers” or 
“securities administrators”, which are sometimes engaged to handle securities-related issues 
such as compiling reports to the SEC and certificateholders. In its written comment on 
Regulation AB, Wells Fargo claimed to act as master servicers or securities administrators to 
more than 80% of the public RMBS issuances as of May 2004.
102 All these websites are 
publicly accessible after free registrations, even if the applicants do not hold any RMBS 
securities. As the trustee market is highly concentrated, investors are able to obtain such 
reports on any securities by visiting only a few websites. Some data vendors aggregate 
monthly reports from various trustees and offer them on a one-stop basis.    
  Reports to certificateholders under the PSAs generally do not include updated loan-
level data. However, the disclosure websites now generally carry monthly loan-level data 
back to the issuance data for most, if not all of the RMBS transactions. It is not clear though 
whether this is the result of increased demands for transparency after the credit crisis or 
whether this has always been the case. In some RMBS transactions, the trustee has express 
discretion to disclose additional information to investors as it sees fit. The disclosure of 
updated loan-level data is likely to be an exercise of such discretion.       
  The strangest thing about RMBS securities probably is that even if securities laws 
have not required and trustees have not always disclosed updated loan-level data, such data is 
still available through private data vendors such as Bloomberg, Intex and LoanPerformance.
 
103 According to an 2006 ASF and TBMA survey, LoanPerformance claimed to track loan-
level data on 85% to 90% of the non-agency RMBS securities.
104 A 2008 news article 
                                                 
102 See Letter of Wells Fargo Bank, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72104/s72104-9.pdf, 3-4.  
103 See Nomura, Report from Orlando 2006: Coverage of Selected Sessions of ABS East 2006, 
http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/ABS_East_2006_Notes.pdf, 7. 
104 See The Bond Market Association and The American Securitization Forum, An Analysis and Description of 
Pricing and Information Sources in the Securitized and Structured Finance Markets, Oct. 2006, 
www.sifma.org/research/pdf/Pricing-Informaton_Sources_Study_1006.pdf, 83.    
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reported that the percentage at that time was 95%.
105 LoanPerformance does not receive its 
data from trustees; rather it contracts directly with large originators and servicers.
106 It has 
always been the data vendor for the three rating agencies and at least the earliest rating 
models of Moody’s and Fitch’s were built on the data provided by LoanPerformance. The 
availability of loan-level data from LoanPerformance even helped Fitch survive in the RMBS 
market because it was able to test its own rating model on those RMBS securities that it had 
not rated.
107  
 
105 See Ruth Simon, Mortgages Made in 2007 Go Bad at Rapid Clip – Delinquencies Worse Than 2006 
Vintgage; New Stress on Banks, Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 2008, At A3.  
106 See The Bond Market Association and The American Securitization Forum, supra note 104, 83. 
107 See Fitch, ResiLogic: U.S. Residential Mortgage Loss Model Technical Document, January 18, 2007, 2.     
Part IV  Anatomy of the Blame Game 
Part II of the paper reviews how non-agency RMBS transactions are put up. Part III 
describes the flow of information in this market. This part provides an analysis on the 
mortgage securitization process. The role of each key party to the securitization process will 
be discussed and the merits of some of the criticisms on them will be evaluated.   
1.  Investors, Product Complexities and Leverage 
  A.  Criticisms on Securitization Products 
Securitization products are the first to be blamed for causing the credit crisis. One 
criticism is that information disclosure on these products is insufficient and inaccurate.
 108 
The insufficiency argument has been indirectly discussed in the previous part by showing that 
the actual scope of disclosed information is much broader than that included in the prospectus 
supplement itself. The inaccuracy argument will be dealt with below together with the 
examination of the role of investment banks in the securitization process.  
Another widely-held view about the cause of the credit crisis is that structured 
products created by Wall Street rocket scientists are too complicated for investors to 
understand. There are concerns that investors may have not properly understood the 
structuring assumptions of some of the securities.
109 There are also criticisms that the 
disclosure documents are so full of legal jargons that investors could not get useful 
                                                 
108 See Letters to the Editor, Opacity Is the Problem With Securitized Mortgages, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 2008, At 
A16. (Professor James H. Stock argues that market fails when information is incomplete or manipulated.) See 
also L. Gordon Crovitz: Information Age: Seeking Rational Exuberance, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 2008, At A17. 
(Claiming that the credit crisis is a crisis of the lack of information and that law firms representing banks failed 
to draft adequate disclosure about investments in mortgage-backed securities. Lawyers didn’t fully explain the 
terms and conditions underlying securities, hiding their real risks. ) See also James R. Hagerty: Mortgage-Bond 
Pioneer Dislikes What He Sees, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 2007. See also, ___, Full Disclosure, Economist, Feb. 21, 
2009 (Arguing that subprime mortgage-backed securities can have prospectuses of about 500-600 pages, most 
of which are devoted to intricate legalese but they do not contain the information about individual loans that is 
needed to detect default risk.)   
109 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1109 
(2008), 1114.  
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information out of it. 
110 Many acknowledge the fact that the non-agency market is 
predominantly an institutional market and the investors in those structured products are not 
moms and pops but the most sophisticated institutional investors. Several explanations are 
offered as to why these institutional investors are willing to purchase financial products that 
they do not understand. They may do so out of fear that their ignorance may be exposed to 
the sellers.
111 Also, increasing specialization makes it possible that one’s knowledge in one 
type of products is not useful for another type of products. However, institutional investors do 
not want to hire specialized experts because they do not perceive the increased benefit from 
specialization could justify the cost of hiring these experts.
112 This line of argument points to 
the inevitable result that, instead of reviewing hundreds of pages of disclosure documents and 
looking for any sign of warning about the riskiness of the mortgage securities, investors turn 
to rating agencies for their analysis results presented in clear and easily understandable letter 
grades. Over-reliance on rating agencies has therefore caused the market to fail. 
Many of the criticisms on structured products target them as a group without 
differentiating the relative complexities between different structured products. At the bottom 
of the pyramid are RMBS securities, which are either held by investors directly or used to 
construct other structured products. For example, cash collateralized debt obligations 
(“CDOs”) are re-securitization of a basket of existing MBS securities. Then there are credit 
default swaps (“CDS”), which basically are bets on the default probability of certain 
reference MBS securities. Many CDOs are synthetic ones which emulate the performance of 
a batch of MBS securities. At last there are CDOs of CDOs (“CDO square”), which are 
securitization of existing CDO pieces. It should be noted that products such as CDO, CDS 
and CDO square, either cash or synthetic, are by no means confined only to the mortgage 
market. They are also widely used for other fixed income securities such as corporate bonds. 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id., 1115. 
112 Id. 
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Investments whose returns depend on the performance of a basket of other assets are 
commonplace in the investment world. Stocks, bonds, commodities, funds and effectively 
anything whose performance is traceable can be used as references. These techniques have 
for a long time been used to offer investors exposure to certain assets without actually buying 
them.  
Because of the differences, a fundamental distinction should be made between RMBS 
securities, which are a distinctive class of securities similar to stocks and bonds, and their 
derivatives forms such as CDS and CDO, which use RMBS securities as building materials. 
The distinction should also be made when dealing with criticisms on securitization products. 
B.  Did Complexities of RMBS Securities Cause the Crisis? 
There is no doubt that RMBS securities have complicated structures. However, there 
is doubt whether structural complexities are the cause of the credit crisis.  
First, the asset-backed securities market has already surpassed the corporate bond 
market in terms of issuance volume.
113 It is hard to imagine that investors will refuse to 
invest in specialized expertise in a multi trillion-dollar market. In particular, RMBS securities
have always been the backbone of the asset securitization market. It is very unlikely
institutional investors will not hire managers with expertise in RMBS securities and simply 
follow the directions of rating agencies. As a matter of fact, many investors have dedicated 
mortgage teams and there are investment funds dedicated to investments in mortgage-related 
products. As Figure 17 shows, even investors in the AAA-rated portion of RMBS securities, 
which are believed to constitute more than 85% of the total outstanding RMBS securities and 
likely to be invested by the most conservative investors, are by no means unsophisticated. In 
particular, it does not make much sense to suggest that the largest holders of AAA-rated 
 
 that 
                                                 
113 See MBS Handbook, 1.  
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securities, the two GSEs and federal home loan banks (“FHLBs”), do not understand how 
RMBS securities work.        
Figure 17 Holders of Non-Agency AAA Securities (as of end of 2008)  
Entity  Holdings (in billions)  Percentage (%) 
GSEs/FHLB 370  25.48% 
US banks/thrifts  315  21.69% 
Money managers  200  13.77% 
Insurance companies  190  13.09% 
Overseas 160  11.02% 
Hedge funds  100  6.89% 
Broker/dealers 75  5.17% 
REITs/others 42  2.89% 
Total 1,452  100% 
  (source: Barclays Capital research report
114) 
  Second, even if there is much to learn about RMBS securities, knowledge of one 
product can be re-used in investing in another product because issuances of RMBS securities 
are repeated transactions and even products issued by different issuers are very similar to 
each other, for the obvious reason that the less exotic the product is, the more investors will 
be attracted.  
  In a typical RMBS issuance, the base prospectus is more than 100 pages long. The 
prospectus supplement is typically between 100 to 200 pages long. If an investor wants to be 
thorough, she should also read the underlying transaction documents including the PSA and 
the servicing agreement, each of which is easily hundreds of pages long. However, one 
should not be fooled by the pure length of the disclosure documents. The information 
disclosed therein can be classified as structural information, i.e. information on how the 
mortgage pool is securitized, and asset and transaction party information, i.e. information on 
the asset pool and parties involved in the securitization. Structural information changes very 
little from transaction to transaction. For example, it is highly unlikely that the rights and 
obligations of the parties under the PSA will be completely rewritten from one transaction to 
the next transaction. The reason why such information needs to be repeated in each 
                                                 
114 See Barclays Capital, Residential Credit Outlook for 2009, 13 (formerly Lehman Brothers research report).  
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transaction is that the entire securitization structure is built by contract and the rights and 
obligations of every transaction party and the rights embodied in the securities need to be re-
established by contract each time for a new transaction.  
If the exact nature of a security needs to be described in a disclosure document, one 
may find the prospectus for a stock offering to be much longer and more complicated than 
that for an offering of RMBS securities because the entire text of the corporate code of the 
incorporation state as well as at least fundamental court cases have to be attached to the 
prospectus. No one invests in a stock only after she reads the entire corporate code word by 
word. By the same token, investors actually do not have to read a large portion of the 
disclosure documents each time. Even if they do, they can use document comparison 
software to quickly identify what has been changed to the disclosure document since last time.  
If structural information is taken out, what remain in each disclosure document are 
just short descriptions of transaction parties, which are also very likely to be recycled from 
transaction to transaction, and mortgage pool statistics, which are almost always presented 
based on the same standard form. It is fair to say that an experienced investor can quickly 
process the disclosed information and find everything she has not already known. 
  Third, what exactly has gone wrong in the securitization process? To structure a series 
of RMBS securities backed by a mortgage pool, the structurer has to do two things. First, the 
structurer must know how many loans in the mortgage pool will go bad and what the likely 
losses are. Second, based on the expected loss information, the structurer slices and dices the 
mortgage pool to create different securities. What has caused the credit crisis is a 
misjudgment by rating agencies and investors about the expected losses. Needless to say, 
they are much higher than expected. The complexity of the transaction structures simply does 
not matter - even if these mortgage pools were sold as whole loans, the same amount of loss 
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would still have occurred. The only difference is that holders of RMBS securities do not 
share the losses on a pro rata basis. Rather the junior tranches would be hit first. 
C.  How Are Investors Supposed to Invest in RMBS Securities? 
  What should an investor do before investing in RMBS securities? It seems that the 
investor should do exactly what the rating agencies would do before assigning their ratings. 
The investor should first build its own model that can be used to predict the expected loss of a 
given mortgage pool. It should then use the model to calculate the expected loss of the 
mortgage pool and evaluate the safety of the securities it intends to invest in. For such a 
purpose, the investor must have access to loan level data that its own model requires for the 
calculation. 
  It is not clear how many investors have actually done this. Building a model as 
sophisticated as those used by rating agencies definitely needs time and money. It is unlikely 
that investors will get whatever loan-level data they want – it may be difficult for investors to 
get loan-level data beyond what has been disclosed to rating agencies on the loan tape. Some 
investors in the market definitely have the capacity to build their own models but it is likely 
that a lot of the existing investors in RMBS securities do not see the additional benefit to 
build a model that outperforms those of the rating agencies. Reliance on rating agencies is 
definitely a major cause of the credit crisis but the existence of reliance is not because the 
securities are complicated, rather investors are relying on rating agencies to perform a credit 
analysis of the entire mortgage pool. 
And indeed it may not be the tradition of the market for investors to worry about 
credit risks. “The investor did not have to become a home loan savant. He or she did not have 
to know very much, if anything, about the underlying mortgages. .. The credit mechanisms 
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were designed to be bulletproof, almost risk free. ”
115 The idea behind these RMBS securities, 
according to its creator, is to free investors from credit risk concerns and let them focus their 
attentions on other risks. One issuer actually lamented the fact that investors had been asking 
for more and more information about the underlying mortgage pools and believed that this 
was against the original idea of securitization.
116  
Most of the developments of RMBS securities in early days were in the agency 
market where the credit risk was outsourced to the GSEs.
 117 With regard to the non-agency 
market, until 2000 the majority of the securities issued had been guaranteed by monoline 
bond insurers. Investors would still require information about the underlying mortgage loans 
to calculate the prepayment risk, on which they have already had abundant experience from 
the agency market. The GSEs have not disclosed loan level data when they issue RMBS 
securities and investors have been used to calibrating prepayment risks based on aggregate 
pool information considering loan-level data to be unnecessary.
118 One can only assume that 
the SEC has impliedly endorsed the idea that investors do not have to conduct their own 
credit analysis about the underlying mortgage pool and should rely on rating agencies, or else 
its policy not to require disclosure of loan-level data makes little sense, because only with 
loan-level data can one make a correct decision on credit risks.   
D.  Did CDOs Cause the Credit Crisis? 
  The problem in the non-agency mortgage market was brought to the attention of the 
general public because of the bust of a couple of hedge funds and structured investment 
vehicles managed by large financial institutions.
119 Then there were massive write-offs of 
CDOs, some of which were even originally AAA-rated. Ever since then the public and 
                                                 
115 Lewis Ranieri, supra note 7, 37. 
116 See Mark Korell, supra note 49, 99. 
117 See Lewis Ranieri, supra note 7, 36. 
118 See Task Force on Mortgage-Backed Securities Disclosure, supra note 4, 45. 
119 See in general, Charles R. Morris, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS AND 
THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH (Public Affairs, 2008).  
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politicians have been fixated on complicated financial products such as CDOs and CDS. 
Everyone seems to have a say as to how these toxic products of financial alchemy have been 
clogging the financial system.  
  It is hardly surprising that complicated CDOs were the first to get busted in the crisis 
because they composed of mainly junior tranches of MBS securities and were naturally more 
susceptible to credit risks. Traditionally these riskier junior tranches were purchased by 
sophisticated investors that had significant investment experiences in RMBS.
120 During that 
period, CDO products also existed but the underlying assets were predominantly high-yield 
bonds. The poor performance of these bond CDOs in early 2000s made people want to find 
new assets for CDOs. RMBS securities were chosen because of their historical strong 
performances.
121 According to Moody’s, the share of CDOs backed by asset-backed 
securities in the CDO market grew from less than10% to 60% from 1999 to 2006. (Figure 18) 
Although subprime mortgage-backed securities were widely used to structure such CDOs, 
they never represented more than 50% of the underlying assets of cash and hybrid CDOs of 
asset-backed securities during this period. A large portion of the CDOs were backed by prime 
and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities. (Figure 19)  
Figure 18 
                                                 
120 See Adelson & Jacob Consulting, LLC, supra note 14, 3. 
121 Jian Hu: Assessing the Credit Risk of CDOs Backed by Structured Finance Securities: Rating Analysts’ 
Challenges and Solutions, Journal of Structured Finance, Fall 2007, 43-59, 43-44. 
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Figure 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jian Hu 
122 
Did CDOs cause the credit crisis? The answer is yes and no. 
The performance of a CDO is entirely dependent on the performance of the 
underlying assets, which usually are hundreds of junior tranches of RMBS securities. All the 
                                                 
122 Id., Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5. 
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fundamental information required to price a CDO comes from the mortgage pools backing 
those underlying securities. Such information has already been disclosed in the disclosure 
documents accompanying the issuances of these securities. The information is also available 
from private information vendors such as LoanPerformance. For rating agencies, the 
information is even more easily accessible since the top two rating agencies, Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s, have rated the majority of the underlying RMBS securities in the first 
place. If an investor could predict how each RMBS piece will perform based on the 
information on the underlying mortgage pool, the investor should be able to assess how the 
entire CDO could perform. The opposite is also true. If an investor systematically 
underestimates the risk of each RMBS piece, which is sadly the case here, there is no way the 
pricing of the CDO can be correct. In this sense, the credit crisis was not attributable to CDOs 
and other derivative products but the mispricing at the original mortgage pool level.     
Figure 20 Percentage of Non-Agency RMBS Rated By Top Three Rating Agencies 
Company  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001 
S&P  93.6% 93.7% 93.4% 94.7% 93.5% 92.2% 85.1% 
Moody’s  82.0% 91.8% 89.0% 85.3% 72.2% 79.0% 77.5% 
Fitch  47.3% 43.9% 42.5% 44.0% 60.0% 56.6% 67.5% 
(Source: Inside Mortgage Finance) 
On the other hand, the existence of complicated products referenced to RMBS 
securities did make the collapse more likely to happen. As a CDO adopts a senior/subordinate 
structure similar to that of RMBS securities, the aggregate credit risk of the underlying junior 
tranches of RMBS securities is further disproportionally allocated to the junior tranches of 
the CDO and probably further to the junior tranches of CDO squares. The pricing error, 
which may be tolerable at the RMBS level, is gradually escalated to a catastrophic mispricing 
when the securities are re-securitized again and again. It is no wonder that an early sign of 
problem in subprime RMBS securities could quickly wipe out the value of an entire hedge 
fund investing heavily in the riskiest portions of these securities. Concentration of risk has 
made certain entities much more likely to fail and the spectacular failure of a few institutions 
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is more likely to send a shock to the market than a little loss to everyone, causing market 
frenzy and loss of faith in the entire system. 
Synthetic products and high leverages have also magnified the total losses, which may 
be much higher than actual losses on the underlying mortgage pools.
123 Products such as 
synthetic CDOs or CDS are essentially just bets between transaction parties about the 
performance of certain securities, although the derivatives industry has always distanced 
itself from the gambling industry. Some of the bets are without doubt for hedging purposes or 
for the purpose of diversification and gaining exposure to the mortgage market indirectly. 
However, if the general characteristic of derivatives trading also holds true in the mortgage 
market, a lot of the bets are purely speculative. What further exacerbates the problem is the 
fact that many transaction parties to these bets were highly leveraged. Hedge funds borrowed 
heavily by using their AAA-rated CDOs as collateral and protection sellers such as AIG 
wrote credit default swaps without the need to putting aside any capital because it was not 
regulated as insurance products.
124 Combining these double-edged finance techniques, 
financial engineers have created a financial system that is much more sensitive to small 
movements and unexpected events, i.e. a system that is much easier to fail.     
2.  Originate-to-Sell Model and Rating Models 
A.  Criticisms on the Origination-to-Sell Model 
To a lot of the critics looking at the other end of the securitization process, the cause 
of the credit crisis is so obvious – over the years originators relaxed their underwriting 
                                                 
123 See Carrick Mollenkamp and Serena Ng: Wall Street Wizardry Amplified Credit Crisis – A CDO Called 
Norma Left “Hairball of Risk”; Tailored by Merrill Lynch, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2007, At A1. (The use of 
derivatives “multiplied the risk” The subprime-mortgage crisis is far greater in terms of potential losses than 
anyone expected because it is not just physical loans that are defaulting.)  
124 See Joe Nocera: Propping Up A House of Cards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2009, At Sec. B, P.1. 
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standards and made too many bad loans that should have never been made.
 125 The evidence 
is said to be abundant. Many of the securitized loans have loan-to-value ratios as high as 95% 
percent, which means that if the property value drops by 5%, the borrower will be under 
water.
 126 Over time the documentation of borrower income has become loosened. According 
to LoanPerformance, 25% of the subprime mortgage loans originated in 2001 were made to 
borrowers with little or no income verification. In 2006, the percentage rose to 45%.
127 These 
“liar’s loans” were often extended to borrowers who could not qualify for full-documentation 
loans. Lastly, many lenders were under investigations for predatory lending practices that 
tricked people into borrowing under expensive terms. 
According to the critics, the originate-to-sell model creates a classic moral hazard 
problem - originators originate bad loans because they do not bear the consequences once 
they quickly get rid of them through securitization. As a result, they have the incentive to 
reduce their screening efforts once the chances of securitization increase.
 128 There are reports 
that originators keep good loans on their own balance sheets and sell bad loans to the 
secondary market.
 129 Rating agencies have also contributed their research. They have found 
that loans originated by different originators would perform very differently with some 
having much higher default rates than others.
 130 This suggests that the source of the loans has 
a significant impact on their performance as different originators exert different levels of 
efforts when originating the loans.  
                                                 
125 See Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame In the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. Times, Sep. 30, 2007, Sec. 3, Pg. 4. 
See also Standard & Poor’s, supra note 16.   
126 See Nicole Gelinas, The Rise of the Mortgage “Walkers”, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 2008, At A17.  
127 See Damian Paletta, Subprime Players Get Washington Summons – Regulators Ask Wall Street If Investor 
Demand led to Looser Loan Standards, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 2007, At A2.  
128 See Benjamin J., Keys, Mukherjee, Tanmoy K., Seru, Amit and Vig, Vikrant, Did Securitization Lead to Lax 
Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans(April 2008). EFA 2008 Athens Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137. 
129 See James R. Hagerty and Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Feels Bite of Move Into Mortgage-Backed Securities – 
Delinquency Rates Among the Highest In Banking Industry, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 2009, At C8. (Reporting that 
Bank of America’s loans kept on its own books have performed better than those sold in the form of securities.) 
130 See Standard & Poor’s, The Spotlight's On US Alt-A RMBS Issuers As Performance Deteriorates Rapidly, 
Dec. 20, 2007 (Arguing that issuer differences are significant.) See also Standard & Poor’s, US Subprime RMBS 
Performance Update August 2008 Distribution Date, Sept. 30, 2008 (Reporting comparisons of issuer practice 
differences).  
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B.  The Meaning of Risk-based Pricing  
The arguments blaming originators for creating the mess have failed to recognize the 
role of risk-based pricing mechanisms in investments. Loans extended to less creditworthy 
borrowers do not necessarily translate into bad lending decisions. The increased lending rate 
may well cover the additional risk associated with the decline of borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
It is clearly possible that one may make a profit from lending to borrowers with bad credits if 
she can price the risk properly and lose money from lending to borrowers with much better 
credits if she gets the pricing calculation wrong.  
For RMBS securities, if one agrees that a downgrade by rating agencies after the 
initial rating translates into a mispricing at the first place, it is not even clear whether so far 
investors have lost more from investing in subprime loans than from investing in Alt-A loans, 
which generally have better credit qualities. Figure 21 lists the total downgrades of structured 
mortgage products issued between the first quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2007 by 
Standard and Poor’s as of the end of 2008.
131 An interesting observation is that 31% of the 
Alt-A RMBS securities, calculated according to the original issuance volume, have been 
downgraded, of which 58% of the downgrades are from investment-grade to speculative-
grade. The downgrade percentage for the subprime RMBS securities is actually lower – at 
27% - and of which 60% are from investment-grade to speculative-grade. Of course there is a 
possibility that the downgrades of subprime RMBS securities are generally more severe than 
the downgrades of Alt-A RMBS securities. For example, most subprime RMBS securities 
may be downgraded directly from AAA to CCC while most Alt-A downgrades are from 
single A to BBB. No matter whether this is the case, the comparison illustrates the point that 
it is wrong to only focus on the qualities of the loans and blame originators for originating 
                                                 
131 See Standard & Poor’s, Structured Finance Rating Transition and Default Update As of Dec. 12, 2008, Dec. 
19, 2008. 
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bad loans. How accurately these loans have been priced at securitization also directly affects 
the total losses that the investors will finally suffer.       
Figure 21 S&P: Original Issuance-Based Cumulative Performance And CreditWatch
132  
U.S. RMBS, CDOs of ABS, and SIV lites for Q1 2005-Q3 2007 vintages       
Subsector 
Original 
issuance 
(in 
billions) 
Down 
graded 
% of 
issuance
IG to 
SG 
% of 
downgraded Defaulted 
CW 
negative
Downgraded 
CW 
negative 
U.S. CDO cash 
flow CDO of ABS  261.87  233.21  89.06% 192.64 82.60% 6.74 143.11 140.78
U.S. CDO hybrid 
(mainly CDO of 
ABS) 166.53  149.28  89.64% 138.69 92.91% 29.88  53.12 48.68
Global CDO 
market value/SIV 
lites 33.59  2.42  7.20% 1.98 81.82% 1.89 5.21 0.19
U.S. synthetic 
CDO of ABS  52.25  17.13  32.78% 12.64 73.79% 0.18 2.64 2.47
Total 514.24  402.04  78.18% 345.95 86.05% 38.68  204.08 192.13
U.S. RMBS Alt-A  1,029.36  319.54  31.04% 186.1 58.24% 1.95 35.1 3.83
U.S. RMBS CES  82.74  70.47  85.17% 38.9 55.20% 13.11 1.46 0.21
U.S. RMBS NIMS  26.06  16.05  61.59% 13.44 83.74%  1.61 0.25
U.S. RMBS-other  204.97  60.3  29.42% 20.67 34.28% 0.46 20.19 6.25
U.S. RMBS prime  359.11  53.41  14.87% 10.57 19.79% 0.26 0.44  
U.S. RMBS 
subprime  1,056.77 287.68  27.22% 174.89 60.79% 10.35 36.29 5.15
Total 2,759.01  807.46  29.27% 444.57 55.06% 26.13 95.08 15.7
ALL 3,273.25  1,209.50  36.95% 790.52 65.36% 64.81 299.17 207.82
  
C.  Overview of Key Underwriting Practices        
Another weakness of the criticisms on originators is that they fail to distinguish 
relaxed underwriting practices that investors are aware of from those relaxations that have 
been hidden from the investors.
133 For example, investors and rating agencies are well aware 
of the existence of liar’s loans. As discussed below, rating agencies have even developed 
                                                 
 
132 Downgrades include IG to SG as well as defaults; IG to SG includes defaults; and CW negative includes 
downgraded CW negative dollar amounts. IG—Investment grade. SG—Speculative grade. CW—CreditWatch. 
SIV lites—Structured investment vehicle lites. Alt-A—Alternative A. CES—Closed-end second lien. NIMS—
Net interest margin securities. 
133 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 16.  
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coding systems and required issuers to assign a correct documentation code to each loan. It 
does not take the mind of a genius to figure out that loans with no documentation or low 
documentation of income and asset can be easily manipulated by borrowers. The same is true 
about loans with high loan-to-value ratios, loans with complicated features such as adjustable 
rate mortgages and loans borrowed for investment purposes. If investors are aware of the 
relaxations, it is strange that the originators should be blamed for originating them because 
investors could have bargained for a higher discount on purchase prices or simply refused to 
buy securities backed by these loans.  
It should be conceded that there is doubt whether some of the originators’ 
underwriting practices are sound and if they are not, whether the risk has always been 
adequately disclosed. To understand what may have gone wrong with origination practices, 
this section provides an overview of three key aspects of origination practices focusing in 
turn on one of the three “Cs”, i.e., character, collateral and capacity. 
In late 2007, Fitch conducted a widely-cited research focusing on the impact of poor 
underwriting practices on the performance of subprime RMBS securities.
134 Fitch’s basic 
view was that data integrity issues (e.g. debt-to-income ratios were incorrectly stated on the 
loan tape) might not be the primary driver of the underperformance of these securities. Rather, 
data that is technically accurate but does not reflect the true credit risks of the borrowers 
might have a more significant impact. To assess the validity of such claims, Fitch reviewed 
the mortgage loan files for a sample of 45 loans originated in 2006 that suffered early defaults. 
Many of the loans had apparently strong credit characteristics such as high FICO scores. 
Some of Fitch’s findings are as follows: 
                                                 
134 See Fitch, The Impact of Poor Underwriting Practices and Fraud in Subprime RMBS Performance, 
November 28, 2007. 
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•  66% of the loans involve occupancy fraud. The property is stated as owner-
occupied but has never been occupied according to information provided by 
borrower or field inspector. 
•  51% of the loans have property value or condition issues. The appraisal done by 
Fitch is materially different from original appraisal or original appraisal contained 
conflicting information or items outside of typically accepted parameters. 
•  48% of the loans involve alleged first time homebuyers whose credit reports 
showed mortgage information. 
•  44% of the loans have questionable stated income or employment that is often in 
conflict with credit report information or cannot be reasonably explained. 
•  22% of the loans involve fraud alerts noted on credit reports.  
•  18% of the loans involve credit reports that show questionable ownership of 
accounts (name or social security numbers do not match). 
•  16% of the loans involve credit reports based on “authorized” user accounts. 
•  16% of the loans involve strawbuyer/flip scheme indicated based on evidence in 
servicing file. 
One must realize that the list above is not representative, because the sample is too 
small and the selection criteria (early default loans) are biased. In addition, it should be noted 
that the third highest ratio in the list, 48% of the loans involving first time homebuyers 
actually means that originators have suffered a loss by not checking the information, as rating 
agencies believe loans to first time homebuyers will perform worse than loans to other buyers 
because they tend to “underestimate the true costs of home ownership.”
135 The rest of the 
findings can be categorized into issues relating to three factors: character, collateral and 
capacity issues. 
                                                 
135 See Moody’s, supra note 72, 14.  
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(1) FICO  Scores 
Long gone are the times when loan officers judge the character of a borrower by 
feeling the firmness of her handshake. FICO score is everything. Despite of warnings that 
FICO scores may not accurately reflect an individual borrower’s creditworthiness in 
borrowing long-term debts because they are designed primarily for short-term consumer 
lending, there is no doubt that FICO scores are the very first factor considered by most 
mortgage lenders before they make a loan. Rating agencies inevitably require FICO scores to 
be reported on loan tapes. Fitch even publicly lists FICO scores as the No.1 factor in its 
calculation of frequencies of foreclosure.  
It is widely known that FICO scores can be fairly easily manipulated by ordinary 
people. And if people do not want to take the trouble, there are thousands of credit repair 
companies just one click away although many if not all of them are scams. One way to boost 
one’s FICO score is to dispute with credit bureaus about certain negative credit histories 
listed on the credit reports. By law credit bureaus have thirty days to investigate but they have 
so many to investigate, partly because there are indeed a lot of errors in credit reports.
136 A 
credit repair company may take advantage of the loophole and send numerous complaining 
letters. Often times credit bureaus will simply take out the negative items without 
investigation.  
Another way to boost one’s FICO scores is piggybacking. A borrower may pay a 
credit repair company to find someone with sterling credit agreeing to add the borrower as 
the “authorized user” of a credit card account of the second person. Within a few months’ 
time, the borrower’s FICO scores may be inflated by 50-100 points. The credit bureaus and 
the company designing the algorithm, Fair Isaac Corporation, are all well aware of such 
piggybacking abuses. The newest version, FICO ’08, have already plugged the loophole by 
                                                 
136 15 U.S.C.§1681i (a)(1).    
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ignoring such authorized accounts.
137 Still there are ways to pump up one’s credit score with 
some institutional assistance. For example, as credit bureaus collect information from all 
kinds of sources, a company may report to credit bureaus that it has opened a proprietary 
account for a customer with a high credit limit. The existence of such a credit line will help 
improve the borrower’s FICO scores, although the borrower actually cannot tap the credit 
line.
138  
(2)  Property Appraisal Value 
An accurate appraisal of the mortgaged property is fundamental to the calculation of 
loan-to-value ratio. However, property appraisal is more of an art than science and the 
appraisal value is inherently subjective. Different appraisal methods require different levels 
of investigations. The latest Standard and Poor’s rating model accepts nine types of appraisal 
methods.
139 The most complete appraisal is a full appraisal on URAR Form 1004 while the 
most cost-effective appraisal method is appraisal through an automated appraisal model 
software (“AVM”), which compares the appraisal value with comparable sales prices in the 
neighborhood nearby. Many loan originators use AVM extensively as a quality control 
measure. Due diligence firms also use AVM to check appraised values when they conduct 
due diligence on the mortgage pools.     
Figure 22 Standard and Poor’s Appraisal Classifications 
Appraisal Method  Description
140 
Tax Assessment  The valuation of the property by a public tax assessor for the purpose of tax 
assessment. 
Broker Price Opinion  An opinion of the value f a property from a local real estate broker based on 
comparable properties for sale (or sold) in the subject property’s location. 
Drive-By (Form 704)  More commonly known as the "drive-by" report, this form is used primarily for 
second mortgages and home equity loans. This is generally exterior-only and includes 
a comparable approach with an estimate of value given on the subject property by the 
appraiser. This report may or may not include photos. 
Full appraisal (URAR 
Form 1004 and 
More commonly known as the "full appraisal," the actual name of the report is the 
Uniform Residential Appraisal Report (URAR). This report encompasses a detailed 
                                                 
137 See Dean Foust, et. al., Credit Scores: Not-So-Magic Numbers, Business Week, Feb. 18, 2008, 38.  
138 Id. 
139 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Residential Mortgage Input File Format For LEVELS Version 6.5, Nov. 25, 
2008.   
140 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Appendixes to Glossary for File Format For LEVELS Version 5.7, Oct. 20, 
2006. 
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equivalents)  interior and exterior inspection (including neighborhood analysis) and has several 
addendums including plot graphs, photographs, appraiser representations and 
warranties, and environmental information. The 1004C and 70B forms are used to 
obtain the appraiser's analysis and estimate of the value of single-family properties 
and PUD units that secure first or second mortgages. Form 1004C and Form 70B, 
Manufactured Home Appraisal Report (3/05), are new and distinct forms. 
Property Inspection and 
Marketability Reports 
(Form 2070 and Form 
2075) 
These reports are not appraisal reports. They are generally exterior-only (Form 2070 
may be interior also) inspection reports that require an inspection of the subject 
property from the street by a state-licensed or state-certified appraiser without an 
estimate of market value for the property. 
Form 2055, Form 1075, 
Form 466, and Form 
2095 (Exterior only) 
This form is a property inspection report in which an exterior inspection is 
performed, and is used to document appraisals for one-family properties (including 
units in condominium or PUD projects). It requires a quantitative sales comparison 
analysis in which the appraiser assigns a dollar value to reflect the market's reaction 
to any features of comparable sales that differ from those of the subject property. 
Form 2055, Exterior-Only Inspection Residential Appraisal Report (03/05), is a new 
and distinct form. The Form 2055 with Interior and Exterior and Exterior Only 
inspection options was retired as of Nov. 1, 2005, (Fannie Mae) and Jan. 1, 2006 
(Freddie Mac). The code should remain in place indefinitely for the use in credit-
enhancing seasoned mortgages. 
Form 2055 (with 
Interior Inspection ) 
Same as above, with interior inspection 
Automated Valuation 
Model 
Automated system that is used to derive a property value without the opinion of an 
appraiser. These systems are typically hedonic models or repeat sales indices. 
No Appraisal/Stated 
Value 
The value of the subject property as declared by the borrower on the loan application. 
No valuation verifications are made. 
    The subjective nature of property appraisal and the flexibilities of different appraisal 
methods make it a good candidate for manipulation by all interested parties. First, a home 
owner with no equity in her house because of property value declines may find an appraiser 
to inflate the property value, get a home equity loan and mail the key to the bank immediately 
after closing.
 141 This is particularly workable in states such as California, where lenders are 
prohibited from going after personal assets of mortgage borrowers. A home buyer may also 
do tricks to buy a house with 100% debt financing. As a 15%-20% difference in appraisal 
value is usually within the margin of error tolerated by the appraisal industry, a property 
seller may cooperate with a buyer with no money to make the customary 20% down payment 
to get a “cash-back mortgage”. They first artificially inflate the purchase price by 25%. Then 
they get a bank willing to lend up to 80% of the inflated purchase price, which equals to real 
purchase price agreed upon by the parties. Finally the property seller gives the rest 20% to the 
borrower so that the borrower can make the 20% down payment required by the bank. 
                                                 
141 See Ranieri, supra note 7, 39. 
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Eventually the seller gets exactly the same purchase price she wants and the borrower gets a 
house 100% financed by the bank.
142   
Second, mortgage brokers may team up with unscrupulous appraisers to inflate 
property value so that their customers could get the loan and they could get their 
commissions. Originators generally would require brokers to choose only from the appraisers 
they approve. However, mortgage originators serving the non-agency market are only 
supposed to keep the mortgage loans for a couple of months. Originators, like brokers, have 
strong incentives to get as high an appraisal value as possible so that they may later sell the 
loan at the best price. Indeed, during the credit crisis, there were allegations that originators 
would pick property appraisers that would be willing to revise their appraisal results so that 
the deal could get through.
143 Some would also threaten to cut business with those appraisers 
who decline to cooperate. Under the originate-to-sell model, one should fully expect that 
originators’ behaviors would be fundamentally different if they expect to hold the mortgage 
loans on their own balance sheets. In the latter case, originators would naturally be more 
conservative and discredit any appraisal result they do not believe in. In addition, pumping up 
appraisal results when originators keep their own loans is also more difficult as originators 
tend to work directly with borrowers instead of through mortgage brokers and they know the 
property value in the neighborhoods they do business in.    
(3) Income  Documentation 
The debt-to-income ratio of a borrower determines her capacity to repay the loan. 
How a borrower’s income is required to be documented affects many borrowers’ ability to 
borrow a mortgage loan. Borrowers who are self-employed or who do not have stable income 
                                                 
142 For a detailed analysis of such cash-back mortgages, see Itzhak Ben-David, Manipulation of Collateral 
Values by Borrowers and Intermediaries, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=991387 .  
143 See Amir Efrati, SEC Probes WaMu on Appraisals – Regulator Checks Handling Of Loans Possibly Based 
On Inflated Valuations, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 2007, At A2. (Reporting that SEC and New York Attorney General 
investigated whether Washington Mutual compromised the independence of appraisers it hired.) See also Amir 
Efrati, New York Sues First American Unit In Probe of Home-Loan Appraisals, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 2007, At A4. 
David Cho, Pressure at Mortgage Firm Led to Mass Approval of Bad Loans, Washington Post, May 7, 2007. 
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often could not satisfy the more stringent documentation requirements for prime loans. In the 
Alt-A and subprime sectors, loan originators usually relax certain aspects of the traditional 
“full documentation” requirements to cater to the needs of those borrowers. Different lenders 
have developed very different documentation programs. In addition to full documentation, 
there are “reduced documentation”,” limited documentation”, “documentation lite”, 
“streamline program”, “stated income program” and many others. Each program specifies the 
types of information it requires.  
Due to lack of standardization, documentation programs of different originators are 
often not comparable. Rating agencies have always known the documentation differences and 
have designed different coding systems. From 2004 to 2008, Standard and Poor’s system 
recognized six types of documentation programs.
144 Moody’s had a similar five-grade system 
for full doc, alt doc, limited doc, reduced doc and no doc before the credit crisis.
145 
According to Moody’s itself, the documentation system was not comprehensive enough to 
capture the nuances in the industry. In November 2006, it significantly updated its 
documentation system and designed a documentation program of sixteen types with very 
detailed definitions for each type and a special treatment of “special programs” pre-verified 
by Moody’s similar to the streamline programs defined by Standard and Poor’s.
146   
Figure 23 Standard and Poor’s Documentation Coding System 
Code  Description
147 
C  No income and employment verification; asset verification required only for purchase money 
loans. (Standard & Poor's definition of asset verification is the confirmation of funds used for a 
down payment and closing costs on a purchase money mortgage loan. If a purchase loan does 
not have assets verified, an increase to the foreclosure frequency is assessed. Asset verification 
is not required for refinance transactions, either rate/term or cashout as it is a means of 
determining the source of funds for a down payment and therefore not applicable to refinance 
transactions.) 
V  Verbal verification of employment (VVOE- encompassing currently employed, start date, 
                                                 
144 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Appendixes to Glossary for File Format for LEVELS Version 5.6, Oct. 18, 
2004; Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Appendixes to Glossary for File Format for LEVELS Version 5.7, Oct. 20, 
2006; and Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Appendixes to Glossary for File Format for LEVELS Version 6.3, Mar. 14, 
2008.    
145 See Moody’s, Moody’s Approach to Coding Subprime Residential Mortgage Documentation Programs: 
Updated Methodology, Nov. 28, 2006.   
146 Id.  
147 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 140. 
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position, and probability of continued employment). 
X   Less than 12 months income and employment verified through pay stubs, bank statements, or 
any other verifiable form (typically one pay stub and VVOE). 
Y  12 to 23 months income and employment verified through W-2s, pay stubs, bank statements, or 
any other verifiable form (typically one pay stub and one W-2 and VVOE for salaried 
borrowers or one-year federal tax form 1040 for self-employed borrowers). 
S  Streamline (a refinance program designed for portfolio retention whereby the current servicer 
may refinance an existing borrower. This field is only to be used for a Standard & Poor's 
approved streamlined refinance program). 
Z  24 months or more income and employment verified through W-2s, 1040s, bank statements, or 
any other verifiable form). 
 
It was not clear how Fitch coded documentation programs before the credit crisis. In 
August 2007, it updated its documentation program to the matrix system below
148:  
Figure 24 
 
The lightest documentation requirement, of course, is no documentation, or the so-
called NINJA (No Income, No Job, Asset) or NINA (No Income, No Asset) loans. Some of 
the documentation programs are apparently open invitations to cheat. One may leave the 
phone number of her friend as her employer’s contact information and pass the verbal 
employment verification. She may also take a couple of months to make a fake bank 
statement by depositing money borrowed from friends. If a documentation program only 
requires borrowers to state their income in the application and no one will verify it, some 
                                                 
148 See Fitch, supra note 79, 4. 
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applicants will definitely lie. Understandably loans originated under documentation programs 
less stringent than “full documentation” perform worse. However, interest rates charged on 
these loans are increased accordingly to compensate the incremental credit risks.
149 There are 
other compensating factors. For example, loans with low documentation or no documentation 
are often required to have much lower loan-to-value ratios and significant down payments.
150 
Some originators apparently examine the reasonableness of stated incomes by surveying the 
income levels of the borrowers’ professions in the neighboring regions. One thing that most 
originators may have not done so far, though, is verification of the stated income with tax 
authorities. Apparently almost all mortgage borrowers have granted originators powers to 
access their tax returns by signing IRS 4506T forms (Request for Transcript of Tax Return). 
Originators have refused to use tax returns to verify the stated incomes, citing reasons such as 
the service is too costly ($20 dollars/file) or it is too time-consuming (1 business day).
151  
D.  Who Made the Rules? 
In its research report, Fitch concluded that failure by originators to apply prudent 
origination practices was the major reason why the data provided to rating agencies, though 
technically accurate, did not reflect the true credit risks of the borrowers. It claimed that 
mortgage originators could have checked credit reports for conflicting information and 
performed additional research in case of doubt. Originators could also have used AVMs as a 
cost-effective way to flag out suspicious appraisal results and conducted review appraisals. 
With regard to stated income loans, originators could have adopted reasonableness tests and 
                                                 
149 See MBS Handbook, 20. 
150 Id.  
151 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Road Not Taken By Lenders, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2008, Sec. BU, P. 1. 
(Reporting that a company selling its IRS verification services was rejected by many lenders because they 
claimed it was too costly ($20 per loan) or too time-consuming (one business day). People only used the service 
when spot-check the quality of the loans after they were made. Also discussing the possibility of selling 
fraudulent loans back. ) 
- 79 -  
if the stated income fell outside of the parameters by an established variance, they could have 
conducted additional research.  
Of course originators could do all of the above and make better-underwritten loans. 
The only problem is that an originator would not have any benefit if it does anything that 
rating agencies’ models do not capture. An originator may know a lot about a borrower by 
checking her credit reports but all that matters in the credit rating agencies’ models is the 
FICO score itself. Rating agencies recognize a wide range of property appraisal methods, 
some of which, for example a full appraisal, are treated more favorably than others, for 
example an appraisal by AVM. As a result, the calculation most originators will do is 
comparing the cost saved by a less comprehensive appraisal method and the additional price 
increase if a more comprehensive appraisal method is carried out. An originator may well 
decide that it is better off if it only conducts an AVM appraisal rather than a full appraisal. 
An originator may do the same calculation and design its documentation programs that 
receive the maximum benefits from rating agencies’ models. For example, an originator is 
likely to verify only 12 rather than 23 months of income and employment if it designs a 
documentation program that it wants to be coded as “Y” under Standard and Poor’s 
documentation coding system. Eventually whatever originators believe to be the right 
underwriting practices do not count at all. Rating agencies make the final judgment call on 
the value of the mortgages they originate by assigning different foreclosure frequencies and 
loss severity levels to different loans.    
In a market where rating agencies have the final say, it is unlikely that originators 
have the incentive not to follow their commands. Actually even if an originator really wants 
to stand out and sticks to its own rules, it is unlikely to be rewarded by the market. Small 
originators’ loans are likely to be mixed with other loans when being securitized, which 
makes it hard for these originators to demonstrate their track records. Lenders with stricter 
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rules will be shunned by mortgage brokers and lose out to those that follow the standards of 
the rating agencies. Finally, when the real estate market is booming, there will be no 
significant performance difference between loans originated under different standards. 
Actually bad loans are likely to be better sought after because of better returns.
152 When the 
market collapses, even good lenders suffer.
153      
As a matter of fact, it is even not good policy to let originators decide what to 
originate under the originate-to-sell model. Critics have wrongly characterized the 
relationship between the originators and the secondary market. Purchasers of mortgage-
backed securities are sophisticated institutional investors and they are further assisted by 
investment banks and rating agencies. The principle of caveat emptor should apply. In 
addition, as most of the originators in the non-agency market have made it clear that 
marketability of the loans is their top concern, investors should expect that originators will 
make whatever loans the market is willing to purchase and should therefore impose effective 
controls on the quality of the loans.  
In addition, most originators in the non-agency market do not ask themselves the 
hypothetical question whether to keep the loans they originate on their own balance sheets or 
to securitize them in the secondary market. As originators rely heavily on short-term 
financing rather than deposits to finance their operations, they originate non-conforming 
loans with a clear view to sell them. The real question they will ask themselves is whether to 
securitize the mortgage loans or to sell them to whole loan traders. Whatever the choice they 
make, it is crucial that the mortgage loans must be securitized within the first few months 
after origination. As a result, loan originators are supposed to hold the loans for only a short 
period of time under the originate-to-sell model. If so, it seems very strange to suggest that an 
                                                 
152 For example, New Century’s loans were sought after in the early years because they were cheap and 
performed well. See David Cho, supra note 143.  
153 See Nelson D. Schwartz, Wait, Weren’t These the Safer Bets?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2008, Sec. BU, P.2. 
(Reporting that Thornburg, the second-largest independent mortgage company after Countrywide was on the 
verge of bankruptcy although it refused to get into the subprime business and only originated jumbo loans.) 
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originator with only a short-term interest in the loans it originates should be entrusted to write 
underwriting standards that affect the interests of the long-term holders of these loans in the 
first place. 
E. Who  Failed? 
  Originators should be charged guilty if they have failed to deliver what they have 
promised. And they are always on the hook. For example, if they force appraisers to inflate 
the property appraisal value, it is very likely that the appraisal will be in violation of the 
relevant appraisal guidelines and as a result, they should repurchase the affected loans 
because they have breached their representations and warranties. If they assign the Standard 
and Poor’s documentation code “Z” to a loan, which requires full documentation, while in 
fact they have not conducted any income verification, again they should repurchase the loan 
because they have warranted that the information on the loan tape is accurate. The same is 
true if they have originated any loan in breach of any law or regulation. However, if a loan 
defaults because it has a very high loan-to-value ratio or if the borrower did not have a job 
and borrowed a NINJA loan, the blame should be on the rating agencies or the investors 
themselves.  
   When the credit crisis broke out, rating agencies strongly defended the integrity of 
their rating models.
154 Today, there is no question that the rating models simply failed. As of 
the end of 2008, S&P had downgraded 1.21 trillion out of about 3.27 trillion in original 
issuance of securities issued between the first-quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2007. 
An additional 9% is on negative watch. For these securities about 2% have defaulted and 
7.6% is currently rated as CC or lower. The securities that were downgraded from 
investment-grade to speculative-grade account for about 65% ($791 billion) of the 
                                                 
154 See Vickie Tillman, Don’t Blame the Rating Agencies, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 2007, At A9. See also Standard 
& Poor’s, supra note 60. 
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downgrades in original issuance volume.
155 The total downgrades by Moody’s are not 
available but reportedly one time in early 2009, Moody’s downgraded $59 billion of AAA-
rated securities and 91% of them went straight to junk status.
156  
It seems that not all mistakes rating agencies have made are honest ones as they have 
claimed.
157 The SEC conducted an examination on rating agencies in 2008 and found a 
number of weaknesses in rating agencies’ business development, internal control and 
disclosure practices.
158 Many criticisms targeted their issuer-pay compensation model and 
alleged conflicts of interests.
159 Although there are only three rating agencies in the market, 
they have to reach roughly the same conclusion or else no issuer will use their services.
 160    
There are also evidences suggesting that their rating models have apparent 
deficiencies and they have/should have noticed. Many of the mortgage products are recent 
innovations in the market so there is virtually no performance history for them. The Alt-A 
industry grew out of almost nothing in a few years and Moody’s even had to rely on prime 
loan performance data to model Alt-A loans initially. Subprime loans were transformed so 
much that they became fundamentally different from those subprime loans originated in the 
early 1990s. Rating agencies have known all these and should have realized that their models 
have limitations and they should have rejected some loans because they could not find a 
                                                 
155 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 131. 
156 See ___, Move Over, Subprime, Economist, Feb. 7, 2009. 
157 See Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As housing Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 2008, At 
A1.  
158 See Securities Exchange Commission, Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s 
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies, July 2008, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf.  
159 See, for example, Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, 
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS?, Yasuyuki Fuchita, Robert E. Litan, 
eds., Brookings Institution Press and the Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, 2006; San Diego Legal 
Studies Paper No. 07-46. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257.    
160 See Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As housing Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 2008, At 
A1 (Reporting that Moody’s rated less mortgage bonds than S&P and Fitch because its standards were 
considered more difficult.). See also Aaron Lucchetti, Ratings Firms’ Practices Get Rated – SEC Probes if 
Conflicts Fueled Subprime Troubles, Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 2007, At C1. (Reporting that Moody’s market share 
dropped to 25% from 75% in rating commercial mortgage deals after it increased standards.) 
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rating basis for these loans.
161 Their rating models might have not really embodied the 
existing worst-case scenarios. For example, Fitch deliberately excluded the 2000 vintage data 
when building its ResiLogic model and considered 2000 as an exception. Lastly, their entire 
rating approach – using historical data to predict the future – might be inadequate. They 
should have also considered the unthinkable and used scenario-building techniques routinely 
employed by insurance actuaries to analyze more possibilities.
162   
3.  Investment Banks and Information Brokerage 
  In the non-agency market, investment banks play the key intermediary role by linking 
the supply side of the market, mortgage loan originators, with the demand side, institutional 
investors, through the conversion of mortgage pools into securities. One could easily believe 
that they will assume the same gate-keeping role in this market as they allegedly assume in 
the equity and bond markets. Paul Muolo, an editor of National Mortgage News, recalled 
what Angelo Mozilo, the chairman of Countrywide, thought of Wall Street.
163 In response to 
Mr. Muolo’s book on the savings and loans crisis, Mr. Mozilo lobbied him that the 
criminality inherent in the thrift mess could never happen in the world of residential mortgage 
banking, where loans were securitized into bonds and sold in the market. “The capital 
markets are the regulator in our business. Wall Street would snuff it out.” He believed that 
Wall Street firms were the gatekeepers between the lenders and the institutional investors and 
it was in their best interests to keep everything clean, to promote honesty and integrity. 
  A.  Exposures of Investment Banks to the Non-Agency Mortgage Business 
How good a gatekeeper investment banks can be depends on the extent of their 
exposures, legal, economic and reputational, to the non-agency mortgage business. The 
                                                 
161 See Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 2008, Sec. MM, P. 36. (Reporting that 
Moody’s discovered that some factors were no longer good predictors of default anymore, e.g. FICO scores and 
first mortgage amount.) 
162 See ___, Next Year’s Model? Economist, Mar. 1, 2008. 
163 See Muolo and Padilla, supra note 18, Introduction.  
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reputational exposure has been stressed by many defenders of the Wall Street. It has been 
argued that no financial institution would knowingly want to make or securitize a loan that it 
expects would later go into default.
164 If an RMBS issuance later goes sour, the investment 
bank involved will inevitably get blamed by its clients. In any event, it is fair to conclude that 
reputational control does not seem to have done a good job. Investment banks also have 
significant economic exposure to the business as they are large purchasers/aggregators of 
mortgage loans, warehouse lenders to originators, purchasers and market-makers of RMBS 
securities, CDOs and other products.      
With regard to legal exposure, one difference between investment banks’ role in the 
non-agency market and equity and bond markets is that their role in the non-agency market is 
multi-faceted. If we disregard the differences between traditional independent investment 
banks and financial conglomerates such as JPMorgan and Citibank and consider them both to 
be “investment banks”, investment banks have four different types of exposures in RMBS 
transactions.  
Figure 25  2006-2007 Public Non-Agency RMBS Issuance By Transaction Type  
2006  2007   
Prime  Alt A  Subprime  Prime  Alt A  Subprime 
Type B Transactions  41.70% 35.20%  29.33%  39.73%  35.27%  24.55% 
A-3 and A-4 Transactions  17.57% 39.12%  50.68%  10.34%  31.82%  38.98% 
A-1 Transactions  17.84%  2.95%  14.70%  27.73%  5.02%  22.20% 
A-2 Transactions  22.88%  22.73%  5.28%  22.20%  27.89%  14.26% 
(Source: SEC filings, author’s own calculation) 
The first type of exposure only involves their traditional underwriting business (i.e. 
Type B transactions). An unaffiliated originator or sponsor puts up a pool of mortgages (self-
originated or purchased) and engages an investment bank or an underwriting syndicate to 
underwrite the RMBS issuance. In this scenario, an investment bank only plays the classic 
                                                 
164 See Michael Hudson: Debt Bomb – Lending a Hand: How Wall Street Stoked The Mortgage Meltdown – 
Lehman and Others Transformed the Market For Riskiest Borrowers, Wall St. J., Jun. 27, 2007, At A1. 
(Quoting head of securitized products of Lehman Brothers in a senate hearing.) 
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underwriting role and assumes underwriter liabilities under the Securities Act of 1933 subject 
to the due diligence defense.
165 
The second type involves an investment bank buying the entire underlying mortgage 
pool from one or multiple unaffiliated originators and acting as the sponsor and depositor of 
the transaction (i.e. Type A-3 and A-4 transactions). The sole or lead underwriter will be the 
investment bank itself. Of course the roles of sponsor, depositor and underwriter are likely to 
be played by different affiliates within the same corporate group.   
In these transactions, the underwriter will assume underwriter liabilities subject to the 
due diligence defense. The sponsor will assume contractual liabilities if any of the 
representations or warranties it makes under the sale and purchase agreement between the 
sponsor and the depositor is breached. However, the sponsor are protected by the same 
representations and warranties provided by the originators under their sale and purchase 
agreements and will only suffer losses if the originators fail to perform.  
The depositor will assume issuer liabilities under federal securities laws. However, 
since depositors are set up only for the convenience of shelf registration and do not have 
meaningful assets, it is very likely that in any securities litigation, plaintiffs will invoke 
Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and require controlling persons of the depositors, 
which will typically include sponsors (as shareholders of the depositors) and other entities 
that may be deemed as controlling persons, to assume joint and several liabilities with the 
depositors.  
Controlling persons under Section 15 can exonerate themselves if they can establish 
the defense that they have no knowledge or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of 
the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
166 
Theoretically one can design a system under which the sponsor acts only as a booking entity 
                                                 
165 Securities Act of 1933, §11. 
166 Securities Act of 1933, §15.  
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and does nothing when it purchases mortgage loans from unaffiliated originators. All the due 
diligence will be carried out by the depositor when the depositor purchases the same pool of 
mortgage loans from the sponsor, which will happen very shortly after or in conjunction with 
the purchase by the sponsor from unaffiliated originators. An arrangement may be made 
between the sponsor and the depositor that the depositor will not release any due diligence 
information to the sponsor so the sponsor is always kept in the dark. Under such an 
arrangement, the sponsor in fact knows nothing about the loans it buys and sells but it knows 
that the depositor is doing the due diligence not for itself but for the economic interest of the 
sponsor, as the depositor has only minimum assets.  
Information on the operations of sponsors and depositors prior to securitization is not 
required to be disclosed. As a result, it is not clear whether such a mechanism has actually 
been utilized. It is also questionable whether courts will simply disregard any arrangements 
between the sponsor and the depositor and require an entity with real assets rather than a 
dummy to assume the strict issuer liabilities. This issue is likely to be resolved by court 
through on-going RMBS securities litigations.                                
The third type is a one-stop transaction (i.e. Type A-1 transactions). Mortgage loans 
are originated, pooled, securitized and sold all by different affiliates within the same 
corporate group. As the 2006 and 2007 data shows, there are few Type A-1 transactions in 
the Alt-A area. Most of the transactions in the prime jumbo area are conducted by three 
financial conglomerates, Bank of America, JPMorgan and Washington Mutual. Transactions 
in the subprime area are mainly the result of vertical integration. Roughly half of the 
transactions are conducted by subprime lenders (e.g. Countrywide and large commercial 
banks) with the assistance of their securities affiliates and the other half by investment banks 
with their own subprime lending arms. The nature and scope of liabilities of investment 
banks in these transactions as roughly the same as their liabilities in the second type of 
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transactions. The difference is that it will be very difficult, if ever possible, for them to 
establish underwriters’ Section 11 defenses and controlling persons’ Section 15 defenses as 
essentially the securities are the products of co-operations amongst different units of the same 
group. 
  The fourth type of exposure is a mixture of the second and the third types (i.e. Type 
A-2 transactions). In these transactions, some of the mortgage loans are originated by the 
sponsor itself or its affiliate while some others are purchased from unaffiliated third parties. 
The exposure is likely to be bifurcated as a result with one part following the treatment of the 
second type of transactions and the other following the treatment of the third type of 
transactions. 
To summarize the analysis above, an investment bank’s involvement in any RMBS 
transaction is likely to be composed of three parts: 
  First, to maximize its economic gain, the investment bank must maximize the sales 
proceeds from selling the RMBS securities through slicing and dicing the mortgage pool in 
the most efficient way. In Type B transactions, the investment bank’s remuneration is tied to 
the sales proceeds. In Type A transactions, the bank will book the difference between such 
sales proceeds and the origination costs (in case of self-originated loans)/the purchase price 
(in case of purchase from third parties) as profit. Because the investment banks’ interests are 
closely tied to rating models, naturally they are interested to understand the rating models and 
find out what loans enjoy the most favorable treatments.
167 However, they may not want to 
challenge the models themselves, especially when these loans seem to have been overvalued.   
  Second, in Type A transactions only, the investment bank must control its potential 
liabilities for replacing mortgage loans breaching relevant representations or warranties. With 
regard to self-originated loans, the bank may do so through implementing internal control 
                                                 
167 See Nomura, Report from Boca Raton 2005: Coverage of Selected Sessions of ABS East 2005, 20 September 
2005, http://www.adelsonandjacob.com/pubs/ABS_East_2005_Notes.pdf , 7. 
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measures. With regard to loans purchased from unaffiliated third parties, it may conduct due 
diligence on the mortgage loans by itself and closely monitor the financial health of the 
sellers.  
  Third, the investment bank must ensure that there is no material misstatement or 
omission of material information in the disclosure documents. The structural information, 
such as how the securities are structured and what the payment terms are, does not require 
verification at all since it is merely a summary of contractual terms. The investigation is 
limited to (1) information about transaction parties and (2) mortgage pool data. Required 
information about most transaction parties is quite generic and requires relatively low level of 
verification. As a result, the investigative efforts are likely to be concentrated in verifying the 
accuracy of mortgage pool data and due diligence on originators and their origination 
practices.             
  B.  Due Diligence Practices Relating to Mortgage Pool Data      
  Liabilities can be avoided or controlled through due diligence investigations. 
Although the current RMBS securities litigations have generally not advanced to the 
discovery stage and as a result, there is not much information available on investment banks’ 
actual due diligence practices, one may have a glimpse of what might have been done based 
on information pieced together from various sources.  
However, the more important question, i.e. what due diligence standards should be 
applied, remains to be answered. Do underwriters satisfy their due diligence obligations by 
only ensuring tape-to-file integrity, i.e. whether the information presented on loan 
tapes/prospectus supplement matches with the information in the relevant mortgage files, or 
do they have an obligation to investigate into the so-called “file-to-reality” integrity, i.e. 
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whether the mortgage files reflect the true credit risks of the borrowers?
168 For example, do 
they need to check whether the property appraisal value stated in the appraisal form can be 
justified on reasonable ground? Is the loan data “expertised portion” of the prospectus 
supplement so underwriters have a qualified reliance on accountants? Do different due 
diligence standards apply based on the source of the loans? These are all important issues 
courts need to consider before they finally reach a conclusion on the appropriate due 
diligence standards.         
(1) AUP  Letters 
Unlike in equity or bond offerings, accounting firms in RMBS issuances do not play 
auditor roles and do not sign or assume statutory liabilities for any financial reports. At the 
issuance stage, accounting firms are normally engaged to perform certain agreed upon 
procedures and issue “comfort letters” or “agreed-upon procedures letters” (“AUP letters”) to 
the underwriters.
169 Typically an accounting firm would randomly or adversely select a 
specified percentage of the mortgage loans in the mortgage pool and compare the data 
presented on the loan tape with the records kept by the sponsor. The purpose is to ensure that 
the loan tape data “agrees wit the records of the company”, as the relevant contracts often put 
it. To verify the statistical information in the free writing prospectus, the prospectus and the 
prospectus supplement, similar procedures are carried upon by the accounting firm. All the 
procedures to be conducted by the accounting firm are specified in the engagement 
agreement. The accounting firm has no obligation to conduct procedures beyond those 
specified in the agreement
170, nor will the accounting firm guarantee the sufficiency of the 
procedures. The AUP letters and the relevant engagement agreements are not required to be 
disclosed to investors so it is not clear what the exact agreed-upon procedures are. However, 
                                                 
168 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Incorporating Third-party Due Diligence Results Into the U.S. RMBS Rating 
Process, Nov. 25, 2008.  
169 General AUP engagement standards can be found at the website of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accounts at http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/AT-00201.PDF.  
170 Id., §40.  
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it seems that the review by accounting firms is mainly for the purpose of ensuring tape-to-file 
integrity. 
  (2)  Substantive Due Diligence Reviews 
The formal review by accounting firms is unlikely to identify substantive issues with 
the mortgage loans. Another practice is to engage a third-party due diligence firm, or an 
internal unit of the sponsor, to conduct a qualitative and quantitative review of the mortgage 
loan files. The reviewer would typically sample a specified percentage of the mortgage loans 
in the mortgage pool. The mortgage loans may be selected randomly or only from loans with 
high risks. The standard practice is to select 10% of the loans from the mortgage pools,
171 
although it was reported that firms had been evaluating as few as 5 percent of loans in 
mortgage pools they were buying by 2005, down from as much as 30 percent at the beginning 
of the decade.
172 According to the American Securitization Forum, this type of report 
typically focuses on compliance with laws and regulations (e.g. federal laws such as the Truth 
in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Practices Act as well as state and federal 
predatory lending laws), as well as compliance with the originator’s underwriting standards. 
Similar to AUP letters, these due diligence reports are never disclosed to investors. Due 
diligence firms may charge about $150 dollars for evaluating one loan.
 173 Another report 
indicates that the price may be as high as $ 350 dollars per loan.
174 
  The due diligence firms assisting investment banks in conducting these investigations 
were the first to be investigated at the beginning of the credit crisis.
175 In order to investigate 
whether investment banks had been withholding information from investors, New York State 
                                                 
171 See Becky Walzak, Modernizing Quality Control, Mort. Banking, May 1, 2006, 100. (Providing description 
of the due diligence process.) 
172 See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 
2008. 
173 See Amir Efrati & Ruth Simon, Due-Diligence Firm to Aid New York Subprime Probe, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 
2008, At A2.  
174 See Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, supra note 172. 
175 See Amir Efrati & Ruth Simon, supra note 173. 
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Attorney General gained access to all of the due diligence reports issued by several due 
diligence firms in early 2008 by granting immunity to these firms. Interestingly there have 
been no follow-up news reports on the investigation and Attorney General Cuomo has not 
released his investigation results ever since. The investigation and in particular the remark 
made by the head of one due diligence firm that investment banks treated them as “plotted 
plants” and ignored their due diligence reports have been widely cited as evidence that 
investment banks might not have done proper due diligence on the RMBS securities.
176 
  One question that has not been discussed so far is the exact purpose of the due 
diligence by these firms. Such due diligence has often been discussed in the context of 
mortgage loan purchases from unaffiliated originators (i.e. in Type A-2, A-3 and A-4 
transactions). It must be noted that this is very different from the due diligence required for 
the issuance of RMBS securities. For example, a legal compliance review is not required for 
RMBS issuances since there are no representations in the prospectus supplement about the 
legality and enforceability of the underlying mortgage loans. Rather such representations are 
made by the sponsor in the sale and purchase agreement and the exclusive remedy for breach 
is substituting the breaching loans with conforming ones. It seems that at least a part of such 
due diligence is for the benefit of investment banks to control their contractual liabilities as 
sponsors of the transactions. Legally they are free to ignore any findings by the due diligence 
firms at their own peril. One reason sponsors may ignore negative findings is that they do not 
want to lose deals, especially when the mortgage loans are auctioned by originators and the 
next bidder is willing to do so.
177 They may choose to deal with any actual breaches when 
they have been identified in the future. As discussed in Part II of the paper, actual breaches 
may never be found. They may also rely on the fact that they can invoke similar provisions 
under their agreements with originators.    
                                                 
176 Id.  
177 David Cho, supra note 143. (Reporting that one unnamed investment bank regularly lost New Century deals 
because its more stringent due diligence standards.) 
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  There are still a lot of unanswered questions about this type of due diligences. First, in 
Type A-2, A-3 and A-4 transactions, mortgage loans will be transferred for three times, i.e. 
from unaffiliated originators to sponsors, from sponsors to depositors and from depositors to 
investors in the form of RMBS securities. It is unlikely that a separate due diligence report is 
commissioned each time a transfer occurs, since sponsors, depositors and lead underwriters in 
these transactions are all affiliated parties. It may be possible that due diligence is conducted 
only once and the other two transactions rely on the same report. However, it is not clear 
which of the sponsor, the depositor and the underwriter is typically the official party 
commissioning such reports.  
  In addition, it is not at all clear whether such due diligence is conducted at all in other 
types of transactions. In Type A-1 transactions, originators, sponsors, depositors and lead 
underwriters are all affiliated parties. It is unlikely that a third-party due diligence firm will 
be engaged to conduct such due diligence at all, since they can rely on their internal quality 
control procedures.  
In Type B transactions, investment banks provide securities underwriting services to 
unaffiliated sponsors. It is unlikely that they will require a legal compliance review as they 
will not act as sponsors of the transactions. Do they require a due diligence review of 
mortgage loan files in addition to receiving an AUP letter from the accounting firms? There 
is doubt whether such due diligence reviews have actually been conducted at all.  
The author reviewed the transaction documents for a sample of seventeen Type B-1 
issuances in 2006.
178 Although the size of the sample is quite small, each of the seventeen 
                                                 
178 The seventeen issuances are: Accredited Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2, American Home Mortgage Assets 
Trust 2006-3, Argent Securities Trust 2006-W2*, Alternative Loan Trust 2006-25CB*,First Horizon Mortgage 
Pass-through Trust 2006-4, Fremont Home Loan Trust 2006-C, Impac Securities Assets Trust 2006-3, Indymac 
Indx Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-AR21*, Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-2, New Century Home Equity 
Loan Trust 2006-1, NovaStar Mortgage Funding Trust, Series 2006-5, Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3, 
PHHMC Series 2006-2 Trust, Renaissance Home Equity Loan Trust 2006-2, RAAC Series 2006-SP3 Trust*, 
Saxon Asset Securities Trust 2006-1, and Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-AR13 Trust. The ones 
with “*” did not disclose the text of underwriting agreements.  
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issuances was randomly selected from the Type B-1 issuances by one of the seventeen issuers 
that conducted practically all of the Type B-1 transactions in 2006. Underwriting agreements 
were disclosed in thirteen of the seventeen transactions. All disclosed underwriting 
agreements listed the delivery of satisfactory 10b-5 letters by legal counsels, which as usual, 
do not cover verification of financial, numerical and statistical information in the disclosure 
documents, and AUP letters by accounting firms as condition precedents to the effectiveness 
of the underwriters’ obligations under the agreements. None of these fourteen underwriting 
agreements indicated the existence of due diligence reports prepared by due diligence firms. 
It would seem strange, although not completely impossible, that underwriters would actually 
require such due diligence reviews but do not condition their underwriting obligations upon 
receiving satisfactory reports.        
  C.  Descriptions of Underwriting Standards 
Under Regulation AB, issuers are required to identify originators contributing 10% or 
more of the mortgage pool in the prospectus supplement and provide a description of the 
underwriting practices of originators contributing 20% or more of the mortgage pool. The 
descriptions of underwriting standards have been at the center of current RMBS securities 
litigations. In a typical complaint filed by RMBS investors, the plaintiffs will quote certain 
portions of the descriptions and compare them with news reports and research reports on poor 
underwriting practices. The plaintiffs will then argue that the descriptions in the prospectus 
supplement must be misleading and their discovery demands should be granted. 
179 
(1)  Description of Study     
  The author conducted a study on the disclosure practices relating to subprime RMBS 
securities issued in 2006 and 2007 to examine (1) how underwriting standards were generally 
                                                 
179 For sample complaints filed with courts, see a list of court cases in Ferrell, Allen, Bethel, Jennifer E. and Hu, 
Gang,Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis(November 17, 2008). 
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 612; Harvard Law School Program on Risk Regulation 
Research Paper No. 08-5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582.  
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disclosed; and (2) whether over the two-year period, there were any changes to the 
descriptions of underwriting standards of the same originator. For this purpose, prospectus 
supplements of all subprime RMBS securities publicly issued in 2006 and 2007 were 
retrieved from the SEC EDGAR filing system. As mortgage loans might be securitized by the 
originators themselves or by unaffiliated sponsors purchasing such loans from the originators, 
descriptions of the underwriting standards of one originator would end up in disclosure 
documents of different issuers. All of the descriptions of underwriting standards were 
extracted from these prospectus supplements. They were then saved in separate files and 
categorized by the identities of the originators.  
In total, descriptions of underwriting standards of more than 60 subprime originators 
appeared in these disclosure documents. Among these originators, descriptions relating to 36 
of them appeared more than four times during the two-year period. The list of these 
originators appears is attached to this paper as Appendix 6. In the list, the originators are 
ranked in accordance with their number of appearances. The number of issuers involved in 
securitizing each originator’s loans is set out in the third column of the list. With regard to 
each of the 36 originators, the author compared the descriptions from different issuances 
relating to that originator using the comparison function of Microsoft Word to see whether 
and how the descriptions were changed during the two-year period.  
(2) Study  Results 
The results of the study are as follows: 
First, a description of underwriting standards often consists of two parts. One part is a 
description of the underwriting practices observed by the originator, e.g., how the originator 
selects the FICO score for underwriting purposes, examines the income documents, and 
conducts property valuation.  The second part is an underwriting matrix, which sets out the 
specific requirements for each type of loans. A sample description of Countrywide’s 
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underwriting standards is included in Appendix 6. For all of the 36 originators, the 
descriptive parts generally remained unchanged at all over the two-year period. Updates were 
usually relating to a new origination program of an originator or, at the later stages, lawsuits 
filed against the originators or information on their bankruptcies. The underwriting matrix 
was updated during this period by changing the specific requirements, for example, 
increasing the loan-to-value ratio limit of one type of loans from 80% to 90%. 
Second, if one compares the description of underwriting standards of one originator 
with that of another originator, one probably could not see substantial differences between the 
descriptions for different originators except for the contents of the underwriting matrix. The 
descriptive languages were usually very general. Readers often could only know that the 
originator would pull credit reports, examine employment and income files and conduct 
property appraisals but the exact standards and procedures were generally not disclosed. 
Certain statements on underwriting practices often appeared in the descriptions relating to 
different unaffiliated originators with only unsubstantial wording changes. For example, 
compare the following languages describing quality control procedures of two unaffiliated 
originators: 
“The Originator conducts a number of quality control procedures, … including post funding 
compliance audits as well as a full re-underwriting of a random selection of loans to assure asset 
quality. Under the post-funding audits, a random sample of loans are required to be reviewed to verify 
credit grading, documentation compliance and data accuracy. Under the asset quality procedure, a 
random selection of each month's acquisitions must be reviewed by the Originator. The loan review is 
required to confirm the existence and accuracy of legal documents, credit documentation, appraisal 
analysis and underwriting decision. A report detailing audit findings and level of error is sent monthly 
to each branch for response. The audit findings and branch responses must then be reviewed by the 
Originator's senior management. Adverse findings are to be tracked monthly and over a rolling six 
month period. This review procedure allows the Originator to assess programs for potential guideline 
changes, program enhancements, appraisal policies, areas of risk to be reduced or eliminated and the 
need for additional staff training.” (First Franklin) 
“Fremont conducts a number of quality control procedures, including a post-funding review 
as well as a full re-underwriting of a random selection of loans to assure asset quality. Under the 
funding review, all loans are reviewed to verify credit grading, documentation compliance and data 
accuracy. Under the asset quality procedure, a random selection of each month's originations is 
reviewed. The loan review confirms the existence and accuracy of legal documents, credit 
documentation, appraisal analysis and underwriting decision. A report detailing review findings and 
level of error is sent monthly to each loan production office for response. The review findings and 
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branch responses are then reviewed by Fremont's senior management. Adverse findings are tracked 
monthly. This review procedure allows Fremont to assess programs for potential guideline changes, 
program enhancements, appraisal policies, areas of risk to be reduced or eliminated and the need for 
additional staff training.” (Fremont)         
(3) Analysis 
It would be fair to say that by reading the existing descriptions on underwriting 
standards, an investor could not tell the differences between one originator from another one. 
Indeed the underwriting matrix was updated but investors have already had loan-level 
information, which simply makes the matrix superfluous. The ensuing question would be: 
shouldn’t underwriters have done a better job? 
 It seems that underwriters may justify what they have done on several grounds. First, 
underwriters may also claim, and the descriptions inevitably provide, that the descriptions are 
only supposed to be a summary and not intended to be comprehensive. All descriptions of 
underwriting standards provide that originators may grant exceptions to their underwriting 
standards from time to time based on a variety of factors. Many originators, including 
Countrywide, WMC, New Century and Fremont, would routinely include in their 
descriptions that it expects a substantial portion of the mortgage loans would be originated as 
exception loans. This essentially renders the entire descriptions meaningless. Underwriters 
could also rely on such disclosure to claim that investors should have known the unreliability 
of the descriptions in the prospectus supplements.                   
In many transactions, the mortgage loans were purchased by sponsors through arm’s-
length transactions from unaffiliated originators. Underwriters could not conduct direct due 
diligences on originators. In these transactions, the section on underwriting standards would 
usually provide that the information on underwriting standards is provided by the originator. 
Some issuers (e.g. JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank) would take one step further and clearly 
disclose that none of the sponsor, depositor, underwriter and trustee has participated in the 
preparation of the information or taken steps in investigating its accuracy. It remains to be 
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seen whether such disclaimer would be held effective by courts and if not, whether issuers 
and underwriters could escape liabilities by relying on Rule 409 of Regulation A, which 
provides that if any required information is unknown and not reasonably available because it 
rest peculiarly within the knowledge of another person not affiliated with the registrant, the 
information may be omitted subject to the condition that the registrant shall give information 
it possesses or can acquire without unreasonable effort or expense.
180 Issuers and 
underwriters may argue that they have done exactly what Rule 409 permits.  
In addition, as many originators themselves are public companies, they often disclose 
information on their underwriting practices in their company disclosure documents. Issuers 
and underwriters may claim that they are entitled to rely on such disclosed information. 
RMBS securities are offered on a shelf registration basis, therefore underwriters may claim 
that they should be entitled to expect that certain information has already been examined by 
the previous underwriter, especially when the last issuance was only one month ago. At last, 
underwriters may argue that they are following the industry practice as it seems that the entire 
industry has been doing the same thing with respect to such descriptions of underwriting 
standards. It will be interesting to see how courts would respond to the arguments above and 
decide whether some underwriters/issuers are liable for failing to disclose specific 
information on origination practices.        
 
 
 
180 17 C.F.R. 230.409.  
Part V   Reform Proposals and System Redesign 
1.  Should the Existing System Be Revived? 
  The non-agency RMBS market has effectively been closed since the second half of 
2007 with virtually no new Alt A or subprime issuances ever since. The question in this 
market is not how to reform the existing system, but whether and how to revive the non-
agency market again. 
  There are serious doubts whether this market should be revived at all. In theory, the 
capital market is better at financing residential mortgage loans than financial institutions 
because the market is able to absorb more risks than individual firms. As a result, more 
borrowers are able to borrow money at a cheaper price. However, it is questionable whether 
investors have ever done their own credit analysis before they invest in mortgage-backed 
securities. In the agency market, the GSEs take care of the credit risks. In the non-agency 
market, the popular view is that without the AAA ratings assigned by the rating agencies, the 
RMBS securities would be barely marketable.
 181 After the rating agencies’ models failed, the 
market has been struggling for more than a year to reach a consensus on the price of the 
“toxic assets” of the credit crisis. Some of the investors in the non-agency market definitely 
have the capabilities to build their own models and make their own credit judgments. The 
number of such investors will never be on the high side though, since evaluating the 
performance of a mortgage pool might actually be more difficult than evaluating an operating 
company as it involves cracking tons of historical data and expensive model building. One 
may have to wonder what most investors are supposed to do other than relying on rating 
agencies’ models after the non-agency market is revived. If the rating agencies fail again, the 
market will again be thrown into turmoil.              
                                                 
181 See Neil D. Baron, The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitization Process in in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000), 83.  
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The credit crisis has demonstrated that overexpansion of homeownership may bring 
about unwanted consequences. Many borrowers in the non-agency market might have been 
better off if they had not borrowed those Alt A or subprime loans in the first place. If one 
agrees that the credit crisis is the result of a bubble economy, there is no reason why the 
origination volume of non-agency loans should not be reduced to its pre-2000 level, i.e. less 
than 10%-15% of total mortgage origination. Even if there are still legitimate borrowing 
needs the agency market could not satisfy, lenders could use their own balance sheets to 
finance them or the government could help by expanding the current FHA/VA system. If an 
originator wishes to securitize its loans, it may purchase bond insurance or use other external 
credit enhancement techniques, just as what they had been doing until six or seven years ago.  
Several reforms have been implemented or proposed since the credit crisis broke out. 
A brief overview of each proposal is set out below, followed by the author’s analysis.   
2.  Skin in the Game 
To solve the problem that originators do not have a long-term financial interest in the 
mortgage loans they originate, one proposal is to require RMBS issuers to retain a portion of 
the securities they issue, for example, 10% of the total issuance, and possibly consisting of 
the junior tranches.
 182 The proposal was made by European think tanks
183  and became 
popular with key legislative figures including Representative Barney Frank.
184 
This “skin in the game” proposal has its undeniable appeal for simplicity and apparent 
effectiveness. It can also be seen as a variation of the popular bonding mechanism in the 
corporate world, where senior managers are not paid in cash only but also in shares so that 
their personal interest will be aligned with that of the corporations they serve. However, the 
                                                 
182 See Liz Rappaport and Carrick Mollenkamp, Crisis on Wall Street: Banks May Keep Skin In the Game, Wall 
St. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at C3.  
183 See Liam Pleven and Susanne Craig, Deal Fees Under Fire Amid Mortgage Crisis – Guaranteed Rewards of 
Bankers, Middlemen Are in the Spotlight, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2008, At A1.  
184 Vincent Reinhart, Securitization and the Mortgage Mess, Wall St. J., Jul. 18, 2008, At A13.  
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proposal seems to have misinterpreted the supply and demand relationships in the non-agency 
market and may have implementation difficulties. 
Under the originate-to-sell model, originators are not supposed to have long-term 
interests in the mortgage loans they originate. They will originate whatever loans that can sell, 
no matter how they themselves believe these loans will perform. It is actually exactly because 
of the nature of their short-term interest in the loans that they should better not be given the 
power to decide what to originate. Rather the power should stay in the hands of the investors.  
The “skin in the game”” proposal will change the assumption in the market.  
The first problem with this proposal is that it forces originators to take more than 
credit risks. Prepayment risks, counterparty risks (in case derivatives instruments are used) 
and other structural risks are all risks that are beyond control of originators. It is simply unfair 
that these risks are imposed on originators simply because they supply the loans to the market. 
The second problem is a practical one. Unlike their European counterparts, many of 
the non-bank originators/aggregators in the United States rely heavily on short-term debts to 
finance their operations. They may be financially restrained to hold a lot of long-term 
securities on their own balance sheets. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons some 
originators sell whole loans in the whole loan market instead of securitizing them is that they 
do not have to keep unrated retained interests on their balance sheets. If they do issue RMBS 
securities, they are likely to bundle these retained interests and re-securitize them as net 
interest margin securities. The carrying cost is particularly high, considering that many 
originators even borrow in the market at a higher rate (e.g. a BBB-rated company) than the 
securities they are required to retain (e.g. A-rated RMBS securities). If the transaction cost is 
too high, originators will simply stay in the agency market. They may also originate FHA/VA 
loans, which compete with below-prime loans in the non-agency market.   
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The third problem is also a practical one. Exactly whose skin do we want in the game? 
The non-agency market is a multi-layered origination system in which loans are solicited at 
the bottom by brokers and correspondent lenders and gradually aggregated by some large 
originators. Before securitization, loans may change hands again via the whole loan market. 
More often than not issuers are securitizing loans they have purchased from unaffiliated third 
parties. Do we only want the ultimate issuers to keep the RMBS securities? If so, the ultimate 
issuers may be less willing to securitize other people’s loans. In particular, the largest issuers 
are usually sophisticated financial institutions that may want to have a much higher rate of 
return than most RMBS securities could offer. They will simply find the RMBS business 
unattractive and leave the market. If we want all the participants at different levels have some 
skin in the game, how can this be done? Requiring all the originators in an RMBS issuance to 
be paid in part with RMBS securities are not feasible as good originators will unfairly share 
losses caused by bad originators. 
The fourth problem is whether we should ever trust originators with their long-term 
views on the mortgage market. If originators are required to have skin in the game, there will 
be inevitable reliance on their judgments because investors will believe that they and the 
originators are on the same boat and originators have an informational advantage over 
themselves. Some originators may have some unrealistically rosy view about the future of the 
market and originate bad loans even if they know they will also be required to hold a portion 
of them. The current credit crisis is actually the best illustration of this point. Originators 
always had some skin in the game – if their loans turned sour or if the market collapsed, they 
would be forced to close their doors. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what has happened 
since the collapse of the market. However, they still went ahead and originated many poor 
loans anyway, probably because they simply did not care or they believed that the real estate 
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market would grow forever. Should investors trust their judgments again this time because 
originators are now officially in the same boat with them?     
3.  Project RESTART  
  Project on Residential Securitization Transparency and Reporting (“Project 
RESTART”) was launched in July 2008 by the American Securitization Forum (“ASF”), a 
securitization trade group affiliated with the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association. The purpose of Project RESTART is to restore investor confidence in mortgage 
and asset-backed securities by revamping the entire mortgage securitization process. The 
initial phases of the project include enhancements in the following aspects:
185  
•  ASF RMBS Disclosure Package – a standardized disclosure package to provide 
more data than currently available to investors about the underlying mortgage 
loans; 
•  ASF RMBS Reporting Package – a standardized reporting package that provides 
updated information on underlying mortgage loans after securitization; 
•  Representations and Warranties – development of model RMBS representations 
and warranties; 
•  Repurchase Procedures – development of a uniform set of procedures, including 
the use of post-securitization forensic reviews, for enforcement of model RMBS 
securitization representations and warranties; 
•  Due Diligence – development of standards for pre-securitization due diligence, 
including originator reviews; 
•  Model Servicing Provisions – development of more standardized rules for 
servicers; 
                                                 
185 See Project RESTART Request for Comment, 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/Project_RESTART_RFC_%207_16_%2008.pdf, 3-4. 
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ASF issued the first deliverable, ASF RMBS Disclosure Package, in July 2008 for 
public comments.
186 The disclosure package is in the form of a loan tape layout consisting of 
135 data fields such as originator’s name, loan amount, FICO score and property value. Each 
data field has its corresponding definition in the glossary so issuers will know how to fill out 
the fields. For example, a specific code is assigned to each property type that may be used as 
collateral. Reportedly these 135 data fields were chosen from more than 400 data fields. 
Some were taken out because of privacy concerns, such as nine-digit zip codes of property 
locations.
187 Some were because of the difficulty to standardize, such as reasons an originator 
grants an underwriting exception. In February 2009, ASF issued an updated version of the 
disclosure package incorporating comments received from industry participants.
188 The 
existing data fields were further expanded. In addition, new data fields for manufactured 
housing loans and modified loans were added. Along with the second version of the 
disclosure package, ASF also released the first version of the ASF RMBS Reporting Package 
for public comments.
189 The reporting package is also in the form of a loan tape layout and 
consists of almost 200 data fields on post-securitization mortgage pool performances such as 
servicer ID, servicing fees, default reasons, etc.  
The updated version of the disclosure package is presented in the table in Appendix 4 
under “RESTART”. The key data fields required by Project RESTART, as Appendix 4 
shows, are not that different from the existing data fields that have been required by rating 
agencies’ rating models. Project RESTART does require more detailed information in three 
aspects, i.e. property appraisal value, FICO scores and borrower’s income. Both original and 
most recent property appraisal values are required. Borrowers’ all FICO scores from all credit 
                                                 
186 Id. 
187 See Aaron Lucchetti, Moving the Market: More Data on Mortgage Bonds Sought, Wall St. J., Jul. 16, 2008, 
At C3.  
188 Project RESTART Request for Comment, 
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_2_9_09_RESTART_RFC.pdf.  
189 Id.  
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bureaus are required to be reported and while in the past only one was reported by following 
certain selection convention (i.e. generally reporting the lower one). In addition, all 
borrowers’ incomes and assets are required to be reported. Project RESTART has also 
designed more complicated coding systems for many of the data fields than what rating 
agencies have required. For example, the disclosure package recognizes 18 different types of 
property valuation methods (some for manufactured housing only) and 37 property types.  
 There is no doubt that investors will benefit from standardized disclosure practices. 
Although investors did generally have access to loan-level data, understandably the 
disclosure practices were less uniform amongst issuers, which might have made it difficult 
for investors to compare products issued by different issuers. However, one must be 
cautionary about the immediate benefits from such enhanced disclosures.  
First, as Appendix 4 shows, the majority of the data fields in the disclosure package 
have already been required by rating agencies for a few years so the disclosure package is 
more like a technical improvement rather than a ground-breaking change.  
Second, and perhaps this is the fundamental problem with the enhanced disclosure 
practices, both investors and rating agencies do not have comparable historical data. Investors 
may now have more information about the underlying mortgage pools but any pricing model 
built upon historical mortgage loan data will not consider these newly known factors because 
it is not known how historically such factors have affected the performance of mortgage loans. 
Eventually investors are just left with a large volume of information that they do not really 
know how to use. They can make some rough adjustments based on instincts, for example, if 
two mortgage pools have similar FICO score distributions but one pool consists primarily of 
loans with Next Generation scores while the scores for the other pool are still calculated 
under the old algorithm, investors may conclude that the first pool probably will perform 
better because the new FICO algorithm eliminates the effect of piggybacking. However, 
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investors still do not know home much the first pool will outperform the second pool because 
there is lack of historical data. It may be the case that investors will eventually benefit from 
enhanced disclosures in the long run after a large amount of high-quality data has been 
accumulated over the years. For the moment, it is unrealistic to expect that investors will 
automatically get it right after being handed some extra new data they do not know what to 
do with.           
4.  Rating Agency’s Actions 
  In addition to massive downgrades of RMBS securities, rating agencies have been 
actively reforming their own rating practices to win back investor confidence. Some reforms, 
in particular those relating to conflicts of interest issues, have been pushed by regulators.
190 
To address the conflict of interest issue, rating agencies have reorganized their internal 
structure to separate their business development practices from their rating practices.
191 In the 
settlement agreement between rating agencies and the New York Attorney General Cuomo, 
rating agencies agree to charge review fees no matter whether they are eventually hired to 
rate the deal or not. This is to ensure that they will feel less pressure as they get paid no 
matter they assign a favorable rating or not. This arrangement is unlikely to have any 
meaningful impact on the non-agency market though, as rating agencies make available their 
rating models to market participants. Issuers may check which rating agency will treat their 
mortgage pools most favorably before they actually retain the agency to provide the rating 
service. 
  A lot of the changes have been changes to their rating methodologies. In light of the 
heavy losses suffered by RMBS securities, rating agencies have significantly increased the 
                                                 
190 See SEC, supra note 158.  
191 See Vickie Tillman, Standard & Poor’s Gives Its Side of Story, Wall St. J., March 8, 2008, At A3.  
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loss assumptions in their rating models.
192 As a result, a higher expected loss will be reported 
on the same mortgage pool after the adjustment. The relative importance of some factors in 
the rating models has also been changed. For example, Standard and Poor’s has announced 
that its model will be less reliant on FICO scores in light of their decreasing predictive 
power.
193 All three rating agencies have also revised their loan tape formats to include many 
new data fields.  
  One uniform rating methodology change amongst three rating agencies is the new 
requirements for originator assessments and third party loan-level reviews, which are agreed 
to by rating agencies in their settlement agreements with Attorney General Cuomo. In the 
past, rating agencies did not ask for due diligence reports on the mortgage pools even though 
these reports were available, as they would assume the accuracy of the data presented to them. 
Their rating models were largely originator-neutral. All rating agencies did all claim that they 
would review the underwriting practices of the originators before rating the securities. 
Standard and Poor’s even described the due diligence process in detail in its criteria book.
194 
However, there was serious doubt whether rating agencies had actually adjusted the rating 
results based on the perceived strength of the originators. The SEC report indicated that at 
least one rating agency, likely to be Fitch, had abandoned the practice of reviewing 
origination practices.
195 The other two rating agencies have not factored originator identities 
into their rating models but it is not clear at all whether they have made out-of-model 
adjustments to the rating results and the adjustment standards.
  
                                                 
192 See, for example, Standard & Poor’s, 612 US Subprime RMBS Classes Put On Watch Negative, July 11, 
2007. See also Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor's Revises US  Subprime, Prime, And Alternative-A RMBS 
Loss Assumptions, July 30, 2008. 
193 See Standard & Poor’s, Ratings On 207 US Alt-A RMBS Classes Placed On CreditWatch Negative, August 7, 
2007. 
194 See Standard & Poor’s, supra note 14. 
195 See SEC, supra note 158, 35.  
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 A.  Originator  Review 
  Originator reviews are rating agencies’ own due diligence reviews on mortgage 
originators and are conducted separately from ratings of specific RMBS issuances. The three 
rating agencies all issued special reports detailing their own review criteria and procedures at 
the end of 2008. These are still rules on paper rather than in action, as new RMBS issuances 
are still discontinued.  
 (1)  Moody’s 
  Of the three rating agencies, Moody’s has published the most detailed report on its 
originator review practices.
196 The review will generally be conducted on-site every twelve to 
eighteen months and will be supplemented by quarterly reports from originators and calls 
with originators about their reports and data trends. The review will be applicable to both 
originators and aggregators although the focus of the review will be different for them. 
   Moody’s review will consist of three parts. 40% of the result will be based on a 
review of the historical loan performance, 30% on originator ability and 30% on originator 
stability. The review components of each of the three parts are illustrated in the chart below.   
Figure 26 
                                                 
196 See Moody’s, Moody’s Enhanced Approach to Originator Assessments for U.S. Residential Mortgage 
Backed Securities, Nov. 24, 2008.  
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   Moody’s has provided the detailed review criteria for each component and will assign 
an assessment result of “strong”, “average”, “weak” or “unacceptable” to each component 
through its review of the originator’s policies and procedures as well as onsite inspections 
and discussions with management. Moody’s will aggregate the assessment results for each 
component and reach an overall assessment level of “strong”, “above average”, “average”, 
“below average”, “weak” or “unacceptable”. The originator assessment reports will be 
published by Moody’s on its websites. Moody’s has not stated whether and how it will adjust 
the RMBS rating results based on the identities of the originators. 
  (2)  Standard and Poor’s 
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Standard and Poor’s will conduct similar reviews on originators comprising of two 
parts.
197 The first part is a review of the historical performance of the loans originated by 
different originators. A ratio will be assigned to each originator and an originator ranking will 
be compiled and updated semiannually. For originators with no performance history, average 
performance will be assumed until sufficient performance data exists. In addition to 
reviewing historical loan performance, Standard and Poor’s will review the originator’s 
origination process and guidelines. The focus will be on the following areas:  
•  Management and organization, including financial strength; 
•  Risk management; 
•  Broker/correspondent/retail loan officer management; 
•  Underwriting; 
•  Prefunding data quality; 
•  Post-funding quality control; 
•  Appraisal/valuation management; and  
•  Regulatory compliance. 
The results from the review of these operational factors will be combined with the 
ranking based on historical loan performance to reach an overall ranking of originators. 
Operational factors can override the historical performance and alter the overall ranking of an 
originator. For instances, a lower overall ranking will be assigned if an originator loosens its 
lending standards even if the performance of its loans to date has been strong. On the 
contrary, if an originator tightens its underwriting standards, its ranking might not be 
increased until several years later, after sufficient performance data demonstrates the positive 
impacts of the more stringent standards. Based on the final overall ranking, originators will 
be grouped into three categories: Top Tier (15%), Middle Tier (70%) and Bottom Tier (15%). 
                                                 
197 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Standard & Poor’s Enhanced Mortgage Originator And Underwriting 
Review For U.S. RMBS, Nov. 25, 2008. 
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If an originator is in the Top Tier, the credit enhancement level for its loans may be reduced 
by up to 30%, or by a factor of 0.70x. If the an originator ends up in the Bottom Tier, the 
credit enhancement level for its loans may be increased by up to 30% or more, or a factor of 
1.30x or more.  
(3) Fitch 
Fitch has proposed to conduct reviews similar to those of Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s.
198 The review results will be disclosed in Fitch’s presale reports and will also be 
factored into Fitch’s RMBS rating results. Unlike Standard and Poor’s, Fitch will assign an 
internal score to each originator, which will be used to adjust credit enhancement levels in its 
RMBS rating model.   
B.  Third Party Due Diligence Review 
Until recently rating agencies have been relying on the representations and warranties 
from RMBS issuers that the data presented to them is accurate. Such representations and 
warranties are also usually included in those provided by sponsors and a known violation 
could trigger sponsors’ repurchase obligations. Rating agencies, partly due to pressure from 
Attorney General Cuomo, have proposed to request third party due diligence reviews prior to 
securitization. Different review standards have been proposed.
199 
(1)  Qualifications of Due Diligence Firms 
Due diligence firms and due diligence staff must satisfy certain criteria before their 
reports are accepted by rating agencies. They are generally required to have reviewers with a 
few years of underwriting experience in the relevant sector, maintain quality control systems 
and provide training in specific areas. Independence is also a prerequisite. Both Moody’s and 
                                                 
198 See Fitch, U.S. Residential Mortgage Originator Review Criteria, Dec. 2, 2008. 
199 See Standard & Poor’s, RMBS: Incorporating Third-Party Due Diligence Results Into the U.S. S Rating 
Process, Nov. 25, 2008. Moody’s, Moody’s Criteria for Evaluating Independent Third-Party Loan level 
Reviews for U.S. Residential Mortgage Backed Securities, Nov. 24, 2008. Fitch, Third-Party Loan-Level Review 
Criteria, Dec. 2, 2008. 
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Standard and Poor’s will expect attestation from the due diligence firm that it is not under 
undue influence or coercion from the transaction parties    
(2)  Sample Selection and Size 
Moody’s ties its origination review with third party due diligence review. If an 
originator originates more than 10% of the loans in a mortgage pool, Moody’s will conduct a 
review on the originator. If an originator contributes 10% or less and is not reviewed by 
Moody’s, all the loans from the originator are required to be reviewed by the due diligence 
firm. In addition, the size of the randomly selected sample should not be smaller than that 
computed using a 95% confidence level, a 5% precision level and an assumed error rate equal 
to the higher of the historic error rate for the originator or the minimum rate assumed by 
Moody’s.   
Standard and Poor’s requires the sample to meet the following standards: 
•  a minimum of 200 mortgage loans for a subprime deal and 100 for a prime deal to 
be reviewed; 
•  more than 10% of the loans for a subprime deal and 5% for prime; and  
•  the number of loans should achieve a 5% one-tailed level of significance with a 
2% level of precision. In addition, the number of loans in the sample will also 
depend on the estimated error rate.  
Fitch’s standards are more straightforward: 
•  For prime deals from established originators and loan programs, the randomly 
selected minimum sample size is to be the larger of 200 loans or 10% of the pool; 
•  For subprime/Alt A and all other types, the size is to be the larger of 400 loans or 
20% of the pool; and 
•  If originators or its loan programs have had less than two years of performance 
history, the sample size should be doubled.  
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(3)  Scope of Review 
The scope of review required by each rating agency is roughly the same although 
different rating agencies have set very different review standards due diligence firms must 
follow. Fitch’s standards are too general to make them comparable with those of the other 
two agencies. 
Borrower Information 
Moody’s requires that due diligence firms should confirm whether the loan meets the 
originators’ underwriting guidelines or, if not, a reasonable and documented exception was 
made. They should also examine whether the borrower provided information on her 
employment, income, occupancy, assets and liabilities and the soundness of ensuing 
verifications that support that information. Independent verification of such information will 
be deemed as the most helpful. 
 Standard and Poor’s requires that due diligence firms should verify documentation of 
the verifications done on occupancy, income, assets and employment information. If a loan is 
originated under the full documentation program but the lender fails to perform the 
verification, the credit enhancement level will be increased by 30% or more. If a loan is a 
stated-income loan, the lender is required to verify the income with the borrower’s tax returns. 
If the lender fails to do so or the tax information does not support the income, a 100% 
foreclosure frequency will be assumed. In Standard and Poor’s opinion, a reasonableness test 
is simply not sufficient for a stated-income loan.  
Property Valuation 
Moody’s requires that due diligence firms should determine whether the appraised 
value of the mortgage property is reasonably supported by the appraisal information as well 
as any other documentation in the mortgage file pertaining to the property value. If the 
reviewer believes that the true value of the property is more than 10% lower than the 
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appraised value, the reviewer should obtain an AVM value in order to affirm the 
reasonableness of the property value. If an AVM value cannot be obtained or the AVM value 
does not suppose the appraised value, the reviewer should obtain an external broker price 
opinion.  
Standard & Poor’s requires due diligence firms to scrutinize property appraisal reports 
and identify any unsubstantiated property values. In addition, the issuer is required to engage 
an independent valuation firm to perform property valuation reviews on the entire sample 
using a cascade approach. The first-level review requires the valuation firm to obtain prices 
from AVMs. If the AVM value is within a 10% variance of the original appraised value, the 
loan will pass the test. If the variance is more than 10%, a second-level review by ordering a 
broker price opinion, field review or new appraisal is necessary. 
Legal and Compliance Review  
All rating agencies require due diligence firms to conduct a legal and compliance 
review on the sample loans. Moody’s requires that if any loan in the sample fails a high cost 
loan test or a Regulation Z test, the due diligence firm should review the entire loan pool 
from the originator. Standard and Poor’s requires that if violation of any specific regulation is 
found, the entire loan pool should be reviewed for violation of that specific regulation.   
C. Comments   
  Will rating agencies get things right this time after factoring originator-specific 
factors in their rating models? Probably no one can answer this question with confidence. No 
matter whether they have made the right move or not, the incorporation of originator reviews 
and due diligence reviews in their rating models will create a few problems. 
  First, in proposing to review originators’ practices, rating agencies have assumed that 
the industry still exists while in effect the market has almost been entirely wiped out. Some of 
the biggest names in the non-agency market, such as Countrywide, Indymac, Lehman 
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Brothers, Bear Stearns, New Century and Ameriquest, are no longer with us. Those few 
survivors are more than eager to let people forget their past and treat the past few years as an 
anomaly that does not reflect their current operations. In this sense, the performance data in 
the past five years is completely meaningless and any ranking or performance-based 
adjustment is simply not feasible.   
  Second, the rating agencies have greatly increased their work load by doing their own 
reviews on originators and reviewing reports from third party due diligence firms. Of course 
they have no problem with the increase as they will charge more fees. However, their 
virtually unlimited access to originators creates a huge information asymmetry between them 
and investors, which incentivizes investors to increase their reliance on rating agencies. There 
is no guarantee that rating agencies won’t make mistakes again and if they do, investors will 
get hurt again. The proposed reviews also make the rating process more subjective than 
before, giving rating agencies more room to favor one originator/issuer over the other one. 
  Third, originators may simply not come back to the non-agency market because of 
increased transaction costs and uncertainties. The agency and the FHA/VA markets still exist 
and originators can simply carry on the origination-to-sell model by following the origination 
standards set by the GSEs and the FHA/VA. The ranking system developed by Standard and 
Poor’s and the originator-specific adjustments applied by the other two rating agencies could 
effectively drive some originators in the bottom out of business because probably no investor 
is willing to purchase securities backed by originators in the Bottom Tier.   
Fourth, by requesting for third party due diligence reviews, rating agencies are doing 
more than what they have traditionally been doing – credit risk analysis. There is no reason 
why rating agencies cannot simply assume data accuracy in their analysis and leave the 
verification issue to securities laws and contractual arrangements. Their request for legal and 
compliance review is particularly strange because investors are never even supposed to be 
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exposed to legal and compliance risks. It may be true that the existing system is not 
particularly effective in identifying breaches of representations and warranties but this should 
not be the job of the rating agencies but should be subject to now contractual arrangements 
supervised by other parties, for example, the trustee of the issuing trust. 
Lastly, the rating agencies are probably the only ones that should but still do not have 
real skin in the game. Their rating models have failed once but they do not need to bear any 
financial liabilities. If one agrees that it is good policy never to allow the non-agency market 
to grow to the size of its peak days and keep it only a small segment of the market, a better 
policy might be to re-introduce bond insurance into the non-agency market. Private bond 
insurers, or with the help of the government, may guarantee the credit risks of non-agency 
RMBS issuances in return for a few. The insurers may conduct the same analysis as the rating 
agencies do and may be granted private access to originators beyond disclosed information. 
Regulator may choose to regulate bond insurers and impose capital requirements. Whatever 
the system with bond insurance looks like, it might be better than the one allowing 
unmatched responsibilities and liabilities.  
  
 
        
- 116 -  
- 117 - 
Part VI  Concluding Remarks 
  The primary purpose of this paper is to provide the necessary facts for future 
discussions and to raise questions on some of the “settled views” about the non-agency 
RMBS market. As a result, most of the views expressed in this paper so far do seem to be 
destructive than constructive. In addition, this paper seems to be defending originators. Not at 
all. What the author is trying to argue is that originators have acted exactly as how they are 
supposed to act under the originate-to-sell model. To the extent that they have failed to 
deliver what they have promised, they should pay for it through performing their 
repurchasing obligations. If they no longer exist, the sponsors of the transactions, some of 
which do still exist, should perform as they have promised. On the other hand, this paper 
seems to be particularly harsh on the rating agencies. First, they are culpable for making such 
gigantic mistakes, honest or not. Second, the core of the criticism is really on the system itself 
– a system guarded by only a few of so-called guardians is inherently unstable and unsound. 
It may be noted that this paper does not offer a view on investment banks. This is partly 
because there is still no substantial evidence either supporting or denying that they have 
failed to do what they are supposed to do. If courts eventually find that they have failed in 
performing their due diligence performances, then they should just face the consequences.  
  As a final note, the Treasury has just released its plan to set up a Public Private 
Investment Program and utilize public and private money to purchase the toxic assets on the 
balance sheets of the financial institutions. It may be advisable for the program to conduct a 
forensic review on the existing mortgage loans in a mortgage pool before it purchases the 
securities backed by the pool. If some mortgage loans are found to be in breach of the 
representations and warranties provided by the sponsor at the issuance, then the sponsor 
should buy them back. Just as what they have promised. The program should not be an 
opportunities for entities to escape liabilities belonging to them.   
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Appendix 1: Issuance Types 
 (volume in millions)  Public Transactions  Private Non-NIM Transactions  Private NIM Transactions 
Asset  Type  Year  Number Volume  Percentage Number Volume Percentage Number Volume Percentage
2001 259 129,314.72 90.94% 23 12,830.85 9.02% 1 57.00 0.00%
2002 263 197,072.01 96.18% 19 7,828.39 3.82% 0 0.00 0.00%
2003 354 232,241.55 97.93% 13 4,902.85 2.07% 0 0.00 0.23%
2004 324 217,817.64 93.33% 17 15,535.72 6.66% 1 25.00 0.17%
2005 315 251,994.80 89.77% 12 28,708.86 10.23% 0 0.00 0.00%
2006 244 208,927.39 95.38% 10 9,864.00 4.50% 6 246.03 0.10%
Prime Jumbo 
2007 210 179,936.27 99.71% 0 0.00 0.00% 5 526.00 0.08%
2001 38 11,373.58 100.00% 0 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 0.00%
2002 110 51,714.30 96.73% 4 1,736.92 3.25% 1 11.50 0.02%
2003 149 69,035.95 93.10% 9 5,039.43 6.80% 8 75.64 0.10%
2004 255 150,802.02 95.09% 11 7,300.08 4.60% 29 483.77 0.31%
2005 409 325,672.46 98.00% 8 6,097.60 1.83% 21 553.15 0.17%
2006 423 359,399.88 98.29% 7 3,392.16 0.93% 73 2,878.81 0.79%
Alt A 
2007 316 240,443.21 96.33% 16 6,914.19 2.77% 64 2,252.45 0.90%
2001 110 54,357.49 62.44% 17 30,496.60 35.03% 46 2,198.80 2.53%
2002 152 101,850.43 83.02% 23 15,815.53 12.89% 112 5,015.01 4.09%
2003 209 174,670.53 89.59% 22 12,207.43 6.26% 146 8,080.40 4.14%
2004 320 342,169.36 94.38% 7 4,628.31 1.28% 243 15,751.83 4.34%
2005 406 450,087.88 96.79% 9 2,812.67 0.60% 297 12,133.81 2.61%
2006 420 426,779.83 95.07% 19 9,405.19 2.10% 308 12,714.00 2.83%
Subprime 
2007 196 176,954.70 87.80% 30 18,092.79 8.98% 176 6,499.33 3.22%
2001 31 14,509.51 93.54% 3 1,002.71 6.46% 0 0.00 0.00%
2002 38 20,905.68 85.29% 5 3,606.98 14.71% 0 0.00 0.00%
2003 45 18,392.59 90.38% 5 1,850.03 9.09% 3 108.75 0.53%
2004 63 43,820.61 89.21% 17 5,302.75 10.79% 0 0.00 0.00%
2005 76 51,709.35 85.14% 18 8,997.28 14.81% 1 29.00 0.05%
2006 99 63,605.99 85.68% 25 10,011.47 13.49% 20 623.51 0.84%
HELOC 
2007 39 22,058.12 69.58% 16 9,525.44 30.05% 3 119.62 0.38%
2001 8 2,292.11 41.51% 16 3,230.15 58.49% 0 0.00 0.00%
2002 12 5,756.00 22.87% 37 19,416.11 77.13% 0 0.00 0.00%
2003 31 19,618.21 41.71% 53 27,304.95 58.05% 5 109.80 0.23%
2004 31 12,631.33 36.40% 61 22,010.77 63.43% 4 58.82 0.17%
2005 33 10,479.94 38.25% 57 16,915.58 61.75% 0 0.00 0.00%
2006 16 4,760.89 29.32% 47 11,458.25 70.58% 3 16.34 0.10%
Scratch&Dent
2007 11 3,710.76 35.39% 27 6,765.16 64.53% 1 8.44 0.08%
(Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, SEC filings, Thomson SDI and author’s own calculation. “NIM” is short for net interest margin )  
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Appendix 2: Top Originators By Asset Type 
Top 20 Prime Jumbo Originators in 2007 
 
 
Company 
Volume 
(Billions) 
Market 
Share 
Market 
Share ‘06  Type  Status 
Wells Fargo  61.85 17.80% Commercial bank  Existing 
Washington Mutual  45.2 13.00% Commercial bank  Acquired by JPMorgan 
Citibank 33.9 9.80% Commercial  bank  Existing 
Bank of America  26 7.50% Commercial bank  Existing 
Countrywide  24.85 7.20% Federal savings bank  Acquired by Bank of America 
Chase Home Finance  24.1 6.90% Commercial bank  Existing 
SunTrust Mortgage Inc.  10.65 3.10% Commercial bank  Existing 
Lehman Brothers  10.55 3.00% Investment bank  Bankrupt 
American Home Mortgage Corp.  10.02 2.90% Mortgage loan company  Bankrupt 
PHH Mortgage  9.71 2.80% Mortgage loan company  Existing 
Residential Capital LLC  8.85 2.60% Subsidiary of GMAC  Existing 
Wachovia Corporation  6.96 2.00% Commercial bank  Acquired by Wells Fargo 
IndyMac  6.75 1.90% Federal savings bank  Taken over by FDIC 
National City Mortgage Co.  5.82 1.70% Division of National City Bank  Existing 
First Horizon Home Loans  3.84 1.10% Commercial bank  Existing 
GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc.  3.34 1.00% Operating subsidiary of Capital One  Closed 
Quicken Loans Inc.  2.8 0.80% Mortgage loan company  Existing 
AmTrust Bank  2.53 0.70% Savings bank  Existing 
Guaranty Bank  2 0.60% Federal savings bank  Existing 
US Bank Home Mortgage  1.95 0.60% Commercial bank  Existing 
Top 20 Total  301.67 87.00%   
Market Total  347 100%   
  Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, SEC filings and company websites  
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Top 20 Alt-A Originators in 2007 
 
 
Company 
Volume 
(Billions) 
Market 
Share 
Market 
Share ‘06  Type  Status 
Countrywide Financial  41.45 15.10% Federal savings bank  Acquired by Bank of America 
IndyMac  30.7 11.20% Federal savings bank  Taken over by FDIC 
Lehman Brothers  19.25 7.00% Investment bank  Bankrupt 
Citibank 16.5 6.00% Commercial  bank  Existing 
Washington Mutual  14.7 5.30% Federal savings bank  Existing 
Residential Capital LLC  14.7 5.30% Subsidiary of GMAC  Existing 
Chase Home Finance  9.9 3.60% Commercial bank  Existing 
EMC Mortgage  9.42 3.40% Subsidiary of Bear Stearns  Acquired by JPMorgan 
ING Bank  8.8 3.20% Commercial bank  Existing 
GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc.  7.76 2.80% Operating subsidiary of Capital One  Existing 
Wells Fargo  6.8 2.50% Commercial bank  Existing 
First Magnus Financial  6.39 2.30% Mortgage loan company  Bankrupt 
AmTrust Bank  6.18 2.20% Savings bank  Existing 
National City Mortgage Co.  5.75 2.10% Division of National City Bank  Existing 
Flagstar Bank  5.4 2.00% Federal savings bank  Existing 
Quicken Loans Inc.  5.2 1.90% Mortgage loan company  Existing 
Wachovia Corporation  4.29 1.60% Commercial bank  Acquired by Wells Fargo 
Impac Mortgage Holdings  4.58 1.70% REIT  Existing 
First Horizon Home Loans  3.67 1.30% Commercial bank  Existing 
Bank of America  3.4 1.20% Commercial bank  Existing 
Top 20 Total  224.8 81.70%   
Total  275 100%   
  Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, SEC filings and company websites  
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Top 20 Subprime Originators in 2007 
 
 
Company 
Volume 
(Billions) 
Market 
Share 
Market 
Share ‘06  Type  Status 
CitiMortgage  19.7 10.20% Member of Citigroup  Existing 
HSBC Finance  18 9.30% Member of HSBC  Existing 
Countrywide Financial  17 8.80% Federal savings bank  Acquired by Bank of America 
Wells Fargo   15.4 8.00% Commercial bank  Existing 
First Franklin Financial Corp.  13.5 7.00% Subsidiary of National City Bank  Closed 
Chase Home Finance  11.5 6.00% Commercial bank  Existing 
Option One Mortgage  11.2 5.80% Subsidiary of H&R Block  Closed 
EMC Mortgage Corp.  7.9 4.10% Subsidiary of Bear Stearns  Acquired by JPMorgan 
Ameriquest Mortgage  6.4 3.30% Mortgage loan company  Closed 
BNC Mortgage  6.1 3.20% Subsidiary of Lehman Brothers  Closed 
Washington Mutual  5.5 2.90% Federal savings bank  Acquired by Wells Fargo 
WMC Mortgage  5 2.60% Subsidiary of GE  Closed 
New Century Financial  4.7 2.40% REIT Bankrupt 
American General Finance  4.5 2.30% Subsidiary of AIG  Existing 
Equifirst  4.4 2.30% Subsidiary of Barclays  Closed 
Aegis Mortgage Corp.  4.3 2.20% Mortgage loan company  Bankrupt 
Residential Capital LLC  4.2 2.20% Subsidiary of GMAC  Existing 
Saxon Mortgage  4.1 2.10% Subsidiary of Morgan Stanley  Existing 
Accredited Home Lenders  4 2.10% Mortgage loan company  Existing 
Delta Financial Corp.  3.6 1.90% Mortgage loan company  Bankrupt 
Top 20 Total  171 88.80%   
Total  192.5 100%   
  Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, SEC filings and company websites  
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Appendix 3: Types of Non-Agency Securitization Transactions in 2006 
Volume in millions  Sponsor Type  Prime Jumbo  Alt A  Subprime 
Banks 31135.84  14.90% 6023.71 1.68% 24686.75 5.78% 
Investment Banks  1633.98  0.78% 0 0.00% 11545.49 2.71% 
Transaction Type A-1: Originator, 
securitization sponsor and lead 
underwriter are affiliated parties. 
Non-bank Entities  4505.52  2.16% 4594.54 1.28% 26514.55 6.21% 
Banks 24936.17  11.94% 9166.71 2.55% 0 0.00% 
Investment Banks  19675.5  9.42% 45587.33 12.68% 13886.2 3.25% 
Transaction Type A-2: Sponsor 
and lead underwriter are affiliated 
parties. Loans are originated by both 
affiliated and unaffiliated originators.  Non-bank Entities  3195.89  1.53% 26934.26 7.49% 8652.1 2.03% 
Banks 4652.28  2.23% 1151.28 0.32% 35726.76 8.37% 
Investment Banks  750.76  0.36% 49,057.07 13.65% 103184.72 24.18% 
Transaction Type A-3: Sponsor 
and lead underwriter are affiliated 
parties. Loans are originated by only 
one unaffiliated originator.   Non-bank Entities  0  0.00% 0 0.00% 7830 1.83% 
Banks 8296.16  3.97% 17989.95 5.01% 3521.53 0.83% 
Investment Banks  23010.12  11.01% 72396.18 20.14% 65403.39 15.32% 
Transaction Type A-4: Sponsor 
and lead underwriter are affiliated 
parties. Loans are originated by 
multiple unaffiliated originators.   Non-bank Entities  0  0.00% 0 0.00% 632.67 0.15% 
Banks 13065.6  6.25% 33363.97 9.28% 17649.09 4.14% 
Investment Banks  0  0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Transaction Type B-1: Originator 
and sponsor are affiliated parties (or 
the same entity). Lead underwriter is 
unaffiliated.    Non-bank Entities  12997.89  6.22% 55341.11 15.40% 62175.06 14.57% 
Banks 36435.77  17.44% 2368.65 0.66% 866.97 0.20% 
Investment Banks  0  0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Transaction Type B-2: Originator 
and sponsor are affiliated parties (or 
the same entity). Lead underwriter is 
unaffiliated. Loans from other 
unaffiliated originators are included.   
Non-bank Entities  21206.59  10.15% 29963.83 8.34% 10636.81 2.49% 
Banks 0  0.00% 0 0.00% 1666.18 0.39% 
Investment Banks  0  0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Transaction Type B-3: Sponsor 
purchases all loans from an 
unaffiliated originator. Lead 
underwriter is unaffiliated.   Non-bank Entities  981.13  0.47% 576.12 0.16% 16660.7 3.90% 
Banks 1252.31  0.60% 0 0.00% 2758.28 0.65% 
Investment Banks  433.63  0.21% 541.93 0.15% 0 0.00% 
Transaction Type B-4: Sponsor 
purchases loans from multiple 
unaffiliated originators. Lead 
underwriter is unaffiliated.    Non-bank Entities  762.25  0.36% 4343.21 1.21% 12782.58 3.00% 
Source: SEC filings, author’s own calculation. (1) Investment banks exclude securities subsidiaries of large commercial bank groups. Originations by non-bank lenders 
owned by investment banks are added to investment bank origination volumes. Banks include commercial banks and savings banks. Indymac is treated as a bank but 
Countrywide is treated as a non-bank lender. (2) Affiliation is defined here more stringently than under accounting rules. Only wholly owned subsidiaries of one financial 
group are considered to be affiliates.        
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Appendix 4: Comparison of Loan Tape Layouts  
S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
General Information   
Cut-off Date    ●  ●      
Loan Group (Identifying loan group for structures with multiple loan groups)          ●  ●  ● 
Loan ID (Unique number identifying the loan)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Sub Pool ID       ●  ●  ●  
Borrower ID       ●    
Loan Origination and Servicing   
Originator     ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Origination Channel (broker, correspondent, retail, etc)    ●  ●    ●  ● 
Broker Indicator (Whether a broker took  the  application)         ● 
Origination or Discount Points        ●  ● 
Total Costs Financed (As costs financed by the borrower including origination fee, insurance, interest rate buydowns, 
etc.) 
      ●  
Servicer (Using Fitch’s code, likely to mean the actual servicer rather than master servicer)            ●  
Primary Servicer     ●  ●  ●  ● 
Master Servicer     ●  ●  ●    
Special Servicer     ●  ●      
Servicing Fee (Stated in basis points)        ●  ● 
Servicing Advance Methodology (How principal/interest are to be advanced, e.g. on an actual  or  scheduled  basis)         ● 
Escrow Indicator (Whether various expenses such as taxes and insurance are paid directly by borrower or through 
escrow) 
    ●  ●  ● 
Escrow Amount       ●    
Buy Down or Employer Subsidy Indicator        ●  
Buy Down Period (Total number of months during which any buy down is in effect)              ● 
Underwriting Due Diligence (S&P’s due diligence grade)      ●      
Value Due Diligence  (S&P’s due diligence grade)      ●      
Regulatory Compliance Due Diligence  (S&P’s due diligence grade)      ●      
Adherence to S&P File Format (Yes or no)     ●      
Relocation Loan Indicator (Whether the loan is part of a corporate relocation program)              ● 
Employee Loan (Whether it is a loan to an employee of the originator)          ●    
Covered/High Cost Loan Indicator (Loan categorized as “high cost”)              ●  
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Anti-Predatory Lending Category (S&P’s category of predatory lending laws)    ●  ●      
Property Information   
Property Type (single family, two family, PUD, etc.)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Legal Interest Type (fee simple or leasehold)        ●  
Occupancy Status (owner occupied, investor occupied, second home)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Property Address    ●  ●    ●  
City    ●  ●    ●  ● 
Zip Code    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
State     ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Association Fees (monthly fee amount for PUDs, condos, coops, etc.)            ●  
Sales Price (negotiated price between buyer and seller)    ●  ●      ● 
Original Appraised Value    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Original Appraisal Date    ●  ●      ● 
Original Appraisal Type (full, AVM, BPO, drive by, etc.)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Original Automated Valuation Model (AVM)    ●  ●      ● 
Original AVM Confidence Score         ● 
Most Recent Appraisal Value      ●  ●  ● 
Most Recent Appraisal Type         ● 
Most Recent Appraisal Date         ● 
Most Recent AVM Model Name         ● 
Most Recent AVM Confidence Score         ● 
Asset Verification (confirmation of funds used for a down payment and closing costs)    ●  ●      
General Borrower Information   
Total Number of Borrowers (Number of borrowers  obligated  to  repay  the  loan)         ● 
Borrower Credit Quality (Grade from loan underwriter’s system)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
First Time Home Buyer Indicator      ●  ●  ● 
Borrower Qualification Payment Type (Type of mortgage payment used to quality the borrower for the loan)          ●    
Borrower Qualification Payment Rate (The rate used to qualify the borrower for the loan)          ●    
Mortgage Score Value (Not currently used)    ●  ●    ●  
Date of Mortgage Score (Not currently used)    ●  ●      
Validated Automated Underwriting System (Not currently used)    ●  ●       
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Risk Grades (Originator assigned risk grades according to S&P’s system)    ●  ●      
Months from disposition of bankruptcy at origination date        ●  ●  ● 
Months from disposition of foreclosure at origination date        ●  ●  ● 
Number of Mortgaged Properties (Number of properties owned by the borrower that currently  secure  mortgage  loans)         ● 
FICO Score   
Current FICO Score    ●  ●  ●      
Original FICO Score (If different from Current FICO Score)    ●  ●    ●  
NetxGen FICO Score Indicator (for Current FICO Score)    ●  ●    ●  
Original FICO Model (Classic, Classic08,  Next  Generation  model)         ● 
Most Recent FICO Date (Date on which the most recent FICO score was obtained)              ● 
Equifax FICO score for primary borrower       ●  ● 
Experian FICO score for primary borrower       ●  ● 
TransUnion FICO score for primary borrower       ●  ● 
Equifax FICO score for secondary borrower       ●  ● 
Experian FICO score for secondary borrower       ●  ● 
TransUnion FICO score for secondary borrower          ●  ● 
FICO score if credit bureau not specified       ●    
Most Recent Primary Borrower FICO Score         ● 
Most Recent Co-Borrower FICO Score         ● 
Most Recent FICO Method (Name of the credit bureau that provided the most recent FICO score)              ● 
Vantage Score: Primary Borrower         ● 
Vantage Score: Co-Borrower         ● 
Vantage Score Date         ● 
Total count of outstanding and open trade lines          ●  ● 
Maximum trade line amount currently open       ●  ● 
Longest Trade Line       ●  ● 
Total dollar amount of consumer claims submitted to collection agencies          ●    
Employment   
Length of Employment of Borrower at Present Job    ●  ●  ●  ● 
Length of Employment: Co-borrower         ● 
Self Employed Borrower Indicator    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Income and Assets   
Borrower Income    ●  ●      
Co-Borrower Income    ●  ●      
Borrower & Co-Borrower Disposable Income    ●  ●  ●   ●      
Primary Borrower Wage Income         ● 
Primary Borrower Other Income         ● 
Co-Borrower Wage Income         ● 
Co-Borrower Other Income         ● 
All Borrower Wage Income         ● 
All Borrower Total Income         ● 
4506-T Indicator (Whether a Transcript of Tax Return was obtained)              ● 
Borrower Income Verification Level         ● 
Co-Borrower Income Verification          ● 
Borrower Employment Verification Level         ● 
Co-Borrower Employment Verification Level         ● 
Borrower Asset Verification Level         ● 
Co-Borrower Asset Verification Level         ● 
Monthly Debt of All Borrowers         ● 
Primary Borrower’s Net Worth        ●  
Primary Borrower’s liquid reserves (Liquid/Cash  Reserves  (RESTART))        ●  ● 
Percentage of Down Payment from Borrower Own Funds              ● 
Net Pledged Assets (Assets pledged for the loan)            ●  ● 
Cash Reserves at Closing (Fund available to borrower after making a down payment and paying all closing costs)    ●  ●  ●  ●    
# Months Reserves at Closing (Cash Reserves at Closing divided by principal, interest, tax and insurance payment 
amount) 
  ●  ●      
General Loan Information   
Product Description (prime, subprime, Alt A, etc)    ●  ●    ●  
Loan Type (fixed rate, ARM, balloon, etc)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Loan Purpose (purchase/refinance, etc.)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Documentation Type (full, limited, or no documentation, etc.)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
HELOC Indicator      ●  ●  ●  
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
HELOC Draw Period (Number of months in which  the  borrower  may  withdraw  funds)         ● 
Loan Terms   
Origination Date of Loan    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Original Loan Term    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Remaining Loan Term      ●  ●  ●  
Amortization Term (Term when the loan amortizes)        ●  ●  ●  ● 
First Payment Date of Loan (The first due date on which the loan is due)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Loan Maturity Date        ●  
Original Loan Balance     ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Current Loan Balance    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Simple Interest or Actuarial Interest        ●  ● 
Original Interest Rate       ●  ●   ● 
Fully Indexed Rate (Fully indexed rate at origination)          ●    
Current Interest Rate    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Interest Paid Through Date (Date through which interest in paid with the current payment)               
Prepayment Penalty Indicator     ●      
Prepayment Penalty Term     ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Prepayment Penalty Type     ●  ●  ●  ● 
Prepayment Penalty Due (Prepayment penalty due during each phase of the prepayment penalty term)              ● 
Prepayment Penalty Multiplier (Multiple of interest due for pledged prepayment penalties)              ● 
Prepayment Penalty Hard Term (Number of months in which a hard prepayment penalty applies for hybrid prepayment 
penalties) 
       ● 
Length of Interest Only Period (In months)      ●  ●  ●  ● 
Payment Type (fully amortizing, interest only, growing equity, negative amortizing, etc.)            ●  
Liens and LTV   
Lien Position      ●  ●  ●  ● 
Second Lien Indicator    ●  ●      
Simultaneous Second Indicator (Indicates whether there is a simultaneous second lien)    ●  ●      
Junior Balance (Loan amount for all loans which are junior to the securitized loan)        ●  ●  ●  ● 
Senior Balance (Loan amount for all loans which are senior to the securitized loan)        ●  ●  ●  ● 
Loan Type of Most Senior Lien (fixed, ARM, hybrid, etc)              ●  
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Hybrid Period of Most Senior Lien         ● 
Negative Amortization Limit of Most Senior Lien              ● 
Origination Date of Most Senior Lien         ● 
Participation Percentage (what percentage of the loan is securitized)            ●  
Original LTV Ratio    ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Current LTV Ratio        ●  
Junior LTV Ratio      ●  ●    
Combined Original LTV Ratio (The total amount of all of the outstanding mortgage liens divided by appraisal value )    ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Combined Current LTV Ratio        ●  
Mortgage Insurance   
Mortgage Insurance Company Name         ● 
Mortgage Insurance Percent (Mortgage insurance coverage  percentage  paid  by  lender)         ● 
MI: Lender or Borrower Paid?         ● 
Mortgage Insurance Coverage (Percentage of the mortgage loan’s principal balance covered by insurance)    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Mortgage Insurer     ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
Eligibility for Lender-paid MI Indicator        ●  
Lender Paid MI      ●  ●  ●  
Lender-paid MI Insurer      ●  ●  ●  
Lender-paid MI Coverage        ●  
Lender-paid MI Fee        ●  
Pool Insurance Co. Name (Name of pool insurance provider)              ● 
Pool Insurance Stop Loss %          ● 
Debt and Payments   
Mortgage Payment Method (Monthly statement, automatic debit to account, coupon book, etc.)    ●       
Due date of last made payment       ●    
Date the paid through date was reported as of       ●    
Total Debt to Income Ratio (Total monthly liabilities divided by income)    ●  ●  ●  ●   ●    
Combined Current Loan Balance    ●  ●      
Current Payment Amount Due (Next total payment  to  be  collected)         ● 
Scheduled P&I Payment (Current periodic principal and interest due on the loan)            ●  
PITI Payment Amount (Current periodic principal, interest, taxes and insurance due on the loan)    ●  ●    ●   
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S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Current Other Monthly Payments (Payments on the property  other  than  principal/interest)         ● 
Total Other Debt (All liabilities of the borrower excluding the debt on the subject property.)    ●  ●      
Pay History Grade (Moody’s grade)       ●    
12-month delinquency history (How many months the borrower is delinquent on the property in the previous 12 
months) 
  ●  ●  ●   ●  ●  ● 
Delinquency Calculation Method (OAS  or  MBA  method)        ●  
Current Delinquency Status (Days delinquent under either OAS or MBS method)    ●  ●      
Current Payment Status (Number of payments the borrower is past due as of the cut-off date)              ● 
Rolling Delinquency (If rolling delinquency is allowed)          ●    
Last Paid Installment Date        ●  
Refinance Loans   
Years in Home (only applicable to refinance loans)          ●  ● 
Cash Out Amount       ●  ● 
Use of Cash-Out Refinance Proceeds (How cash-out proceeds are used)    ●  ●      
Prior Loan Origination Date    ●  ●      
Refinance Loans – Prior Loan Purchase Price    ●  ●      
Adjustable Rate Mortgages Loan Terms   
Negative Amortization Indicator (yes or no)    ●  ●      
Margin  (The amount added to an index)    ●  ●  ●  ●   ●  ● 
Interest Rate Adjustment Frequency (Time between coupon adjustments of a floating-rate mortgage)     ●  ●      
Original Interest Rate    ●  ●      
Annual Payment Cap (Maximum percentage per year by which an adjustable-rate mortgage borrower's monthly 
principal and interest payment can increase.) 
  ●  ●      
Initial Interest Rate Cap on First Adjustment Date    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Initial Interest Rate Floor on First Adjustment Date              ● 
Subsequent Interest Rate Reset Period         ● 
Periodic Rate Cap Subsequent to First Adjustment Date    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
Periodic Payment Cap (Maximum percentage by which a payment can change in one period)              ● 
Negative Amortization Recast Period (Limit (in months) during which negative amortization is allowed and after which 
the loan is recast) 
       ● 
Subsequent Interest Rate Floor         ● 
Lifetime Cap Rate    ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
- 130 - 
S&P 
 
Moody’s 
 
Fitch  REST
ART  Data Fields and Descriptions 
 
Diligen
ce 
Check  ‘04  ‘08  Pre-07  Latest  Latest  ‘09 
Lifetime Floor Rate      ●  ●  ●  ● 
Negative Amortization Limit    ●  ●  ●   ●  ● 
Negative Amortization Initial Minimum Payment Term (Term over which the initial minimum payment applies)              ● 
Negative Amortization Recast Date (Date of payment recast after a loan reaches its maximum balance)              ● 
Negative Amortization Subsequent Payment Adjustment Frequency (Number of months between minimum payment 
adjustment after the first adjustment has been made) 
       ● 
Index Type (Index used to calculate the adjustable rate)          ●  ● 
Month of First Reset (Months before the loan first adjusts)          ●  ●  
Reset Periodicity (How often the interest rate of the loan resets)          ●  ●  ● 
Initial Fixed Rate Period (For hybrid ARMs, period between first payment  date  and  first  interest  adjustment  date)         ● 
Fully Indexed Rate         ● 
Qualification Method (Type of mortgage payment used to quality a borrower for the loan)              ● 
Current Minimum Payment          ● 
Option ARM Loan Terms    
Option ARM Indicator (yes or no)       ●    
Options at Recast (Whether the borrower may pay fully amortizing, I/O, or minimum payment after recast)          ●  ● 
Option ARM Indicator         ● 
Fully Indexed Monthly Payment (Fully amortizing, fully indexed  monthly  payment)       ●    
Initial Minimum Payment Option Available (Initial minimum payment option available to the borrower)           ●    
Initial Minimum Payment Period (Initial number of months the borrower can pay the minimum)          ●    
Annual Payment Cap (Max % of the minimum payment can be adjusted each year)          ●    
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Appendix 5: Information Disclosure in the Prospectus Supplement 
  Item 
No. 
Title of the Relevant Regulation 
AB Section 
Description of the Information Required to Be Disclosed 
Item 
1102 
Forepart of registration statement 
and outside cover page of the 
prospectus 
•  Information to be presented on the front page of the registration statement   Transaction 
Overview 
Item 
1103 
Transaction summary and risk 
factors 
•  Transaction summary 
•  Risk factors 
Item 
1104 
Sponsors  •  Sponsor’s name and form of organization; 
•  General character of the sponsor’s business; 
•  The sponsor’s securitization program; and 
•  The sponsor’s material roles and responsibilities in its securitization program. 
Item 
1106 
Depositors  •  The depositor’s name, ownership structure and form of organization; 
•  General character of the sponsor’s business; 
•  General character of any activities the depositor is engaged in other than securitizing assets; and 
•  Any continuing duties of the depositor after issuance of the securities. 
Item 
1107 
Issuing entities  •  Name of the issuing entities and form of organization; 
•  File the issuing entity’s governing documents as an exhibit; 
•  Permissible activities and restrictions on the activities of the issuing entity; 
•  Any specific discretionary activities; and 
•  Provisions or arrangements relating to the issuing entities. 
Item 
1108 
Servicers  •  Roles and responsibilities of each servicer; 
•  Information and experience of each servicer; 
•  Servicing agreements and servicing practices; and 
•  Back-up servicing arrangements 
Item 
1109 
Trustees  •  Trustee’s name and form of organization; 
•  Trust’s prior experience; 
•  Trustee’s duties and responsibilities; under the government documents and under law; 
•  Limitations on the trustee’s liability; 
•  Any indemnification provisions; and 
•  Any contractual provisions or understandings regarding the trustee’s replacement. 
Item 
1110 
Originators  •  Identify any originator that originates 10% or more of the pool assets; 
•  Information about any originator that originates 20% or more of the pool assets: 
o  The originator’s form of organization; 
o  Description of the originator’s origination program and experience. Include if material 
information on the originator’s origination portfolio and the originator’s underwriting 
criteria.  
Transaction 
Parties 
Item 
1117 
Legal proceedings  •  Description of legal proceedings pending against the sponsor, depositor, trustee, issuing entity, and 
servicer.  
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  Item 
No. 
Title of the Relevant Regulation 
AB Section 
Description of the Information Required to Be Disclosed 
Item 
1119 
Affiliations and certain 
relationships and related 
transactions 
•  Affiliations amongst transaction parties.  
Past Pool 
Performance 
Item 
1105 
Static pool information  •  Static pool information regarding delinquencies, cumulative losses and prepayments for prior 
securitized pools of the sponsor for that asset type.  
Item 
1111 
Pool assets  •  General information regarding pool asset types and selection criteria; 
•  Pool characteristics; 
•  Delinquency and loss information;  
•  Sources of pool cash flow; 
•  Representations and warranties and repurchase obligations regarding pool assets; 
•  Claims on pool assets; and 
•  Revolving periods, prefunding accounts and other changes to the asset pool.  
Current 
Mortgage Pool 
Information 
Item 
1112 
Significant obligors of pool assets  *Note: Not applicable for residential MBS as no mortgage loan will be significantly larger than others. 
Item 
1113 
Structure of the transaction  •  Types or categories of securities to be offered, flow of funds, tranche structure, determination of 
interest rate, methods to pay principal, frequency of distribution, etc; 
•  Triggers to structure changes, overcollateralization ratio; 
•  Security holder rights; and  
•  Fees and expenses to be paid out of the cash flows.  
Item 
1120 
Ratings  •  Whether the issuance or sale of any securities is conditioned on the assignment of a rating by rating 
agencies. 
•  Any arrangements to have such rating monitored on an on-going basis. 
Item 
1114 
Credit enhancement and other 
support, except for certain 
derivatives instruments 
•  Description of credit enhancement mechanisms; 
•  Information regarding significant enhancement providers 
Tranche 
Structure and 
Credit 
Enhancement 
Item 
1115 
Certain derivatives instruments  •  Derivatives instruments that are used to alter the payment characteristics of the cash flows; and 
•  Financial information of significant counterparties. 
Reports  Item 
1118 
Reports and additional information  •  Description of the reports provided to security holders under the transaction documents; and 
•  Reports to be filed with the SEC. 
Tax  Item 
1116 
Tax matters  •  Tax issues relating to the purchase of the securities 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 6: Descriptions of Underwriting Standards of Subprime Originators  
 
 
Originator  Appearances Issuers 
New Century  64 15 
Countrywide 57 5 
Option One  44 12 
WMC 38 10 
Fremont 32 9 
Residential Funding Company  32 3 
First Franklin  29 2 
Wells Fargo  25 8 
BNC Mortgage Inc.  23 2 
Ameriquest 21 9 
Long Beach   16 1 
Ownit 16 6 
Decision One  15 4 
Lehman Bank  15 1 
NovaStar 13 4 
ResMAE 12 6 
Accredited Home Lenders  11 6 
Bear Stearns  11 1 
Equifirst 11 5 
First NLC  11 5 
Washington Mutual  11 1 
Aames Financial Corporation   10 5 
Argent Mortgage Company  10 4 
HSBC 10 3 
Merrill Lynch  10 1 
Deutsche Bank  9 1 
Encore 9 4 
Fieldstone 9 5 
Aegis Mortgage Corporation  7 5 
Indymac 7 1 
People's Choice  7 5 
JPM 6 1 
Saxon 6 1 
SouthStar 6 1 
Finance America  5 2 
Wilmington 5 3 
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Sample Description of Underwriting Standards  
(excerpt from prospectus supplement for CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 2007-7) 
 
General . All of the Statistical Calculation Pool Mortgage Loans in Loan Group 1, and approximately 88.73% of the 
Statistical Calculation Pool Mortgage Loans in Loan Group 2, were originated by Countrywide Home Loans in accordance with 
its underwriting standards for credit-blemished mortgage loans, which are set forth below under “— Credit-Blemished Mortgage 
Loans ”. Those Statistical Calculation Pool Mortgage Loans are identified in the “Loan Documentation Type” tables in Annex A 
to this prospectus supplement as either “Full Documentation” or “Stated Income”. The remaining Statistical Calculation Pool 
Mortgage Loans were originated by Countrywide Home Loans as described below under “ —Mortgage Loans other than Credit-
Blemished Mortgage Loans ”. 
 
Credit-Blemished Mortgage Loans .   The following is a description of the underwriting procedures customarily 
employed by Countrywide Home Loans with respect to credit-blemished mortgage loans. Countrywide Home Loans has been 
originating first lien credit-blemished mortgage loans since 1995 and second lien credit-blemished mortgage loans since 1997. 
Countrywide Home Loans produces its credit-blemished mortgage loans through its Consumer Markets, Full Spectrum Lending, 
Correspondent Lending and Wholesale Lending Divisions. Prior to the funding of any credit-blemished mortgage loan, 
Countrywide Home Loans underwrites the related mortgage loan in accordance with the underwriting standards established by 
Countrywide Home Loans. In general, the mortgage loans are underwritten centrally by a specialized group of underwriters who 
are familiar with the unique characteristics of credit-blemished mortgage loans. In general, Countrywide Home Loans does not 
purchase any credit-blemished mortgage loan that it has not itself underwritten. 
Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards are primarily intended to evaluate the value and adequacy of the mortgaged 
property as collateral for the proposed mortgage loan and the borrower’s credit standing and repayment ability. On a case by case 
basis, Countrywide Home Loans may determine that, based upon compensating factors, a prospective borrower not strictly 
qualifying under the underwriting risk category guidelines described below warrants an underwriting exception. Compensating 
factors may include low loan-to-value ratio or combined loan-to-value ratio, as applicable, low debt-to-income ratio, stable 
employment, time in the same residence or other factors. It is expected that a significant number of the Mortgage Loans will have 
been originated based on these types of underwriting exceptions. 
  
Each prospective borrower completes an application for credit which includes information with respect to the applicant’s 
assets, liabilities, income and employment history, as well as certain other personal information. Countrywide Home Loans 
requires an independent credit bureau report on the credit history of each applicant in order to evaluate the applicant’s prior 
willingness and/or ability to repay. The report typically contains information relating to credit history with local and national 
merchants and lenders, installment debt payments and any record of defaults, bankruptcy, repossession, suits or judgments, among 
other matters. 
  
After obtaining all applicable employment, credit and property information, Countrywide Home Loans uses a debt-to-
income ratio to assist in determining whether the prospective borrower has sufficient monthly income available to support the 
payments of principal and interest on the mortgage loan in addition to other monthly credit obligations. The “ debt-to-income 
ratio ” is the ratio of the borrower’s total monthly credit obligations to the borrower’s gross monthly income. The maximum 
monthly debt-to-income ratio varies depending upon a borrower’s credit grade and documentation level (as described below) but 
does not generally exceed 55%. Variations in the monthly debt-to-income ratios limit are permitted based on compensating factors. 
  
Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards are applied in accordance with applicable federal and state laws and 
regulations and require an independent appraisal of the mortgaged property prepared on a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report 
(Form 1004) or other appraisal form as applicable to the specific mortgaged property type. Each appraisal includes a market data 
analysis based on recent sales of comparable homes in the area and, where deemed appropriate, replacement cost analysis based 
on the current cost of constructing a similar home and generally is required to have been made not earlier than 180 days prior to 
the date of origination of the mortgage loan. Every independent appraisal is reviewed by a representative of Countrywide Home 
Loans before the loan is funded, and an additional review appraisal is generally performed in connection with appraisals not 
provided by Landsafe Appraisals, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Countrywide Home Loans. In most cases, properties that are 
not at least in average condition (including properties requiring major deferred maintenance) are not acceptable as collateral for a 
credit-blemished loan. The maximum loan amount varies depending upon a borrower’s credit grade, Credit Bureau Risk Score, 
and documentation level but does not generally exceed $1,000,000 for first lien credit-blemished mortgage loans, or $175,000 for 
second lien credit-blemished mortgage loans. Variations in maximum loan amount limits are permitted based on compensating 
factors. 
  
Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards permit first lien credit-blemished mortgage loans with loan-to-value 
ratios at origination of up to 100% and second lien credit-blemished mortgage loans with combined loan-to-value ratios at 
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origination of up to 100% depending on the program, type and use of the property, documentation level, creditworthiness of the 
borrower, debt-to-income ratio and loan amount. 
  
Countrywide Home Loans requires title insurance on all credit-blemished mortgage loans. Countrywide Home Loans 
also requires that fire and extended coverage casualty insurance be maintained on the mortgaged property in an amount at least 
equal to the principal balance or the replacement cost of the mortgaged property, whichever is less. 
  
Countrywide Home Loans’ credit-blemished mortgage loan underwriting standards are more flexible than the standards 
generally acceptable to Countrywide Home Loans for its non-credit-blemished mortgage loans with regard to the borrower’s 
credit standing and repayment ability. While more flexible, Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting guidelines still place primary 
reliance on a borrower’s ability to repay; however Countrywide Home Loans may require lower loan-to-value ratios or combined 
loan-to-value ratios, as applicable, than for loans underwritten to more traditional standards. Borrowers who qualify generally 
have payment histories and debt-to-income ratios which would not satisfy more traditional underwriting guidelines and may have 
a record of major derogatory credit items such as outstanding judgments or prior bankruptcies. Countrywide Home Loans’ credit-
blemished mortgage loan underwriting guidelines establish the maximum permitted loan-to-value ratio or combined loan-to-value 
ratio, as applicable, for each loan type based upon these and other risk factors with more risk factors resulting in lower ratios. 
Countrywide Home Loans underwrites or originates credit blemished mortgage loans pursuant to alternative sets of 
underwriting criteria under its Full Documentation Loan Program (the “ Full Doc Program ”) and Stated Income Loan Program 
(the “ Stated Income Program ”). Under each of the underwriting programs, Countrywide Home Loans verifies the loan 
applicant’s sources and amounts of income (except under the Stated Income Program where the amount of income is not verified), 
calculates the amount of income from all sources indicated on the loan application, reviews the credit history of the applicant, 
calculates the debt-to-income ratio to determine the applicant’s ability to repay the loan, and reviews the appraisal of the 
mortgaged property for compliance with Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards. 
  
Under the Stated Income Program, the borrower’s employment and income sources and amounts must be stated on the 
borrower’s application for credit. The borrower’s income as stated must be reasonable for the related occupation and the 
determination as to reasonableness is subject to the loan underwriter’s discretion. However, the borrower’s income as stated on the 
application is not independently verified. With respect to first lien credit-blemished mortgage loans, maximum loan-to-value 
ratios are generally lower than those permitted under the Full Doc Program. Except as otherwise stated above, the same mortgage 
credit, consumer credit and collateral related underwriting guidelines apply. 
  
Under the Full Doc and Stated Income Programs, various risk categories are used to grade the likelihood that the 
borrower will satisfy the repayment conditions of the mortgage loan. These risk categories establish the maximum permitted loan-
to-value ratio or combined loan-to-value ratio, as applicable, debt-to-income ratio and loan amount, given the borrower’s credit 
history, the occupancy status of the mortgaged property and the type of mortgaged property. In general, more (or more recent) 
derogatory credit items such as delinquent mortgage payments or prior bankruptcies result in a loan being assigned to a higher 
credit risk category. 
  
Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting guidelines for credit blemished mortgage loans utilize credit grade categories to 
grade the likelihood that the borrower will satisfy the repayment conditions of the mortgage loans. In general, a credit grade 
category is assigned by evaluating a borrower’s mortgage history, time since bankruptcy, and time since foreclosure or notice of 
default. In the case of borrowers with less than twelve months’ mortgage history, credit grade category is assigned by evaluating, 
time since bankruptcy, and time since foreclosure or notice of default. The credit grade categories establish guidelines for 
determining maximum allowable loan-to-value ratios or combined loan-to-value ratios, as applicable, and loan amounts given the 
borrower’s Credit Bureau Risk Score, and maximum allowable debt-to-income ratios for a given mortgage loan. A summary of 
the credit grade categories is set forth below. 
  
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “A” 
Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 100% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $1,000,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of— 
500 for loan amounts up to $700,000, 
560 for loan amounts of $700,001 to $750,000, 
580 for loan amounts of $750,001 to $850,000, or 
600 for loan amounts of $850,001 to $1,000,000. 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 non-consecutive delinquency of 30 days during the past 12 months. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 2 years since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 3 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
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Second Lien Credit Grade Category: “A” 
Combined Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 100% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $175,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of— 
560 for loan amounts up to $100,000, 
580 for loan amounts of $100,001 to $125,000, 
600 for loan amounts of $125,001to $137,500,  
620 for loan amounts of $137,501 to $162,500, and 
640 for loan amounts of $162,501 to $175,000. 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 non-consecutive delinquency of 30 days during the past 12 months. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 2 years since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 3 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “A-” 
Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 90% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $850,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of— 
500 for loan amounts up to $650,000, 
580 for loan amounts of $650,001 to $750,000, or 
620 for loan amounts of $750,001 to $850,000. 
Mortgage History : No more than 2 non-consecutive delinquencies of 30 days during the past 12 months. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 2 years since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 3 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
Second Lien Credit Grade Category: “A-” 
Combined Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 85% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $100,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of 560 
Mortgage History : No more than 2 non-consecutive delinquencies of 30 days during the past 12 months. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 2 years since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 3 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “B” 
Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 85% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $650,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of— 
500 for loan amounts up to $600,000, 
580 for loan amounts of $600,001 to $650,000. 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 delinquency of 60 days in the past 12 months. Delinquencies of 30 days are 
not restricted. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 1 year since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy, or open 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy must be paid-off through escrow at funding. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 2 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
Second Lien Credit Grade Category: “B” 
Combined Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 80% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $100,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of 560 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 delinquency of 60 days in the past 12 months. Delinquencies of 30 days are 
not restricted. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 1 year since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 2 years since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “C” 
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Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 80% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55%   
Loan Amount : Maximum of $600,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of— 
500 for loan amounts up to $550,000, or 
580 for loan amounts of $550,001 to $600,000. 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 delinquency of 90 days during the past 12 months. Delinquencies of 30 days 
and 60 days are not restricted. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 1 year since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy, or open 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy must be paid-off through escrow at funding. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 1 year since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
Second Lien Credit Grade Category: “C” 
Combined Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 70% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $100,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of 560 
Mortgage History : No more than 1 delinquency of 90 days during the past 12 months. Delinquencies of 30 days 
and 60 days are not restricted. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or 1 year since dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : At least 1 year since foreclosure/notice of default released. 
 
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “C-” 
Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 70% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 55% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $500,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of 500 
Mortgage History : No more than 2 delinquencies of 90 days during the past 12 months. Delinquencies of 30 
days and 60 days are not restricted. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy, or open Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy must be paid-off through escrow at funding. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : None at time of funding. 
 
First Lien Credit Grade Category: “D” 
Loan-To-Value Ratio : Maximum of 65% 
Debt-To-Income Ratio : Maximum of 45% 
Loan Amount : Maximum of $250,000 
Credit Bureau Risk Score : Minimum of 500 
Mortgage History : Open Notice of default must be cured at time of funding. 
Bankruptcy : At least 1 day since discharge or dismissal of Chapter 7 or 13 Bankruptcy, or open Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy must be paid-off through escrow at funding. 
Foreclosure/Notice of Default : Notice of default is acceptable but must be cured at time of funding. 
 
The loan-to-value ratios or combined loan-to-value ratios, as applicable, debt-to-income ratios, and loan amounts stated 
above are maximum levels for a given credit grade category. There are additional restrictions on loan-to-value ratios or combined 
loan-to-value ratios, as applicable, debt-to-income ratios, and loan amounts depending on, but not limited to, the occupancy status 
of the mortgaged property, the type of mortgaged property, and the documentation program. 
  
The “ Credit Bureau Risk Score ” is a statistical credit score obtained by Countrywide Home Loans in connection with 
the loan application to help assess a borrower’s creditworthiness. Credit Bureau Risk Scores are generated by models developed 
by a third party and are made available to mortgage lenders through three national credit bureaus. The models were derived by 
analyzing data on consumers in order to establish patterns which are believed to be indicative of the borrower’s probability of 
default. The Credit Bureau Risk Scores are based on a borrower’s historical credit data, including, among other things, payment 
history, delinquencies on accounts, levels of outstanding indebtedness, length of client history, types of credit, and bankruptcy 
experience. Credit Bureau Risk 
  
Scores range from approximately 250 to approximately 900, with higher scores indicating an individual with a more favorable 
credit history compared to an individual with a lower score. However, a Credit Bureau Risk Score purports only to be a 
measurement of the relative degree of risk a borrower represents to a lender, i.e., that a borrower with a higher score is statistically 
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expected to be less likely to default in payment than a borrower with a lower score. In addition, it should be noted that Credit 
Bureau Risk Scores were developed to indicate a level of default probability over a two-year period which does not correspond to 
the life of a mortgage loan. Furthermore, Credit Bureau Risk Scores were not developed specifically for use in connection with 
mortgage loans, but for consumer loans in general. Therefore, a Credit Bureau Risk Score does not take into consideration the 
effect of mortgage loan characteristics on the probability of repayment by the borrower. The Credit Bureau Risk Scores set forth 
in Annex A hereto were obtained either at the time of origination of the Mortgage Loan or more recently. The Credit Bureau Risk 
Score is used as an aid to, not a substitute for, the underwriter’s judgment. 
  
In determining a Credit Bureau Risk Score for a particular borrower, Countrywide Home Loans attempts to obtain Credit 
Bureau Risk Scores from each of the three national credit bureaus that produce these scores. Although different scores may be 
available from each of the three national credit bureaus for a particular borrower, Countrywide Home Loans will use only one 
score in its determination of whether to underwrite a mortgage loan, based on the following methodology: if scores are available 
from each of the three national credit bureaus, Countrywide Home Loans will disregard the highest and lowest scores, and use the 
remaining score; and if scores are available from only two of the three national credit bureaus, Countrywide Home Loans will use 
the lower of the two scores. In the case of a mortgage loan with more than one applicant, Countrywide Home Loans will use the 
Credit Bureau Risk Score of the applicant contributing the highest percentage of the total qualifying income. 
  
If only one score is available, or no score is available, Countrywide Home Loans will follow its limited credit guidelines. 
Under the limited credit guidelines, credit histories may be developed using rent verification from current and/or previous 
landlords, proof of payment to utilities such as telephone, or verification from other sources of credit or services for which the 
applicant has (or had) a regular financial obligation. In general, applications with the aforementioned type of credit documentation 
are limited to A- risk and 80% loan-to-value ratio or combined loan-to-value ratio, as applicable. For applicants with established 
mortgage payment history of at least 12 months and one credit score or no credit score, the mortgage payment history may be used 
in lieu of a credit score to determine a risk grade. 
  
Mortgage Loans other than Credit-Blemished Mortgage Loans . The Statistical Calculation Pool Mortgage Loans in 
Loan Group 2 that were not originated in accordance with its underwriting standards for credit-blemished mortgage loans were 
originated generally in accordance with the procedures set forth in the prospectus under “ Loan Program—Underwriting 
Standards ”, subject to the exceptions noted below. Those Statistical Calculation Pool Mortgage Loans are identified in the “Loan 
Documentation Type” tables in Annex A to this prospectus supplement as either “Full/Alternative”, “Reduced”, “Preferred”, 
“Streamlined”, “Stated Income/Stated Asset”, “No Ratio” or “No Income/No Asset”. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “Full/Alternative”, the related 
underwriting guidelines generally permit a borrower to provide W-2 forms instead of tax returns covering the most recent two 
years, permit bank statements in lieu of verification of deposits and permit alternative methods of employment verification. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “Reduced”, under the related 
underwriting guidelines, some underwriting documentation concerning income, employment and asset verification is waived. 
Countrywide Home Loans obtained from a prospective borrower either a verification of deposit or bank statements for the two-
month period immediately before the date of the mortgage loan application or verbal verification of employment. Since 
information relating to a prospective borrower’s income and employment is not verified, the borrower’s debt-to-income ratios are 
calculated based on the information provided by the borrower in the mortgage loan application. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “Preferred”, those Mortgage Loans 
were originated under Countrywide Home Loans’ Preferred Processing Program. Countrywide Home Loans’ Preferred Processing 
Program is generally available to borrowers possessing higher Credit Bureau Risk Scores, which indicate a more favorable credit 
history, and who give Countrywide Home Loans the right to obtain the tax returns they filed for the preceding two years. 
Countrywide Home Loans may waive some documentation requirements for Mortgage Loans originated under the Preferred 
Processing Program. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “Streamlined”, those Mortgage Loans 
were originated under Countrywide Home Loans’ Streamlined Documentation Program. Countrywide Home Loans’ Streamlined 
Documentation Program is generally available for borrowers who are refinancing an existing mortgage loan that was originated or 
acquired by Countrywide Home Loans provided that, among other things, the mortgage loan has not been more than 30 days 
delinquent in payment during the previous twelve-month period. Under the Streamlined Documentation Program, appraisals are 
obtained only if the loan amount of the loan being refinanced had a Loan-to-Value Ratio at the time of origination in excess of 
80% or if the loan amount of the new loan being originated is greater than $650,000. In addition, under the Streamlined 
Documentation Program, a credit report is obtained but only a limited credit review is conducted, no income or asset verification 
is required, and telephonic verification of employment is permitted. The maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio under the Streamlined 
Documentation Program ranges up to 95%. 
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In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “Stated Income/Stated Asset”, the 
related mortgage loan applications were generally reviewed to determine that the stated income was reasonable for the borrower’s 
employment and that the stated assets were consistent with the borrower’s income. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “No Ratio”, the borrower is not 
required to disclose his or her income although the nature of employment is disclosed and assets are verified. Countrywide Home 
Loans generally conducted a verbal verification of employment of the borrower prior to origination. 
  
In the case of Mortgage Loans identified in “Loan Documentation Type” tables as “No Income/No Asset”, under the 
related underwriting guidelines, no documentation relating to a prospective borrower’s income, employment or assets is required 
and therefore debt-to-income ratios are not calculated or included in the underwriting analysis, or if the documentation or 
calculations are included in a mortgage loan file, they are not taken into account for purposes of the underwriting analysis. 
  
Mortgage Loans not originated in accordance with Countrywide Home Loans’ underwriting standards for credit-
blemished mortgage loans are assigned credit grade categories as described under “ —Credit-Blemished Mortgage Loans ” above, 
and Credit Bureau Risk Scores for those Mortgage Loans are generally obtained as described under “ —Credit-Blemished 
Mortgage Loans ”. 
 
 
 